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FOREWORD 
Since the beginnings of Thailand's modernization in the last half 
of the nineteenth century, the kingdom's leaders have evinced a painful 
concern with the question of its political development. As early as 
the 1880's, King Chulalongkorn had to face both the ultimate nec-essity
of political democratization and the risks such a devolution of royal 
authority posed to the kingdom's stability; and he.prophetically fore­
saw the rise of the military to a commanding position in the life of 
the state. The remarkable collection of documents in.this volume re­
flects the final stages of the debate concerning democratization in the 
reign of King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), in which the king himself took a 
leading role. The general question then posed was whether, and to what 
extent, democratic institutions were appropriate to the conditions of 
Siam. The documents in this volume, now four decades old, still speak 
to that issue in a debate that has become more urgent and insistent 
since the events of October, 1973. One of these documents, that an­
nouncing King Prajadhipok's abdication in 1935, recently has been re­
vived to wide public currency as a critique o.f military rule, while 
most of the others in this collection have never before been published.
Their publication now in English provides a valuable historical per­
spective on Thai political development in the twentieth century. At 
the same time, they point to the importance of a period and a monarch 
little studied to date. 
Benjamin A. Batson, a doctoral candidate in Southeast Asian History 
at Cornell University, spent eighteen months in 1972-1973 conducting
research in Thailand on the last years of the absolute monarchy and the 
early years of constitutional government. I am confident that his con­
siderable efforts in making these documents available to a wider audi­
ence will earn him the gratitude of all those with a serious interest 
in, and concern for, "Siam's Political Future." 





The documents in this collection come from the National Archives 
(Bangkok) and books, journals, and newspapers of the period. Documents 
I, II, V, VII, and VIII have not previously been published. Document 
III has been published several times in Thai, and was published once in 
English translation during the Seventh Reign. Ddcuments IV and VI were 
published in English during the Seventh Reign but have not been ·repub­
lished since, while the final document, IX, has been republished sev� 
eral times in both Thai and English. 
Documents I, II, IV, and VII -were written in Engl_ish, while docu­
ments III, V, VIII, and IX have been translated from Thai by the editor. 
The translation of document VI has been taken from the Bangkok Times. 
In addition to the nine documents, use has b�en made in the intro­
ductions and notes of other materials from the National Archives (Bang­
kok), National Library (Bangkok), Damrong Library (Bangkok), British 
and American diplomatic archives, the Francis B. Sayre Papers in the 
Library of Congress (Washington), and various books, journals, and 
newspapers. 
Thai titles and the names of Thai persons and places have been 
left in commonly accepted romanizations, without attempting a syste­
matic transliteration. Other Thai words have been transliterated in 
accordance with the modified Cornell system. 
Until 1941 the Thai year began April 1. Thai calendar years have 
been indicated by the use of a slash; thus 1931/32 is the year begin­
ning April 1, 1931, and ending March 31, 1932. 
The two units of Thai currency used in the documents are the 
'baht' and the 'tical,' both having the same value which in the last 
years of the absolute monarchy was equivalent to approximately US$0.45. 
The five titles of awarded nobility under the absolute monarchy 
were, in ascending order, Khun, Luang, Phra, Phya, and Chao Phya. 
Since the June 1932 coup these titles have not been conferred. 
In 1939 'Siam' became 'Thailand,' and except for a brief period 
shortly after the Second World War has remained 'Thailand' ever since. 
In this account, however, the name used in the days of the absolute 
monarchy has been retained. • 
The editor would like to express appreciation to the staffs of the 
National Research Council, the National Archives, the National Library,
and the Center of Thai Studies at Thammasat University, all in Bangkok, 
for help and cooperation extended during the research which made this 
volume possible. A great many individuals have also made important 
contributions--two who should be particularly recognized are David B. 
Johnston, through whom the editor first came into contact with several 
of the documents and ideas presented here, and Chatchai Panananon, a 
Vl.1 
graduate student in history at the Prasanmitr College of Education, who 
helped in many ways, including checking some references after the edi­
tor had left Bangkok. 
Mention must also be made of Professors David K. Wyatt and O. W. 
Wolters of Cornell University. Professor Wyatt has suggested a number 
of corrections and improvements and also has kindly written the Fore­
word; Professor Wolters, although not directly involved in this under­
taking, was nonetheless unknowingly (and perhaps unwillingly) a source 
of the original idea for this volume through his enthusiastic dedica­
tion to what he has called "the present duty of historians of South 
East Asia, which is the ploughing of new fields of study by making 
available hitherto unpublished sources.r" 
The editor's research in Bangkok in 1972-1973 was made possible by 
a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, while financial sup­
port at Cornell in 1973-1974, as well as funds for a research trip to 
Washington, were provided by the Southeast Asia Program of Cornell 
University. 
None of the above, however, should in any way be considered re­
sponsible for errors or for the opinions expressed, which are solely
those of the editor. Many of the issues raised are complex and have 
been little studied, and hence are subject to more than one plausible
interpretation. The editor claims only to have tried, in so far as 
possible, to make the factual aspects of the account as accurate as· 
the available documentation permits. 
Benjamin A. Batson 
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THE SEVENTH REIGN 
The Seventh Reign (1925-1935) has been the shortest reign of the 
Bangkok period and, at least for the years prior to the end of the abso­
lute monaichy in 1932, one of the least studied. What writing there 
has been on the period has for the most part come from one or another 
of the factions involved in the 1932 eoup. While these factions have 
been in disagreement among themselves on many issues, one position they 
have all shared is a critical view of the last years of the absolute 
monarchy. Even the more conservative royalists have to a degree joined 
in this criticism, seeing the period as the time when the ineptness of 
the king and his advisers caused the royal family to lose the exalted 
position it had held for generations. There has been relatively little 
study of the events and problems of the period as they appeared to vari­
ous groups in Thai society at the time, -rather- than as viewed through
the distorting filter of the events of June 1932, and even the basic 
historical documentation has been little explored, despite the fatt 
that the extensive Seventh Reign archives and a number of other sources 
are now available. The result is that th� conventional view of the 
last years of the absolute monarchy has been a largely negative and in 
part mislead�ng one. 
Even King Prajadhipok, the last absolute monarch, the .'Lord of 
Life,' remains a rather shadowy figure in history. No one had ever 
expected Prajadhipok to become king. He was the seventy-sixth child of 
King Chulalongkorn, and the thirty-second and last son. His mother was 
a queen, and hence he was a ehao fa, the highest princely rank, but 
when he was born in 1893 the succession was not even in his line of the 
family. Even when the death of the crown prince in 1895 led to his 
eldest full brother, Vajiravudh, being made heir, Prajadhipok, the 
youngest of his mother's nine children (of whom five, all male, sur­
vived childhood), still ranked behind his four elder brothers as well 
as the male children they could be expected to father. 
In 1910 Vajiravudh succeeded his father as king, and Prajadhipok 
continued to rank well down on the probable succession list. Then be­
tween 1920 and 1925 a series of deaths in the royal family brought 
Prajadhipok closer to the throne. In 1920 Prince Chakrabongse, the 
second brother and heir presumptive, died; in 1923 Prince Chutadhuj,
the fourth brother, died; and early in 1925 Prince Asdang, the only
brother remaining between Vajiravudh and Prajadhipok, also died. It 
was only with the death of Asdang that P_rajadhipok became even a likely
candidate for the throne. Nevertheless, the succession question re­
mained unclear. Chutadhuj had left a young son, Prince Varanand (Prince
Chula Chakrabongse, the son of Prince Chakrabongse, was ineligible be­
cause his mother was foreign), while there was also some support for 
Prince Boriphat, a ahao fa half-brother of Prajadhipok who was both 
considerably older and much more experienced in government. However 
Varanand was very young and his mother not royal, while Boriphat was 
not on_ good terms with Vajiravudh,1 who had the right to name his 




successor, and thus it was widely thought that should Vajiravudh remain 
childless Prajadhipok would be the probable heir, a belief that was 
reinforced when after the death of Asdang the king appointed Prajadhi­
pok to act as his representative whenever he was ill or away from the 
capital. However, uncertainty again surrounded the succession question
when it was announced in mid-1925 that one of Vajiravudh's wives was ex­
pecting a child. In the last days before the anticipated birth Vaj iravudh 
became seriously ill, and it was doubtful whether the king would live 
long enough to see his only child. The baby, born November 24, was a 
girl and hence ineligible to succeed to the throne; Vajiravudh died on 
November 26, leaving behind a letter which, as expected, passed over 
the possible claims of Varanand and Boriphat and named Prajadhipok as 
his heir.2 
Thus when Prajadhipok became absolute ruler of Siam in November of 
1925 he had been a likely heir less than a year and a fairly certain 
heir for only two days. He had just passed his thirty-second birthday, 
and the greater part of his training and career had been in the mili­
tary. He had spent a considerable part of his life studying in Europe,
first in England and then in France, and had returned to Siam from the 
Ecole de Guerre only in 1924. Only since the death of Asdang had he 
played any important role in the government. Not only had Prajadhipok 
never expected to be king, he appears not to have particularly wanted 
to be king, and, citing his youth and lack of experience, when Vajira­
vudh died he offered to step aside in favor of Boriphat or another 
senior member of the royal family (see I). 
This then, to use Prajadhipok's own words (see I), was the "dark 
horse" who in November of 1925 succeeded to the only major absolute 
monarchy remaining in the world. What he received was described by
Prince D amrong as a "deplorable inheritance" (see I). There was a 
widespread feeling in the government that for all his acknowledged 
abilities, Vajiravudh had not been a success as king.3 As described 
in Bangkok reported that, according to Sir Edward Cook, the Financial Adviser, 
most of the Thai elite had not been anxious for Boriphat to become king--the 
older generation because they feared he would be too strong and overbearing, and 
the younger, foreign-educated generation because they wanted an end to absolute 
rule. These, according to Cook, had welcomed the Sixth Reign as discrediting thea_
monarchy, but they feared that Boriphat would be a strong, able, and successful 
king and "would have given a new lease of life to autocratic rule in Siam. " 
Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 6257/183/40 (November 26, 1925), Greg 
to Chamberlain. 
The letter, written before the daughter was born, named Prajadhipok to head a 
council of regency if the child were male. Prince Dhani, "Life of King Prajadhi-.," 
pok" (in Thai, 1949), in Chumnwn Niphon ( �lJl.4lJUV.U1i; Collected Works), Bangkok, 
1964, p. 9. 
3. In December of 1925 Prince Boriphat, in discussing possible reign names for the 
new king, reportedly told the British Minister "not Rama anyhow--we have done 
with Ramas" (Vajiravudh had styled himself 'Rama VI,' and, posthumously, his 
predecessors in the dynasty 'Rama I' through 'Rama V'; Prajadhipok did not use 
'Rama VII'), and added "it must never happen again," which the British Minister 
considered an obvious reference to the past reign. Great Britain, Foreign Office 
Records, F 260/78/40 (December 18, 1925), Greg to Chamberlain. 
British diplomats in general were highly critical of Vajiravudh, who they 
thought--as did many Thai--did not act as a king should. It should be noted that 
the British judged Vajiravudh mainly on his administrative and financial record, 
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in the documents in I, the end of the Sixth Reign found the administra­
tion in disorrder, the monarchy in disrepute, and the state finances 
deeply in the red.r4 Prajadhipok's response was in part what may be 
described as a 'returrn to Chulalongkorn'--the Fifth Reign now became 
the model to be emulated, and its policies and in some cases even -its 
personnel were brought back (see III). The commoner favorites ofr· 
Vajiravudh were removed from high office, and Prajadhipok, like his 
father, tended to rely much more on members of the royal family, whom 
Vajiravudh had to a degree ignored. Among those rehabilitated was 
Prince Damrong, a younger half-brother of Chulalongkorn who in the 
Fifth Reign had held high positions in the military and in education, 
and had then served for many years as Minister of the Interior, in 
which office he carried out a major reform of the whole internal admin­
istration of Siam. In 1915 he had been dismissed by Vajiravudh and had 
spent the remainder of the Sixth Reign outside the circle of royal
favor, which was to be a blessing for Thai historiography as r emoved 
from high office he turned his considerable talents and energies to 
cultural and scholarly purrsuits. At the beginning of the Seventh Reign
however he returned to the center of power as a member of the Supreme
Council of State, and down to June of 1932 he remained one of the most 
influential voices in the government. 
Another high member of the royal family, and an outspoken crritic 
of Vajiravudh, who had spent most of the Sixth Reign in r elatively 
minor positions was Prince Boriphat, who now became a member of the 
Supreme Council of State, and, successively, head of the two most power­
ful Ministries, War and Interior. 
The Seventh Reign, as noted above, began amid serious diffriculties. 
It then went through a period of apparent success, when the future of 
the reign and the monarchy looked bright, and was finally caught up in 
the even more serious difficulties which were to impel events toward 
the end of the absolute monarchy in June of 1932. The first and most 
important policy of the new king was one of strict economy in all 
spheres of government. A sweeping progrram of 'retrrenchment,' similar 
to the better known case of 1931-1932, was undertaken. The government 
bureaucracy·rwas cut back substantially, and ministry budgets reduced. 
King Prajadhipok himself set the example by ordering that the largest 
cuts be in royal expenses. So successful was the program of economy 
which were not his strengths, and were largely unable to appreciate his contribu­
tions to Thai literature, arts, and social and political thought. Of all the 
important figures of the early Seventh Reign the two least critical of Vajiravudh 
were the king, who apparently retained a genuine affection for his brother, and
Prince Bhanurangsi, the senior prince of the royal family, whose attitude may 
have been less influenced by personalities than by his belief that the monarchy
as an institution should be above criticism. 
4. Most foreigners, as well as many Thai, blamed the financial situation on exces­
sive royal expenditures and, to a lesser degree, excessive military spending. In
June of 1925 the new Financial Adviser, Sir Edward Cook, who was having difficulty 
even getting to see Vajiravudh, much less influence policy, submitted a memoran­
dum on Siam's financial position in which he pointed out that in the monarchies
of Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway royal expenditures ranged 
from a low of 0. 13% to a high of 0.33% of the total national budget, whereas for
Siam the figure was 10.7%. Even this figure he considered an tmderestimate, as a
ntDDber of items which should properly have been classified as royal expenses were
"tucked away" in the ordinary budget. National Archives, Papers of Prince 
Damrong, 37/35. 
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that by early 1928 the problem had become what to do with the large sur­
pluses piling up in the government account, and the king, the Supreme 
Council of State, and the Financial Adviser, Sir Edward Cook, were 
credited with financial genius. This situation, however, proved short­
lived, and as the effects of theo-world depression began to reach Siam 
from 1930 onward, the country slid into an economic crisis which was to 
undermine seriously the prestige of the absolute monarchy, and of the 
king and his advisers personally, and to be a major factor precipitating
the aoup of June 1932. 
While the economic situation stands out as perhaps the maJor con­
cern of the period 1925-1932, a number of other significant develop­
ments should be noted. Communism and the various Marxist and non­
Marxist independence movements throughout Southeast Asia were for the 
first time perceived as a serious problem for the government, and major 
communist figures like Ho Chi Minh and Tan Malaka, as well as shadowy 
agents like the mysterious Slater, reportedly used Siam as a base of 
operations, complicating Siam's relations with the European colonial 
powers (see V). The government also began for the first time to take 
effective steps to restrict Chinese immigration, a marked departure
from the policy of the Sixth Reign, in which the rhetoric, with the en­
couragement of Vajiravudh himself, had been much more anti-Chinese but 
in which virtually no measures restricting Chinese activities had been 
implemented (see I). In relations with the West, a series of new 
treaties were concluded with the Western powers which foreshadowed the 
eventual relinquishing of special Western rights in Siam. The greater 
part of the long and difficult negotiations for these treaties had been 
conducted in the Sixth Reign, a part of Vajiravudh's policy of assert­
ing full sovereignty in foreign relations, a field in which he was more 
successful than in domestic affairs. 
The technological modernization begun in Chulalongkorn's reign 
continued, largely under the direction of the dynamic prince Purachatra, 
with major emphasis on the construction of railways. Socially, Western 
culture continued to make inroads on tradition, while elite society was 
becoming increasingly more differentiated with the formation of various 
formal or informal associations representing business, professional, 
and other special interests. One such group which exercised an influ­
ence far out of proportion to its size was the group of students edu­
cated in the West, whether active participants or passive observers of 
the June 1932 aoup which toppled the absolute monarchy (see IV). 
-Political developments, with which the present collection of docu­
ments is primarily concerned, were dominated by the attempts of King 
Prajadhipok to devise institutional innovations which would put re­
straints on the monarchy and allow the people a voice in the government 
without, however, seriously upsetting the traditional political, social, 
and economic order. In this he ultimately failed, but nevertheless the 
efforts are of interest and significance. The turbulent post-1932 
political history of Siam and Thailand shows that many of the political 
issues which so troubled the last years of the absolute monarchy have 
remained unresolved. 
The king saw more clearly than any of his principal advisers the 
dangers inherent in the absolute monarchy and the necessity for change. 
Two tentative but significant steps to enlarge the circle of leadership 
were taken--the creation at the very beginning of the reign of the 
Supreme Council of State and the creation in 1927 of the Committee of 
the Privy Council, concerning which Documents I and II provide important 
s 
information. Equally important are the documents (I , I I ,  VIIr, VIrI I )  
describing various proposed political changes which were not effected, 
together with some of the reasons why they were not. I n  connection 
with these documents it should be noted that new developments and dif­
ferently perceived situations may be expected to lead to changes in 
opinions, and King Prajadhipok's rather pessimistic assessment of the 
utility of representative political institutions in Siam in documents 
I and I I  (1926, 1927) contrasts with his views, both stated and im­
plied, in documents VIrI and VIrI I  (1932). 
A related point which the king stressed in his introduction to 
Chulalongkorn's speech on administrative reform (IrI I )  and elsewhere was 
the importance of the timing of change, and particularly his belief 
that to achieve the proper timing necessary to successful change re­
quires not only good judgment and planning but an element of luck as 
well. Thus by early 1932 when the economic crisis was causing Praja­
dhipok to complain of "my bad luck" (VI ) one senses a certain fatalism 
and a feeling that men, even absolute monarchs, are no longer able to 
control events. This problem of the pace of political change, as well 
as its direction, was one widely discussed among the Thai elite through­
out the last years of the absolute monarchy, and especially in the 
Bangkok press in an unusual period of journalistic license in 1925-1927. 
On June 24, 1932, the People's Party, under the leadership of the 
civilian Pridi Phanomyong and the soldier Phya Phahon, overthrew the 
absolute monarchy and inaugurated the constitutional era in Siam.5 
After a relatively short period of good will and high ·expectations,
serious divisions appeared within the political leadership of the coun­
try. One of the most important of these divisions was between the king
and the faction that came to dominate the government, resulting finally 
in the end of the reign with Prajadhipok's abdication in March of 1935. 
The central figure of the documents and the above account of the 
reign is King Prajadhipok, not because of a special predilection toward 
monarchy but because so long as the absolute monarchy endured it is 
virtually impossible to discuss Thai political history without dealing
in some detail with the person who occupied the supreme political of­
fice. Prajadhipok's accession in 1925 was to be the last time that the 
accession of a new king led to immediate major changes in government 
policy. 
The king labored under a number of handicaps. Throughout the 
reign he was never in good health, and in the latter years he developed
serious eye problems which threatened him with blindness. Unlike his 
three immediate predecessors, Mongkut, Chulalongkorn, and Vajiravudh, 
he wrote very little for publication and thus forfeited this potentially 
s. A constitution was an alien concept in the Siam of 1932, and even less understood 
than such institutions as consultative assemblies, which in their Western form 
had a history going back to the Fifth Reign, and in more traditional form a his­
tory as old as the Thai political entity. King Prajadhipok wrote to his nephew
Chula Chakrabongse shortly after the promulgation of the permanent Constitution
in December 1932, " • . .  the actual fact is that this movement for a constitution 
is not as popular in Siam as one might expect." Prince Chula Chakrabongse, LoPds 
of Life: A HistoPy of the Kings of Thailand (London, 2nd edition, 1967), p. 316.
Earlier in 1932 the People's Party had sent teams of speakers into the coun­
tryside to explain and generate support for the Constitution. 
I 
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powerful instrument for influencing public opinion. Furthermore, by
the early twentieth century the increasing complexity of government had 
made it practically impossible for one man to fulfill all the functions 
of the absolute monarchy. There was little delegated authority, and 
even the most minor decisions had to be personally approved by the king,
resulting in a voluminous paperwork. I n  addition to the substantive 
work of government, the king was also responsible for the affairs of a 
very extensive royal family as well as for the major secular and reli­
gious ceremonies of the country. This became a particularly great bur­
den as the April 1932 celebrations marking the 150th anniversary of the 
dynasty approached. As absolute monarch, the king was held personally
accountable for all adverse developments affecting the national wel­
fare, even, as Prajadhipok once noted with resignation, the weather, 
while receiving little or no credit for successes.6 By his own admis­
sion, Prajadhipok was particularly inexperienced in financial affairs 
(see I, VI ) which by an irony of fate would come to be the central 
issue of the reign. As Prajadhipok himself reportedly said during the 
1931-1932 economic crisis, "I'm only a soldier, how can I understand 
such things as the Gold Standard?"r7 
Finally, Prajadhipok had certain personal qualities which added to 
the difficulties of his position. Modest, if not shy, he had an unusu­
al willingness to admit mistakes and to be critical of himself.r8 But 
what may be virtues in ordinary men may not necessarily be so in an 
absolute ruler, for the perpetuation of the absolute monarchy depended 
in part on the maintenance of the illusion of infallibility, or at 
least an uncommon order of perfection, in the Lords of Life. Prajadhi­
pok's striking honesty and candor in public as well as private could 
only encourage those who considered themselves better qualified to 
govern. 
If Prajadhipok had several handicaps in fulfilling the demanding 
duties of his office, he also had a number of assets, perhaps the most 
important of which were his extreme conscientiousness and diligence and 
his devotion to the welfare of Siam and the Thai people. He was not, 
as some believed, a royal nonentity controlled by reactionary relatives, 
but was capable on occasion of overruling the opinions of such powerful
advisers as Prince Boriphat (see II), and he could accuse his own 
bureaucracy of "Administrative tyranny" and "criminal neglect of an 
obvious duty.119 Although he had no background or detailed knowledge of 
6. National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 7/2. This passage is quoted 
in Chai-anan Samuthwanich, et al., editors, Sat Kan Muang (�fi1n11L"��), Bangkok, 
1971, p. 11. 
7. Prince Chula Chakrabongse, Lords of Life, p. 307. 
8. See document VI, and also the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry of 
Finance, 15.a1/1, in which Prajadhipok blames himself for not having programs pre­
pared to make productive use of the anticipated 1928/29 budget surplus. (This
latter is quoted in Sat Kan Muang, p. 9. ) The royal secretary, however, in in­
corporating Prajadhipok's memorandum into a letter left out this passage. 
9. National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 1/69, and National Archives, 
Seventh Reign, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, 8. 1/1. The first refer­
ence is a 1929 draft letter to all ministries criticizing the common practice
according to which officials who had shown themselves to be incompetent or cor­
rupt were merely transferred to a new post rather than being punished; the second 
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agriculture, he realized intuitively, and to a greater degree than any
other high official of the government--including those working directly
in agriculture--the extent to which every aspect of Thai life must 
ultimately depend upon conditions in the countryside. Thus the ·king 
gave personal attention and support to the pioneering efforts of Prince 
Sithiporn (see II) to modernize Thai agriculture,r10 to a variety of 
government programs in agriculture, and to such projects as the 1931 
survey of rural economic conditions and a special 1932 study of condi­
tions in the Northeast. His views on questions of race, nationalism, 
and religion were markedly moderate and tolerant (see IX). This very
moderation was a factor in his postponing, until events took the ques­
tion out of his hands, political changes which he himself had repeat­
edly advocated. It has been said of Chang Chien, 'the Confucian indus­
trialist,' a leading figure of the last years of the imperial dynasty 
and the first years of· the republic�n era in China, that his misfortune 
was to be "a moderate man in an immoderate time.r" Prajadhipok was also 
a moderate man in an immoderate time;r11 whether anyone in his office 
could have succeeded in achieving the kind of peaceful, gradual, and 
limited political change Prajadhipok desired is open to question, but 
the various proposed political changes of the last years of the abso­
lute monarchy, whether implemented or considered and rejected, consti­
tute an important and undeservedly neglected stage in the history_ of 
modern Thai political development. 
The nine documents or sets of documents in this volumer-cover the 
years 1926 to 1935, and are arranged chronologically. The first group
of documents, a set of three memoranda exchanged by the king and two 
advisers in 1926, covers a wide range of topics but most particularly
the dangers inherent in the absolute monarchy and-the possibility of 
political changes looking toward a more representative form of govern­
ment. Document II, "Democracy in Siam," is a memorandum by the king 
occasioned by the debate over the establishment of the Committee of the 
reference is to margin notes Prajadhipok made on a 1930 Ministry of Agriculture 
memorandum on the condition of the rice industry, recommending various measures
which the king believed should have been initiated long before. In both cases 
the phrases quoted are in English in an otherwise Thai text. 
10. The king even proposed making Prince Sithiporn Minister of Agriculture, but was
dissuaded in this by the Supreme Council of State (National Archives, Seventh
Reign, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, 2/13). Prince Sithiporn did 
become an adviser to the government in 1931, and in 1932 Director�General of 
the Department of Agricultural Research. 
11. Chang Chien, like Prajadhipok, had ability, industry, and dedication, and left
behind some significant accomplishments, but nevertheless came to be regarded 
by himself and many of his contemporaries as something of a failure. 
Another figure who invites comparison with Prajadhipok is the American 
President Herbert Hoover. Both Hoover and Prajadhipok were conscientious and 
hard-working and, in the first years of their rule, successful and popular; both
however encountered severe economic difficulties which contributed to their fall
from power in the same year of 1932; both blamed their problems on international 
economic forces beyond their control (an argument that was more valid in the 
case of Siam than of the United States; it should also be noted that, unlike 
Prajadhipok, Hoover had had broad experience in economic affairs); and in recent 
years both have been the subjects of a re-examination and re-evaluation by his­
torians. 
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Privy Council in 1927, while I II, also written by the king in 1927, 
discusses the reforms of Chulalongkorn and the question of the proper
timing of change. Documents IV (1928) and V (1930) are the only two 
documents of the collection originating outside the government; the 
first is an essay by a Thai student in England on what the policy of 
Siam should be toward the challenge of Western civilization, and the 
second a Marxist analysis of the Thai economic and political structure. 
The next three documents are all from early 1932, the last months of 
the absolute monarchy--VI is King Prajadhipok's famous February address 
on the economic crisis; VII is the plan for the establishment of a con­
stitution and a measure of representative government which, on the 
king's orders, was secretly prepared in March; and VIrI I  is a letter of 
the king, written shortly before the coup, discussing possible politi­
cal alternatives for Siam. The final document is Prajadhipok's 1935 
abdication statement and thus does not, strictly speaking, belong to 
the period of the absolute monarchy. It has been included because both 
chronologically and in substance it marks the end of the era; because 
it provides a succinct summary of the king's version of his dispute
with the government and his political hopes for Siam; because in recent 
years it has become something of a political manifesto for advocates of 
democracy in Thailand, frequently cited or quoted; and because most 
existing translations are incomplete and/or in some degree inaccurate. 
In addition to the nine major documents, other materials from 
Thai, British, and American archives and from books, journals, and 
newspapers have been used in the various introductions and n�tes. 
I .  THE PROBLEMS OF SIAM 
Introduction 
The following set of three memoranda resulted from the visit to 
Siam in the summer of 1926 of Francis B. Sayre. Sayre had been one of 
a series of professors of Harvard Law School to serve as Adviser in 
Foreign Affairs to the government of Si�m. He had been appointed in 
1924, originally for a period of one year, and then had spent another 
year in the service of Siam in Europe, negotiating new treaties between 
Siam and the Western powers which stipulated the gradual abolition of 
the various special rights and privileges which the West had enjoyed in 
Siam since the mid-nineteenth century. I Treaty revision and the elimi­
nation of extraterritoriality and other judicial, political, and eco­
nomic restrictions on Thai autonomy had long been one of the most cher­
ished goals of the Thai government, and Sayre's success in this diffi­
cult undertaking gave him immense prestige in Siam. At the time of his 
visit to Bangkok in 1926, the British Minister reported unhappily of 
"the singular influence over the Siamese Government acquired by Dr. 
Francis B. Sayre,r" whom he conceded had done much good for.Siam, and, 
he thought, some harm as well.2 Among other honors, Sayre received 
from the government of Siam the Thai title of nobility 'Phya Kalyan 
Maitri'3 and it is with this title that he signed his memorandum, and 
1. Sayre's own account of the problems encountered in revising Siam's treaties with 
the West, and how they were overcome, is given in his autobiography Glad Adven­
ture (New York, 1957; Thai translation, Bangkok, 1972), Chapters 7 and 8, and in
the two articles cited in note 5 of the notes on the three memoranda. The first 
Western government leader to agree to give up his country's special privileges in 
Siam had been Woodrow Wilson, who was Sayre's father-in-law .a. 
2. Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 3572/78/40 (July 29, 1926), Waterlow to
Chamberlain. British diplomats generally took a dim view of American advisers 
and missionaries in Siam, whom they regarded as well-meaning but misguided med­
dlers. Waterlow wrote that "The Siamese adore Americans," including some "who
one would think had nothing in particular to recommend them.a" This he attributed 
to the United States being "a perpetual fountain of gifts"--schools, money, 
'uplift,' etc., and also to the American character with its hail-fellow-well-met 
bonhomie. As Waterlow saw the American, "His stock of moral platitudes is suc-
cessful for the same reason that Ford cars are successful; it is standardized 
and it is the same for all men regardless of colour and size.a" 
Earlier another British Minister in Bangkok had complained of Sayre and his
predecessors being "idealistically-minded theorists without any practical exper­
ience of Siamese· administration outside Bangkok, and always ready, whether from
interest or conviction, to take the Siamese at their own valuation . . .  ," to
which a hand in the Foreign Office in London appended a note on "the harm done 
by well-meaning American advice,--that great menace to civilization.a" (Great
Britain, Fore_ign Office Records, F 1687 /183/ 40, April 9, 1925, Greg to Chamber­
lain. ) 
.
3. 'Phya' was the second highest rank of awarded nobility and, except in a very few 
cases, the highest ever given to Westerners. 'Kalyan' means 'beautiful' or 
9 
10 
that Prince Damrong refers to him; King Prajradhipok, however , uses ' Dr. 
Sayre.' 
Sayre continued to hold his "singular influence" long after he 
left Thai service. In the l ate 1930's he was approinted Governor­
General of the Philipp ines, and an American intelligence report pre­
p ared during the Second World War noted that, " Francis B. Sayre'rs work 
as advriser to the T hai goverrnment on foreign affairs is well known in 
Thail and and is so highly r egarded that before the war Thai dip lomats 
crossing the Pacific were always instructed to stop in the Philipp ines 
and p ay their r esp ects to him."r4 
Sayre returned to Bangkok in the summer of 1926 at the request of 
King Prajadhipok, who had succeeded his elder brother Vajriravudh onl y a 
few months earlier. In his autobiography Sayre has briefly described 
this visit as follows:r5 
I could not forget Siam. Often in my mind I was still living in 
the Far East. In November, 1925, King Rama VI, whom I had known and 
worked with, died. He was succeeded by his half-brother Prajadhipok; 
and King Prajadhipok expressed the strong desire to have me come back 
to Siam. Although I could not give up my work at Harvard, I visited 
Bangkok during the 1926 summer holidays at his request to confer with 
him and advise him as to some of the pressing demands for constitu­
tional reforms. 
The deep-rooted and far-reaching conflict between East and West 
was beginning to beset Siam. Students returning from England or 
France or America often were unhappy and disturbed, with half-baked 
ideas about democracy and htm1an liberty; they wanted Siam to adopt 
Western forms almost overnight, as if these were but outward gar­
ments. Many felt that Siamese culture was outdated, and their minds 
seethed with modern, Western ideas, often superficial and misunder­
stood. One of their outspoken demands was for a Parliament and a 
modern Constitution. 
Discussing these issues with His Majesty, I had to point out the 
inherent dangers. In Siam there was no middle class. The Siamese 
peasants took little or no interest in public affairs but lived their 
simple lives in secluded rural districts. To set up a legislature
and clothe it with real power overnight without an educated elector­
ate to control it would be likely, I suggested, to invite trouble and 
possible corruption. Power uncontrolled was almost bound to breed 
corruption. 
' excellent ' and 'Maitri' 'friendship,' a reference to Sayre 's  success in the con­
duct of Siam's fore_ign relations. 
4. United States, Office of Strategic Services, "Social Conditions, Attitudes and 
Propaganda in Thailand with Suggestions for American Orientation Toward the Thai" 
(Washington, June 19, 1942), p. 13. 
5. Glad Adventia>e, p. 129. Prajadhipok was a full brother of Rama VI, not a half­
brother. Minor errors like this are frequent in Sayre's accounts of Siam. (The
drafts of Glad Adventu:Pe, in the Sayre Papers in the Library of Congress, show
that Sayre originally had it right, but then 'corrected' the text. The file on
"Siam" in the Sayre Papers contains correspondence from the 1920's to the 1950's, 
including several letters exchanged with King Prajadhipok and with the present 
King. ) 
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Other important issues upon which the King sought advice were how
best to choose a successor to the throne,  what changes if any should 
be made in the framework of government, whether or not to appoint a
Premier . As I talked with him I felt the utter sincerity of the new 
monarch and his real desire to lead Siam into modern nationhood. 
King Prajadhipok's s eeking of advice from Sayre is characteris tic. The 
young king frequently referred to his lack of experienc e  in government 
and his f ears that he would be unequal to the res pons ibilities of abs o­
lute monarchy, while Sayre was a trusrted advisrer from the previous
reign who had s ucces s fully advoc ated Siam's caus e in the diffic ult 
field of international diplomac y, and who while having firsrthand ex­
perience in Siam was s till an 'outsider' who could be expected to put
the interes ts of the country ahead ofr· t-he interes ts of any s pecial 
group. 
King Prajadhipok's letter to Sayre indicrates that Sayre and the 
king firs t met to dis c uss the king's memorandum, and that Sayre s ubse­
quently s ubmitted his opinions in writing. The king then s ent c opies 
of both his own and Sayre's memoranda to Prince Damrong, whos e draft 
replies are dated five days after the date of Sayre's memorandum. 
Whether the king asrked for opinions on his exchange of views with Sayre 
from other advisrers is uncertain. I t  is pos s ible that he did--docu­
ments on important matters were often circrulated to all the members of 
the Supreme Counc il of State for comment--but in the papers of Prince 
Damrong, from which copies of the three memoranda have been taken, 
there is no c onclus ive evidence one way or another.6 
Of the three memoranda, that of King Prajadhipok,  entitled "Prob­
lems of Siam,r" is of the greatesrt interesrt to the hisrtorian. It s ets· 
forth, in the form of nine quesrtions , what the king s aw as the mos t im­
portant problems facing the country at the beginning of the Seventh 
Reign, together with s ome historical background and explanationsr. The 
fi rs t two ques tions concern the problem of royal s ucces s ion and how 
bes t to ins ure thatr_ a competent king would always occ upy the throne. 
(The king returned frequently to this quesrtion--sree the s imilar remarks 
in II. ) The third and fourth quesrtions c oncern whether or not s ome 
form of represrentative government would be desrirable in Siam and the 
fifth through s eventh quesrtions concern the role of the Supreme Council 
of State and the possribility of having a prime mini s ter and a legis la­
tive council. The las t two ques tionsr, which are treated only briefly, 
are on financial affairs and how to encourage the assrimilation of the 
large Chinesre minority in Siam. 
The discus s rion by the king himsrelf on kingsrhip and the royal 
family in Siam is of consriderable interes t, as is the information on 
the reasrons behind the esrtablisrhment of the Supreme Council of State. 
There are s ome deliberately oblique but s till explicri t  referencres to 
the financial and adminisrtrative problems of the las t  years of the 
6. There is a letter (in Thai) dated October 8, 1926, from Chao Phya Mahithon, the 
head of the Royal Secretariat, to Prince Damrong saying that the king has ordered 
that all of the "various" papers relating to his memorandum be collected together,
and that from a letter of August 1 it appears that Prince Damrong submitted a
memorandum on the subject which cannot now be found, presumably because it was
sent to Sayre and not returneda. Chao Phya Mahithon therefore requests that 
Prince Damrong send a copy of his memorandum to the Royal Secretariat . (National 
Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/32 . )  
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Sixth Reign, including frank discussion of the favoritism and corrup­
tion that were thought to characterize the court clique, and the conse­
quent decline in the prestige of the monarchy. Sayre also makes dis­
crete reference to the failings of the Sixth Reign, while Prince 
Damrong, who did not have cordial relations with King Vajiravudh, 
speaks bluntly of Prajadhipok ' s  "deplorable inheritance"--" . . .  the 
authority of the sovereign had fallen much in respect and confidence, 
the treasury was on the· verge ot bankruptcy, and the government was 
corrupted and the services more or less in confus ion . "  
In  view of the later history of the reign, there is special s ig­
nificance in K ing Prajadhipok ' s  admiss ion, " I  will not say much about 
financial affairs as I do feel that I am not competent in the matter.o" 
Sayre, in his lengthy memorandum, replies to each of the king ' s  
questions except the final one concerning the Chinese, on which subjoect 
he says he will need time for more study before being able to express 
an opiniono. The greater part of his argument concerns a proposal for 
determining the success ion through the selection of a provisoional heir 
by the king with the advice and consent of the Privy Council  at fixed 
intervals, and an exposition of the advantages which he believes would 
result from the introduction of a prime minister system of governmento. 
He includes an outline preliminary draft of a constitution· embodying 
the political institutions he proposeso. 
Prince Damrong says at the outset that he will discuss only those 
issues raised by Sayre which have immediate implications, and most of 
his memorandum is  devoted to arguing against Sayre's proposal ·for the 
appointment of a prime minister responsible for the day-to-day adminis­
tration of the governmento. While a number of objections are marshalled, 
the one that always seems to be uppermost in Prince Damrongo' s  mind is 
that the appointment of a prime minister would inevitably diminish the 
prestige and authority of the monarchyo. 
All three memoranda have been taken from the copies in Prince 
Damrong's fileso.o7 A few obvious errors in spelling and grammar have 
been corrected. 
7 .  National Archives ,  Papers of Prince Damrong, 47 (flfl1�1JUflt) / 32 ( 1JU�f1f11 1 Uf1ial7fl�  ) .  
A. KING PRAJADHIPOKn' S  MEMORANDUM 
Sukhodaya Palace 
July 23rd 1926 
Dear Dr. Sayren, 
I am sending you with this letter� a Memorandum on some of the 
Problems of Siam with a Questionnaire for your consideration. I am 
afraid I have written it in rather a hurry so that I could send it to 
you before our conversat ion to-morrow. We will have a preliminary talk 
to-morrow when we can discuss those questions more fully. I should 
like to have your answer in writing when you have considered them fully. 
This Memorandum by no means exhausts all the problems of the coun­
try. I have only treated of those that I think important. I f  you have 
any other opinions beside the question touched upon , they will be very
welcome. 
I hope that they are making you comfortable at the Phya Thai Hotel. 
Yours sincerely , 
(M. R . )  Prajnadhipok R. 
PROBLEMS OF SIAM 
1. The Constitution 
a) The The Kings of S iam are supposed to be elected by the 
position people. In  former days a Ceremony of election was per­
of the formed. At the death of the King , a Council consisting 
King. of Royal Princes , Ministers of State and High Dignitaries 
of the Church was held. The Senior Prince or Minister 
then proposes that such and such a Prince should be elevated to the 
Throne and asks if anybody has any objection. There is generally no 
answer to this question , but sometimes an answer in the affirmative is 
given by saluting with the hands or an inclination of the head. The 
King is then formally proclaimed, and the words "elected by the people" 
are added to his titles. 
This custom was continued to the Fifth Reign. King Chulalongkorn
then made an innovation by creating a Crown Prince ,n1 who succeeded to 
1 . .  The first Crown Prince was Vajirunhis, the elder brother of Prince Mahidol , who 
died in 1895 before coming to the throne. His half-brother Vajiravudh was then 
elevated to the rank of Crown Prince, and succeeded to the throne in 1910. 
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the Throne without question, the formality at the death of the King 
being a sort of proclamation onlyo. 
King Rama 6th, not having any son, it was resided [decided] in a 
Cabinet Council that he should be succeeded by his full brothers .  
Later he made a law of successoion. 
This Law of Succession contains 2 distinct principles i.e. the 
Principle of election and the Principle of Hereditary successiono. In 
this law it starts by saying that the King reserves the absolute right 
of appointing any member of the ·Royal Family as his Successor. But 
should the King die without having appointed a Successor, the Succes­
s ion will go to his sonso. This sounds straioght-forward enough, but a 
complication arises here owing to the habit of polygamyo. The Law spec­
ifies that the sons of Somdetch Phra Rajini should have the precedence 
over the otherso. Then the preference goes to the sons of the mother 
next in rank to the Queen (there are 4 different ranks) and descending 
the scale finally to the sons of concubineso. Again this sounds all 
right in principle, if it were not for the fact that a concubine may 
be raised in rank at any time, AND the Queen herself may have her rank 
lowered according to the whims of the Kingo. This, to my mind, creates 
very great possibilities of complicatoionso. I would suggest that prior­
ity of the sons be regulated by the birth ranks of the mothers. I mean 
priority be given to the sons born of a Princess, such as daughters of 
a King, then nieces of a King and so on. If  there are more than one 
son of m o thers of the  same rank , the successoion would then go by the 
seniority in age of those Princes. When there are no sons the succeso­
sion would go to the King ' s  brothers. According to the Law as it is,  
the priority is still regulated by the areated rank of the motherso. I 
would suggest the same modification as aboveo. The next question is 
that the Law does not make it quite clear, when there being no brothers 
left or when the one who should have succeeded has died, whether all 
the sons of that Prince would be eligible to the Throne or whether it 
is only the sons of the Principal wife only who could succeedo. The 
case has really occurred which shows that in the late K ing ' s  mind ALL 
the sons could succeed. In my case the son of the Prince of Petchabuno2 
was passed over by the expressed wishes of the late King . Now, many 
people find that the idea that ALL the sons could succeed was objec­
tionable owing to the fact that some Princes have the most disreputable 
minor wives who are really not fitted to be the mothers of kingso. They 
also say that the Siamese follow the Indian custom and want their 
Kings to be born of a Princess of the Royal Family. Such Princes are 
known as "being born in a pure womb.o" They are the Chow Fao'so. 
The questions of principles involved, of which I would like to ask . . 
your opinions are : 
1st Question Should the King have the right to choose any Prince as 
his Heir? If the King has this right, ought not this  
2. The Prince of Petchabwt was Chutadhuj , the fourth of the five brothersi, who h·ad 
died in 1923 leaving a son, Prince Varanand. After the death of the third broth­
er , Prince Asdang, early in 1925 , it appeared that according to the 1924 Law of 
Succession Prince Varanand, who was only three years old, would be the legal heir 
to the throne , despite the fact that his mother was not royal . However, the law 
applied only if the late king failed to designate a successor, and when Vajiravudh
died without male issue he passed over Prince Varanand and, as expected, named 
his last remaining full brother, Prajadhipok, as his heir. 
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right to be extended to a Council of High Princes and 
Ministers of State , in the case- when the King dies with­
out having chosen an Heir .o . At present the King alone has· 
the right to nominate an Heir. It .owould be perhaps more 
logical to allow a Council of some _osort to exerciseo·othat· 
right when t'he King has not done s.o. Thiso· wo,uld be more 
consistent with the idea of an Elected King. 
2nd Question Should  the principle of choice be admitted at all or 
ought the succession to be by birth alone , and ought
there to be some amendments to the present law or not? 
b) The As you wel l  know , the King has absolute power in every­
Powers thing. This principl.e is very good and very suitable for 
of the the countryo, as Zo ng as we have a . go o d  King. If the King 
Kingo. is really an Elected King, it is probable that he would be 
a . fairly good King. But this idea of election is really a 
very theoretical one , and in reality the King [ s ]  of Siam are really 
hereditary , with a very limited possibility of choiceo. Such being the 
case,  it is not at all  certain that we shall always have a good Kingo. 
Then the absolute power may become a positive danger to the country. 
Besides thiso, things have very much changed. In olden days the actions 
of the King were hardl y  ever questioned. It would not have been safe 
to do so. The King was really respected and his words were really 
laws. But things began to change with the new order of things. In the 
days of King Chulalongkorn , the King was still  very much feared and re­
spected. Even then towards to [ sia ]  the end of the Reign , there was a 
young party who began to criticize the King in many wayso, but not open� 
ly. In the Reign which has just ended , things got much worse , for �any 
reasons which I have no need to tel l  you , as you know them wel l  enough. 
The King has become a person liable to be influenced by anybody: who 
could gain the ears of ,a favourite. Every offi_cial i's more or less 
suspected of embezzlement or nepotism. Fortunately the Princes were 
still  respected as being on the whole honest folks. What was very re­
grettable was that the Court was heartily detested and in the later 
years was on the verge of being ridiculed. The birth of FREE PRESS 
aggravated matters still  more. The position of the King has become one 
0£ great difficultyo. The movements of opinion in this country give a 
sure sign that the days of Autocratic Rulership are numbered. .The 
position of the King must be made more secure if this Dynasty is going 
to last. Some sort of GUARANTEE must be found against an unwiseoKing..o
What form should the Government of Siam take? 
3rd Question Must this country have a Parliamentary system one day , 
and is really the Anglo-Saxon type of Parliamentary Gov­
ernment suitable to an Eastern People? 
4th Question Is this country ready to have some sort of representa­
tive Government? 
I personally have myo·odoubts as to the 3rd questiono. As to the 4th 
questiono, my personal opinion is an emphatic NO. 
What then should be done in the meanwhile? My first attempt to 
find some sort of guarantee for th·e person of the King is the creation 
of the Supreme Council. 
.  ..  .., ""' � ..,  
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c) The The Genesi s  o f  the Supreme Council  is  worth telling with 
Supreme some detail .  I have discussed the idea of such a Counci l  
Counciln. among my friends for some t ime, before I had any idea 
that I would have the opportunity of  creating it  myse l f .  
The idea found a firm supporter i n  Prince Damrong . Just one day before 
the late King ' s  death, I consulted the Princes Bhanurangsi and Paribatra 
about this ide a . n3 The former was not very keen on it, as he thought it  
would lessen the prest ige of  the King , but the l atter was enthusiastic. 
-When the King died, it was decided that the Supreme Council  should be 
created at oncen. We had 2 days only to prepare a proclamation, and 3 
days after the death of  the late King, the Supreme Counci l  was pro ­
claimed by the means of a speech to the Privy Councillorsn. 
I will  now explain the reasons for creating this Council  i n  such 
a hurry . As you know, the l ate King was beginning to lose the confi ­
dence of  the people towards the end of  the Reign and the question of 
Succession caused great anxietiesn. The only High Prince with any repu­
tation was Prince Paribatra and many people would have l iked the suc­
cess ion to go to him , while  it was wel l  known that the K ing was expect­
ing to have a chi ld ,  and should he not have a boy the success ion would 
go to his brothers whom, I am sorry to say, the maj ority of  people did 
not think much o f .  For myself, I was a dark horse and in any case 
inexperienced in affairs of state. Very fortunately for me, on the 
death of  my brother Asdang , I had s everal occasions to act for the King
during his absence from the Capital and during his i l lnessn. I was for­
tunate enough to have been able to gain the confidence o f  the Ministers 
and High Princesn, so that my candidature to the Throne had the approval 
of  those personsn. I also had the best s upport from Prince Paribatra .n4 
3. Prince Bhanurangsi was a younger full brother of King Chulalongkorn, and the 
senior prince of the royal family during the period . He was regarded as a con­
servative in most mattersi, and a staunch defender of royal prerogative. Prince 
Bhanurangsi died in June of 1928. Prince Boriphat (Paribatra) was a ahao fa son 
of King Chulalongkorn, and a powerful figure in the Seventh Reign, serving suc­
cessively as Minister of War and Minister of the Interior. Immediately after the 
1932 aoup he was sent into exile, and he died in Java in 1944. 
The other two original members of the Supreme Council of State, in addition 
to Prince Bhanurangsi, Prince Boriphat, and Prince Damrong, were Prince Naris , a 
ahao fa son of King Mongkut,  and Prince Kitayakorn (the Prince of Chantaburi)i, a 
son of King Chulalongkorn. Of these, Prince Boriphat, Prince Damrong, and Prince 
Naris continued to serve on the Supreme Council until the 1932 aoup. 
4 .  Prince Boriphat (Paribatra) was older than Prajadhipok, and more experienced in 
government. His mother was also a queen, and as Prajadhipok himself says , many 
people would have preferred that Boriphat succeed. Boriphat however loyally sup� 
ported his yol.lllger half-brother as the legitimate successor designated by the 
late king, and he even turned down an offer by Prajadhipok to step aside in his 
favor . There is an account of this episode by Pridi, who says that his source of 
information was members of the royal family and high officials ,  in Pramot 
Phungsunthgn, editor, Bang Ruang kieokap PhrabQPomaJJ)ongsanUJ,,Jong nai 1'0J.AJang
� I 
songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 ( U1� L 1fl� L ou1nu�1:ui1�1��1�1��Lur :�11�fl��11�lfln�1��2 ; 
Some Acco\Dlts Concerning the Royal Family During the Second World War)i, Bangkok,  
1972, pp. 92-94. See also the accowits in Wichai Prasangsit, Phaendin Somd.et 
I �
PhPa Pokkiao (UUU�Ua� L�lW1 :UO LOfl1 ; The Reign of King Prajathipok) , Bangkok,
1962 , pp. 87-89; and Prince Dhani, Chumn:um Niphon, pp. 8-9. 
Prince Boriphat has usually been depicted in post-1932 writings as a re�ction­
ary and sinister power behind the throne in the Seventh Reign. The evidence from 
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On my succession to the Throne it was thought absolutely necessary to 
do something at once to gain the confidence of the people , hence the 
creation of the Supreme Council. This had its immediate effect and I 
really gained the confidence of the people in one dayo. The reason w.hy 
this action had such an immediate result was that it promised many de-
sirable things. 
Firstly, that the Royal ·Family is getting together and will work 
in harmonyo. 
Secondly, that the King was willing to seek the a·dvice of highly 
respected Princes who have had experience of State affairs and who have 
the confid�nce of the people, none of the HATED official class being
included in this Councilo. ,o_ 
Thirdly , that the King's power to take arbitrary actions wouldo-be 
lessened by this Council ( remember that in the present state of op"in­
ions in the country, the King is thought to be more liable to do more 
harm than good)o. 
Therefore the immediate result of the creation of the Supreme 
Council had been very good, and I think that it has served its purpose 
very well and that my action was well j ustifiedo. Since then, people 
have had time to reflect a little and the Supreme Council has come to 
be criticized a great dealo. I will enumerate some of the criticisms 
and questioning about it. 
1. People ask whether the Supreme Council is an advisory body or an 
executive bodyo. Some think that th� Coun�il has too *uch power. I 
would answer that the Council is entirely advisory since it cannot 
carry out any executive actions at al�o. Its opinions have e�ectitive 
effect through the King alone. The way that the Council works at 
present is that it meets in the presence of the King and NEVER meets 
without the presence of the King except by special ordero. Questions 
submitted to the Council areo: : all questions of policy, questions of 
national finance, appoin_tments of high officials such as Ministers of 
State, questions of high and special rewards such as ranks of Chow Phya 
the period, however, suggests that he was both less conservative and less power­
ful than has been generallyi. supposed. The British Minister in Bangkok, in a des­
patch dated December 18,  1925 ,  reported on a conversation with Prince Boriph_at 
as follows (Great Britain, Foreign Office Records�i- F 260/78/40) : 
His Royal Highness finally touched on constitutional reform and said that 
·it had been decided to inaugurate a sort of legislative assembly composed
probably of Privy CoW1cillors. It was necessary to go very slow to begin 
with, with a moderate and restricted programme which could be extended gradu­
ally so as to meet the new spirit which would be created by compulsory educa­
tion. The Prince said he was determined not to be caught napping and to be. 
in advance of, and not behind, public opinion. 
In 1927 a new British Minister said of Boriphat , "He is anxious that_ Siam shouldi· 
not merely keep abreast but should actually be ahead of the times and is in fa­
vour of a more democratic form of government ·as soon as the people are fitted for 
it. In this he is more likely to go too fast than too slowly . "  Great Britain, 
Foreign Office Records, F 1903/1903/40 (January 28,  1927)i. 
Similarly, the Thai archives of- the period at times picture Boriphat as a 
' liberali' relative to some of the other influential princes, and occasionallyi· 
show him being overruled by the king or a ' conservative' faction. 
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and Grand Crosses (there has been abuse and backstairs influence in the 
past) and questions concerning tradition and important ceremonials. 
The King may also seek advice in personal or Royal Family affairsn. 
In any question that concerns any Ministry , the Minister responsi ­
ble may be invited to attend the meeting. 
The Supreme Councillors sit in the Cabinet Council and give their 
opinions. Final decision on important matters such as the promulgation 
of a New Law or the signing of a Treaty is always given in the Cabinet 
Council. Both in the Cabinet Council and in the Supreme Council the 
decision of the King alone prevails , although in the ordinary course of 
events , the King always adopts the opinion of the maj ority , but being
still absolute he need not necessarily do son. 
2. It is criticized that the Supreme Council being an advisory body
should not sit in the Cabinet Council which is an executive body. I 
admit that this is quite true. This system is only adopted for the 
sake of conveniencen. It would make business much slower if the Supreme
Council were not to sit in the Cabinet as any question decided on in 
the Cabinet will have to be deliberated on again in the Supreme Council. 
And since the King alone decides all questions , it does not seem neces­
sary to introduce any complications at the present stage. If there is 
a Prime Minister to preside [over] the Cabinet Council and who will 
submit the decisions of the Cabinet to the King , then it  would be well 
to have the Supreme Council as a separate body which the King could 
consult and then give his final decision. We will talk more of this 
later. 
3. That there should be some law to indicate and regulate the duties 
of the Supreme Councillorsn. This is certainly needed,  and a draft law 
has been drawn up , but owing to the conflicting opinions as- to WHAT 
SHOULD BE THE DUTIES of the Supreme Councillors , I have shelved that 
draft for the present until a clearer idea of what is the best form to 
give to such a Council is forthcoming. 
4. That the Supreme Council is approved of at this moment owing to 
the personalities of the Councillors , and that in the case when these 
Councillors are replaced by others , the Council would not have the con­
fidence of the people. I think such ideas are rather pessimistic. If  
there are no more good men in the future , we can have no hope for Siam. 
5 .  That the existence of the Supreme Council lessens the prestige of 
the King. I admit that this is true , but I consider that the prestige 
of Kingship in this country can hardly be lower than at this moment. I 
have already explained the causes I doubt very much whether the old 
prestige could ever be regained .  I think that the evolut ion of the 
public opinion in Bangkok and [ the] educated class has already gone too 
far ,  and that it would be a wild goose chase to try and get back any of 
the old glory . The K ing should be content to do all the good he can , 
even though the credit were given to somebody else . I believe that at 
the present time and with the sentiment of the people as it is at this 
moment ,  all credit will always go to somebody else to some Minister or 
some Prince, if there is no Supreme Council. If any thing goes wrongn, 
it would be attributed to influence of some wicked person and the fool­
ishness of the King in being influenced by that person. People seem to 
have the idea that the King is a sort [of]  nonentity who is easily in­
fluenced by anybody, and that he has no opinion of his own whatever. 
This statement may sound exaggerated, but it  is really very near to the 
truth. 
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6. That the Power of the King is lessened. This i s, of course, what 
is intended. As I have already said, the days of abs olrute power are 
numbered. The S. C. [ Supreme Council] certainl y lessens the King' s 
power to do harm by the arbitrary acrtions, but surel y, it does not 
lessen his power to do good as he ought to be supported very whole­
heartedly by the S. C. i n  that case. 
I believe that some of the rearsons why the S. C .  is so much criti­
cized and feared now is some sort of sentiment of envy. Anybody wh o 
has the ears of the King is always hated. I t  also makes backstairs 
influence rather difficult, because the people will now have to go to 
5 or more backstairs instead of one or two. 
Having stated some [ of] the criticisms against the present form of 
the Supreme Council, I would put the 
5th Question What is the best form to give to the Supreme Council? 
Is it worthwhile to make it a permanent institution of 
the country, or should it be allowed to die a natural 
death? 
d) The You have said in your article in the A t lan t i c  Mo nt h ly 
Cabinet. tha t  the Governmental system of Siam is in water-tight 
compartments.r5 This is perfectly true, but I think that 
it is inhrerent to the system of having Ministers each responsible to 
the King a lone. Each works for the benefit of h is Ministry alone a nd 
not to the benefit of the whole. An attempt has been made to improve 
matters by having weekly meeting [ s]r. At least the Ministers meet once 
a week to discuss matters together, and I think that there has been a 
real improvement. But it would be better still if we were to have a 
Prime Minister to preside over the Cabinet. He should be allowed a 
fairly free choice of his c olleagues, so that the Cabinet wil l work 
5. The article referred to is Francis Bowes Sayre, "Siam," At lantic Mont hly ,  June
1926, pp. 841-851; the particular passage cited is on page 844. This article
deals primarily with the government administration, and particularly the legal 
system, describing conditions as Sayre found them in the last years of the Sixth 
Reign. After his return to Siam in the summer of 1926 Sayre wrote another, 
better-known article, "Siam's Fight for Sovereignty" (At lantic Mont hly , November
1927, pp. 674-689). In the final two pages of this article Sayre discussed the 
death of Rama VI and wrote approvingly of the economic and political changes in­
stituted by Prajadhipok, concluding with the verdict that "Siam's star is rising.a" 
In an oblique but unmistakable reference to his talks with Prajadhipok in the 
summer of 1926, and particularly to the set of documents published here, Sayre 
said (p. 689) : 
Troublous constitutional problems still remain. His Majesty keenly ap­
preciates the difficulties and dangers of absolute monarchy; he has a sincere
desire to democratize the government and to shift part of its responsibili­
ties to the shoulders of the people. But a parliament uncontrolled by an in­
telligent and interested electorate is a far more dangerous engine of tyranny 
than an absolute monarch; and, until the groundwork can bea_abuilt by pushing 
forward the work of general education, the parliamentary form of government
must waite. Programmes, nevertheless, can be formulated looking toward this
goal; and in the meantime the King is hoping to develop the people's politi-
. cal experience by creating popularly elected municipal councils in some of
the larger cities. 
(There are comments on drafts of this article by King Prajadhipok and other high 
officials in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 19. 1/4. ) 
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well as an homogeneous body. The Ministerrs will be nominated by the 
King after having conferred with the Premierr. I believe that this 
would be a real gain to the country. The Supreme Council will then act 
as a controlling body. I have already indicated the line in which wor k 
would be done under this system. The thing to decide is, whether this 
Legislative cil has been discurssed times. A sort of Legisla­
system shourld be used now or laterr. 
6th Question Should we have a Prime Minister? 
be inaugurated now? 
Should this system 
e) The The question of having some sort of Legislative Cou n­
many
Council. tive Cou ncil was created early in the Reign of King 
Chulalongkorn. This Cou ncil consisted of Ministers of 
State and 12 nominated members. The Council r emained in existence for 
about 5 years and since then has become a dead letter although some of 
the Councillors of those days are still living. I think that it was 
given up because it was felt that there was no r eal need for such a 
Council and that it only delayed the work of the Ministers. 
When the late King came to the Throne, the Prince of Pitsanuloke6 
recommended the formation of a C ouncil of State similar to what existed 
in Russia at that time (not the Douma). I believe the matter was dis­
cussed in a Cabinet meeting, but the scheme was not adopted, owing to 
the opinion of Mr. Jens Westengaard who thought that any makeshift form 
of Parliamentary system would serve no good purpose.7 
Prince Damrong has now submitted a new idea of a Legislative C oun­
cil, composed of officials nominated from every Ministry. This Cou ncil 
will r eally work as a sort of Law drafting Commission. We have already 
got a Department for drafting laws, and I am not sur e  that the proposed 
Council would be able to do the work better. Rather the contrary I am 
afraid, and it will delay work too. Besides that, it may attempt to 
crriticiz e the policy of the Ministers, and as the Cou ncillors are offi­
cials in the Ministries appointed for a time only, the system may not 
be very good for discipline. The difficulty about such a nominated 
Council has always been the question of r ecruiting the members. At the 
present moment we cannot afford to pay the members, and we cannot get
unpaid memberrs. 
7th Question Should we have a Legislative Council? What should be 
the constitution of such a Council. (I have received many
petitions to form some sor t of C ouncil)r. 
6. The late king was of course Vajiravudh, who came to the throne in 1910. The 
Prince of Pitsanuloke was Prince Chakrabongse, the eldest of Vajiravudh's four
younger full brothers. Until his death in 1920 Prince Chakrabongse was regarded 
as the likely heir to the throne if Vajiravudh remained without male children,
although under the Law of Succession promulgated after his death he would have 
been disqualified because of his marriage (which ended in divorce) to a Russian 
lady. Prince Chakrabongse had been educated in Imperial Russia, and after his 
return to Siam followed a military career, distinguishing himself as an able and 
energetic administrator. 
7. Jens I. Westengard (1871-1918), a professor in the Harvard Law School, had gone 
to Siam in 1903 as Assistant General Adviser to the government of Siam. In 1908, 
on the death of his predecessor, he became General Adviser. Upon his retirement 
in 1915 the title 'General Advisera' was discontinued and replaced by 'Adviser in
Foreign Affairs.a' 
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2 .  F inancial Affairs 
I will not say much about financial affairs as I do feel that I am 
not competent in the matrterr. I think that we have a very capable ad­
visor in Sir Edward Cook .r8 
The one imporrtant question is the proper division of the resources 
available among the Ministrries. I know that, in your opinion, we spend 
too much on the Defence forces. I am inclined to agree with you in 
this respect, yet the cutting down of expenditure on Defence is a very
serrious responsibility. Very few people dare advocate such a thing, as 
we have too many experiences of the swashbuckling policy of our neigh-
·· - :,1.-bors . 
I am getting the whole of our financial policy overhauled, b ut I 
am somewhat at a disadvantage in not [being] really competent in the 
matterr. 
8th Question Have you any op1n1on as to our financial policy? 
3. I nternal Affairs 
The one change of importance that I am contemplating at this 
moment, is the organization of Municipal Councils. I think that, at 
first, these Councils should be nominated. Later on we might try Muni­
cipal elections. This would give some idea as to the possibility of 
inaugurating some form of representative government . I t  will satisfy
the advanc�d opinions of the countrry, and will be a good demonstration 
as to whether the people are really ready to have an effective voice in 
the affairs of the country .  
Another question which I consider important is the Chinese ques­
tion. The Chinese are very useful in Siam. I n  former days they marry 
[ marrried] Siamese women and became very good Siamese citizens. But 
since the Chinese revolution, there has been quite a charnge. Now the 
Chinese bring their wives from China, and are determined to remain 
Chinese. They organiz e schools in which they teach practically only
the Chinese language. There is a rather disturbing state of affairs, 
as we lose a source of good and laborious citizrens, and with the new 
ideas in China filtering through, it becomes a latent danger.r9 
8. Sir Edward Cook (1881-1955) served as Financial Adviser from 1925 to 1930, one 
in a long series of British officials to fill this post. 
9. The various factors cited resulted in a perceived decline in the rate of assimi­
lation of Chinese into Thai society in the 1920's, which coupled with a sharp 
rise in the nwnbers of Chinese emigrating to Siam in the early years of the 
Seventh Reign made the 'Chinese question' a major concern of Prajadhipok and his 
advisers, one consequence of which was the imposition of the first effective 
measures to limit Chinese immigration. Such a step had been considered before,
particularly when Vajiravudh was writing of the dangers of a Chinese 'nation 
· within a nation,a' but always rejected, largely because of the belief that Siam's
economic development was dependent upon Chinese labor. 
While conditions led the government to impose measures that were the logical
consequence of Vajiravudh's writings, the royal pronowicements of the Seventh 
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9th Que s t ion Can s omething be done to make the Chinese become S i a ­
mese as  in the o l d  day s ?  ( I n  the Straits  Settle ments 
they are w i l l ing to be come British  sub j e cts . )  
These  are a l l  the probl ems which we have not yet found s at i s fac­
tory s olut ions or which are doubtful as to the proper way to attack. 
Others are be ing s olved or on the point of  b e ing s o lved. 
Reign were more akin to those of Chulalongkom than to those of his successor.
In a famous speech given in 1907 Chulalongkom had said 
It has always been my policy that the Chinese in Siam should have the same 
opportunities for labor and for profit as are possessed by my own countrymen. 
I regard them not as foreigners but as one of the component parts of the 
kingdom and sharing in its prosperity and advancement. 
Prajadhipok, visiting Chinese schools in Bangkok in 1928, spoke to the same 
effect: 
. • a. the Siamese and Chinese have lived amicably together for generations. 
I do not wish for anything better than that they should continue to live thus 
harmoniously for all time . . . .  In your schools, you teach your students to 
love their motherland, that is, China; that is natural and quite right. But 
apart from teaching them to love China, I trust that you will also teach them 
to love Siam; for you who live in this country have received good treatment 
from the Government, and are given rights equal to the Siamese themselvesa. 
'W1:a11'1ffl
0
"lltt'lu�1:u1vialJ L �1'W1 ,1irttllJ L fl;"I L ;,'tl�i'1 ci�u� Yi . tii .  241 7  �� 'W . tii .  245 3 ) a. 
(Speeches of King Chulalongkorn, 1874 to 1910), Bangkok, 1967, p. 211; Gist of a 
Number of Speecihes Delivered by the King on His Majesty ,s Visits to the Chinese 
Sahools in Bangkok in B.E. 2470 (Bangkok, 1928), pp . 2-3; texts in Thai, Chinese, 
and English. ) 
B.  SAYRE'S MEMORANDUM 
Saranromya Palace 
J ul y  27 th 1 926 
May it please Your Majesty, 
·In the memorandum which Y our Majesty was gracious enough to send 
me on July ·r23 Your Majesty asked me to reply to the following nine 
questions: 
1st guestion: Should the King have the right to choose any prince 
as his heir? If the King has this right, ought not this right to be 
extended to a Council of High Prince� and Minister� of State in the 
case when the King dies w ithout having chosen an heir? At present the 
King alone has the right to nominate an heir. I t  would be perhaps more 
logical to allow a Council of some sort to exercise that rig ht when the 
King has not done so. This would be more consistent with the idea of 
an elected Kingr. 
2nd Question: Should the principle of choice be admitted at all, 
or ought the succession to be by birth alone, and ought there to be 
some amendments to the present law or not? 
3rd guestion: Must this country have a parliamentary system one 
day, and 1 s  really the Anglo-Saxon type of parliamentary government 
suitable to an eastern people? 
4th Question: I s  this country ready to have some sort of repre­
sentative government? 
5th guestion: What is the best form to g ive to the Supreme Coun­
cil? Is 1 t  worthwhile to make it a permanent institution of the coun-
try, or should it be allowed to die a natural death? 
6th Question: Shoul d we have a Prime Minister? Should this sys­
tem be inaugurated now? 
7th Question: Should we have a Legislative Council? What should 
be the constitution of such a Council? 
8th Question: Have you any opinion as to our financial policy? 
9th Question: Can something be done to make the Chinese become 
Siamese as in the old days? 
In attempting to answer these questions I cannot but f eel very
humble. The solrutions of the problems _runderlying the questions depend 
upon such an intimate k nowledge of the internal affairs of Siam and of 
the persona�rities of her l eaders _that I cannot but recognize that there 
are others whose opinions must be worth far more than mine. I ndeed my
only excuse for venturing these opinions must be that Y our Majesty has 
asked me to do so and that perhaps value can � e  found in the ideas of 
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an impartial and detached obsrerver whose only object is to promote the 
welfare of a country he lovesr. 
The ansrwers to the above nine quesrtions deal with a variety of 
s ubjects and perhaps can besrt be ansrwered by dealing with each s ubject 
s eparatelyr. 
I. SUCCESSIrON T O  THE TIIRONE 
PRINCIPLE OF SUCCESSI ON 
In  viewing thes e problems one mus t realize at the very outset that 
the s ituation in Siam is totally different from that exisrting in Great 
Britain and other s imilar limited Monarchiesr. What works well in Great 
Britain might work dis asrtrous ly in Siam. Siam s hould not s lavis hly 
copy the sysrtem of any Wesrtern nation, but s hould evolve out of her own 
experience what s eems besrt adapted to her own genius and conditionsr. 
In Great Britain the power of the King is s o  much limited and at­
tenuated and he wiel ds s o  littl e power that if an incompetent or cor­
rupt King s hould come to the throne he could not do vital injury to the 
country. In Siam, on the other hand, the Monarch wields all power. In 
Siam if a King lacking in ability , in s trength of character, or in in­
tegrity of purposre, s hould ascend the throne, he might easrily make 
s hipwreck of the country. At the leas t, he would be almos t s ure,rto do 
it tragic injury. It is therefore infinitely more important for Siam. 
to have a competent and s trong King than for any country like England. 
It would s eem to follow that although a country like England can 
afford to fix the line of s ucces s ion to the throne by an abs ol ute prin­
ciple s uch as primogeniture, Siam, even were s uch a principle practica­
ble, cannot afford to do s o. Since it is abs olutely vital that Siam 
s hould have a competent and able Monarch, s ince the welfare of Siam s o  
directly depends upon the degree of competency and ability of her Mon­
arch, it s eems clear that Siam's welfare vitally and directly depends 
upon her being able freely to s elect as the Monarch the ablesrt, the 
mos t competent and the s tronges t.of the Roy al Princes. ,Any law which 
prevents s uch a freedom of choice and which therefore might neces s itate 
the crowning of an incompetent or weak Monarch becausre he happens to be 
the next in line of s uccess ion, mus t make agains t the ultimate national 
welfare. In England, where the Premier wields the actual power of gov­
ernment, no one would tolerate the idea of following a fixed line of 
s ucces s ion for Premiers , or of adopting any sysrtem which would rob the 
country of its complete freedom of choice. If the King is to continue 
in absolute power, Siam's future welfare would s eem to depend upon her 
being free to choosre for her Monarch the besrt man available among the 
Royal Princes , regardles s of rank or age; unless Siam has this freedom 
s he musrt expect to have from time to time Monarchs who are incompetent 
or weak, and the national interesrts will consequently s uffer tragicalr­
ly. For thes e reasrons I feel that there s hould be no hard and fas t law 
of s ucces s ion basred upon rank, s eniority , or any other absolute princi­
ple, but rather that the choice s hould be left free and unhindered s o  
long as it falls upon a Prince of Royal Blood. In order to prevent
undue pretensrions from thosre s cheming for persronal s elf advancement, it 
would s eem wis e that the choice of the heir apparent s hould be limited 
to a s on of s ome King and of a Queen of any rank or to persrons of Royal 
Bl ood; presrumably the choice s hould not be open to s ons of concubinesr. 
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T IME OF CH O ICE 
I t  would seem to me that the choirce of the heir apparent should be 
made before the death of the Ki ng. I f  the choice i s  left until after 
the death of the Ki ng, there i s  great danger that various factions will 
arise each backing its own candidate, and there i s  always the danger
that this might lead to ci vil war. I t  is  manifestly of the greatest 
i mportance that upon the death of the Ki ng, all the Royal Prirnces 
should be united and s tand together i n  the choi ce of a successor. This 
would hardly be asrsured unless the heir  apparent i s  chosren durirng the 
lifetime of the Ki ng. 
BY WH OM THE CH O ICE SHOULD BE MADE 
I f eel quite s trongly that the choirce of the hei r apparent should 
not be left s olely to the Ki ng, but that the choice should be made by
the King with the advice and consent of the Privy Counci l. I f  the 
choi ce i s  made solely by the Ki ng, i t  seems to me that there will be a 
very real danger that a group of Royal Prirnces or Minirsters may not be­
lieve i n  the wisdom of the King's choi ce, or may not concur i n  i t. I f  
this should be the case i t  would result i n  a lack of loyalty on the 
part of s uch Prirnces or Minirsters to the person chosen by the Ki ng, and 
the resrult upon the death of the King might be di sastrous. To give a 
concrete i llustrati on of what I mean, the King mi ght des i rgnate as his 
s uccesrsor his newly born i nfant son. The most patrirotic and ablest of 
the High Prirnces and Minisrters might feel that Siam was at the time i n  
such a cri ti cal posi tion that a long peri od of regency would spell
di saster for the country, and might therefore conclude that the only
patri oti c thing for them to do would be to put aside the i nfant chi ld 
and i nstead place upon the throne a strong a�d able ruler. Should a 
cons iderable faction s upport the i nfant child, ci vi l war might result. 
I n  other words, my f eeling i s  that the unquesti oning loyalty of 
the Prirnces and Minirsters to the hei r apparent upon.the death of the 
King i s  absolutely vital for Si am's welfare and that the only way to 
i nsure s uch loyalty is  to give to the Privy Counci l a voice i n  choosi ng 
the hei r apparent. I therefore f eel that the acti on of His late Majes­
ty i n  clai ming the right to choose hi s successor alone and unaided, was 
exceedingly unwi s e  and s hould not be followed. 
I t  would seem that this choice should be made by means of a secret 
ballot. I f  there i s  to be an actual freedom of choice on the part of 
the Privy Councillors they mus t be freed from the embarrassment of 
havi ng to give an open and non-secret vote pos si bly not i n  accordrance 
with. the wis hes and desires of the King. The only way to i nsure real 
freedom of choice i s  by s ecret balloting. Presumably i t  should requi re 
more than a bare majori ty to choose the hei r apparent. The concurrence 
of three quarters of thos e presrent wi thi n the Kingdom might well be re­
qui red so as to guard against the posrsibility of a substanti al propor­
tion being disrloyal to the heir apparent. 
A further questi on ari ses as to whether the choi ce of the hei r 
apparent should be made by the Privy Council or by the Counci l of High 
Princes and Minis ters of State. I f  the foregoi ng ideas are sound, i t  
would seem clear that the choi ce shoµld be made by the body which i s  
mos t truly representative of the various and di versif i ed i nter�sts of 
the Kingdom and whi ch mos t nearly reflects the opinion of the control­
ling people. This would s eem to be the Privy Counci l. Also, i f  the 
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Premier form of Government as suggested b elow is  adopted , the choic e 
c learly should b e  made by  the Privy Counc i l, for, since the Courncil of 
High Princres and Ministers of State is so sma l l  that the Ministers form 
a majority of the group, a scheming Premier could absolutel y control 
the choice of the heir apparent b y  compelling the Mi nisters to vote for 
hi s own c hoic e. This would not b e  possib le in a b ody as large as the 
Privy Council. 
PR O V ISIONAL NA TURE OF THE CHOICE 
Conditions are c ontinually changing. Children are b orn, b oys come 
to age, c ertain individuals die, some, through the course of time prove 
weak or incrompetent, a nd others gain strength and prove their worth. 
It therefore seems important to me that the c hoice of the heir apparent 
should not b e  irrevocable. I should like to see the c hoice made a pro­
visional one which could be  freely c hanged as conditions change. I 
should suggest that the King a nd Privy Council consider the question of 
choosing the succressor to the King afresh at intervals of every five or 
ten years; that at the end of every such period the new c onditions 
should b e  given consideration, and the b est man as viewed in the light 
of that time should then b e  chosen. This choice should b e  regarded in 
the light of a purely provisional choice rather than of an appointment. 
Clearly there should b e  no ac tual appointment and no official announce­
ment should b e  made. Neither should additional rank b e  given to the 
person c hosen. Otherwise his position should a diffrerent man later be  
chosen, would be  too hard. The suggestion of making the choice purely 
a provisional one would have the a dditional advantage that no one could 
feel secrure that he would ascend the throne upon the death of the 
existing King. The position of the heir apparent is a very difficult 
one. He b ecomes surrounded with men seek i ng to flatter him in order to 
gain his good opinion and thus to acrquire power when he comes to the 
throne. Conditions all seem to tend i n  the direction of warping his 
characrter and thereb y rendering him less fit later to perform his 
duties a s  King. I f  no one could feel secure in the position of heir 
apparent and if the c hoice were recognized as an entirely provisional 
one, it seems to me that it would b e  advarntageous from the view-point
of shaping the c haracter of the person provisionally chosen as the heir 
apparent. 
If the newly elected King should die b efore his succ essor has been 
c hosen, then it would seem b est to follow out the same principles, i.e. 
the Privy Counc il should meet a nd choose from the Royal Princes freely
and without restricrtion whoever seems to them best fitted and most com­
petent to carry out the duties of the King. 
The foregoing suggestions, it would seem to me, are those b est 
calculated to secure the most competent and ablest man for the Kingship.
I t  would probably also lessen the likelihood of regencies which are apt
to b e  exceedingly dangerous in a country like Siam, where ab solute 
power is vested in the King. 
Therefore, for all these reasons, my answer to the 1st and 2nd 
questions which Y our Majesty proposed are a s  follows: 
The King should have the right to choose any Royal Prince whatever 
as his heir, b ut not without the advice and consent of the Privy Coun­
c il. This suggestion, as Y our Majesty i ntimated, would be  more consis­
tent with the· idea of an  el�cted King, and would very greatly strertgthen 
the position and influence of the new King. 
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If the se ideas are sound, the present law of success ion . should be 
dropped and a new fundamental law in accordance with these ideas should 
be framed and promulgated. 
I I • FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT 
I do not think that it i s  practicable to consider at this t ime the 
organization of a popular representative parliament in Siam. A work­
able parliament i s  absolutely dependent upon an intelligent electorate. 
Without intelligent control by the people such a body would be sure to 
degenerate into a corrupt and tyrannical body. Unti l  the rank and file 
of people in Siam have generally received a higher degree of education 
than at present it would seem therefore to be exceedingly dangerous to 
try to set  up a popularly controlled parliamentary body . It therefore 
seems inescapable that at least for the present absolute power mus t 
continue to rest in the King . 
Absolute Monarchy can never be free from the great and vital dan­
ger of an incompetent or weak King . In the hands of an enlightened
Monarch , such as King Chulalongkorn , rapid progress  can be made and 
national interests can be greatly advanced , but if an incompetent or 
weak Monarch comes to the throne all the progress  of a former reign may 
be lost  and the country may be faced with the dire alternative of di­
saster or revolution .n . Anything which will help to prevent such disas­
trous abuse of power will tend to promote the ultimate welfare of the 
Monarchy. 
Viewed from this light the system of government by a Premier would 
seen to have distinct advantages. In the first place , if the actual 
work of g.overnment is committed to a Premier , if corruption creeps into 
the gov�rnment or if intriguers or self- interested cliques manage to 
obtain the reins of power ,  as .nlong as the King remains s incere and is 
access ible to others , the Premier can always be removed and the group
of intriguers upse t ,  whereas a King cannot be removed .  In other words , 
in every country there should always be held in reserve some power
other than revolution, to remove one who proves himself in actual prac­
tice unfit for the carrying on of the government , and in  a country like 
Siam this reserve power logically sho�ld be exercised by the King . By
the transfer of the detailed work of government from the shoulders of 
the King to those  of an appointed Premie r ,  Siam would achieve a reserve 
power which would make poss ible through peaceful means the removal of 
whoever proves unfit to do the work of government; and in this way , the 
country would gain a guarantee against incapacity and poss ibly tyranny 
on the part of the one carrying on the actual operations of governmentn. 
In the s econd place , the system of government by a Premier has the 
advantage of allowing a complete freedom in the s e lection of the one 
respon�ible for the· carrying on of the go�ernment . The person thus 
selected need not be confined necessarily to Royal Blood , nor to K ingly 
rank, but can be selected with absolute freedom with a view sole ly to 
ability for the work of government. The work of carrying on the gov­
ernment may be placed upon the shoulders of whoever of all the men in 
the Kingdom is best fitted for the task by reason of his integrity,  his 
s trength of characte r ,  his executive capacity,  and his abi lity to trans­
late des ired policies into practical achievementn. 
A third advantage in the system of Government by a Premier is that 
under a Premier the.nwork of the separate Ministers can be more eas ily 
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unif ied and co- ordinat ed. During t he la st reign one could not but feel 
that much was lost by a lack of co-ordinat ion among t he separate Minis­
ters, and in those fields of work which spread bey ond the sphere of any 
singl e Ministry progress was often hampered or ent i rely blrocked. I t  is 
the duty of a Prermier to formulrate t he general pol icies to  be fol l owed 
by the Governme nt and to unify t he work of al l t he separat e Minist ries 
so as to attrain those desired polricies. A Premier can be thus acces­
sibl e in a way which is not open to  a King. Many of t he difficult ies 
of the l at e  reign were due to  t he fact that His l at e  Majesty was not 
freely accerssibl e to  t hose act ual ly carrying on the work of the govern­
mentr, and he therefore often made decisions based upon opinions gained 
from a singl e sel f-interested cl ique which did not make for t he welfare 
of Siam. Because those who care most for Siam and who exercised wise 
j udgment frequently coul d not reach him, he frequent ly failed to  know 
the trut h  underlying the situations with which he deal t ,  and therefore 
acted in ignorance sometrimes with regrett abl e result s. 
A fourt h advant age of t he system of P re mier Government is that it 
al l ows a division of work. Upon t he King fal l s  t he inescapabl e duty of 
performing innumerabl e ceremonial s, al l of which require t ime and 
st rengt h .  Upon t he King al so must fall t he decision of all questions 
of l arge natrional pol icy , --a t ask exacting the best of any man'rs t ime 
and strengt h. Probl ems invol ving t he family affairs of t he Royal Fami­
ly alrso fal l upon t he King's shoulders, as wel l as innumerabl e other 
dutries which no King can escape. These responsibil it ies are more t han 
suffi cient to  consume t he ful l  t ime and st rengt h of any one man. I f  t o  
all t hese is added t he weighty burden of carrying on t he actual work of 
G overnment and deciding tjle mult it udinous and endlress minor questions 
which t he conduct of government unforgivingly reqruires, t he burden be­
comes too great for any singl e man t o  bear. The work of actual govern­
ment is st renuous and exhaust ing,r--far more so than most peopl e real ize. 
If al l t his work is t hrown upon t he King in addition t o  his other grave
responsibilrities and burdens, either he will break under t he strain 
during a course of years, or else he wil l be compel l ed t o  negl ect , 
through sheer physical incapacity , reading many State papers which t he 
one responsibl e for t he government ought t o  read and seeing many peopl e 
which such a man ought t o  see. I t  is alrmost inevit abl e t hat he wil l 
become t ired and discouraged and in t i me fal l  into t he hands and under 
t he power of an intr iguing, cl ever group scheming for their own sel f­
advancement instead of for the wel fare of Siam. This was not true in 
t he early days when t he t ask of government had not assumed such l arge 
proportrions as it does to-dayr, and when t he work of government was 
simpl e and comparat ively easyr. As t he work of government becomes more 
and more complrex, however, t he t ime wil l soon come, if it has not al ­
ready done so, when no singl e man can possibly perform al l t he Cere­
monial s which t he King must perform, properly decide l arge issues of 
nat ional pol icy , set t l e  questions arising in t he Royal Family , and in 
addition at t he same t ime carry on t he arduous and strenuous work of 
detrailred governmentr. 
For all t hese reasons it woul d seem manifest that the King shoul d 
be relrieved from t he hard work of government and t hat t his shoul d be 
instead pl aced upon t he shoulders of a Premier appointed by t he King.
Such an arrangement does not mean t hat t he King woul d be shorn of his 
power. The ul t imat e power woul d st ill rest wit h t he King. I t  woul d 
mean t hat the King woul d place upon t he Premier t he responsibilrities 
for carrying on t he government and t hat the P remier would al ways be re­
sponsibl e t o  t he King. The King woul d be relrieved of much of t he de­
t ailed burden of government , but questions of l arge pol icy would still 
be referred for decision t o  t he King. 
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Under such a scheme it would be vital and essential that all re­
s po ns i bi lity should be corncent rated i n  the Premier. He t herefore 
should alone have the power. of appointing the Ministers of State, who 
would be responsible for the conduct of the work in their Ministries 
directl y and immediately to the Premirer. All questions should go from 
the Ministers directly to the Premier. Under such a scheme i t  would 
seem vital that the King should not himself select or choose any of the 
Minirsters. I f  he did so the Premier could not be made responsibl e for 
the work of the Ministers thus chosen. Responsibility in such a case 
would rest rather with the King, whereas the whole underlying concep­
tion of government by a Premier is rather to concentrate r esponsibility 
in the Premier so that for any and all mistakes or errors in the work 
of the Ministries the King can blame and hold entirel y responsible the 
Premier under whose control and direction the work is carried on. 
There is one danger which must be faced under such a system. I t  
is possible that the Premier might seek to absorb so much power that he 
would become a rival or even o�ershadow the King, as was the case, for 
example, with the Shoguns in J apan. Although this is a possible dan­
ger, I do not feel that it is a ver y real one under the conditions 
existing in Siam, unless indeed the King should be so manifestly incom­
petent or unfit for his duties that he ought to be stripped of power. 
If the Premier seemed to be scheming for personal power the King could 
of course always remove him. I f, nevertheless, such a danger were felt 
to be real i t  might be guarded against by various possible method s. 
For instance, the Ministry of War or of National Defence might be 
placed directly under the King and therrefore made entirely independent 
of the Premier. I n  this way the Ki ng could keep direct control of the 
Army and see that only officers loyal to him were appointedr. U nder 
such a scheme the Ministry of War would have to be separately budgeted 
for and entirely separated from the other work of government. I n  my 
opinion, however, such a prercaution as·kee�ing the Army out of the con­
trol of the Premier would under the condit ions now prevailing in Siam 
be unnecessary. 
I quite realiz e that there are many diffi cultires which must be 
faced in creating a form of Government by a Premier. Both the concep­
tion of making the various Minister s r esponsi ble to the Premier instead 
of to t he King and the idea of the Premier or a Minirster r esigning be­
cause he personally disagrees with the pol icy advocated by his superior
alrthough he i s  well qualified for hi s post and entirely acceptable to 
his superior are quite foreirgn to the ideas at present generally pre­
vairling in Siam, and would have to be developed cautiously and with 
care. Nevertheless, both of these ideas must be thoroughly learned 
before Parliamentary Government can be achieved, and if, as I hope,
Siam will one day achieve some form of Parliamentary G overrnment, these· 
prerequisite ideas must first be mastered and generally undrerstood by
the people. I f  these first steps to Parliamentary Government must be 
mastered some day, I see no r eason why they should not be mastered now. 
Very much, of course, d epends on personalities. I s  it possible at 
this time to secure someone competent and willing to undertake the in­
finitely important task of accomplishing this transforrmation and carry­
ing on the G overnment as Premier? The programme to be followed vitally
depends upon the answer to thirs question. 
I n  answer to the 3rd and 4th questions proposed by Y our Majesty, 
my answer is that Si�m I hope some day may have a parliamentary form of 
government, but that the country is not yet prepared for representative 
government. I b elieve that those who are shaping the destinies of Siam 
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should not lose sight of a representative form of government at some 
future time when the spread of education makes this possible , for I be­
lieve that some such form o f  Government is inevitable  and desirable 
with the growth of  education and widespread intelligence among the 
populatnionn. Whether or not the form of government should be the Anglo­
Saxon type of parliamentary government is a question which need not be 
decided at this timen. My own hope is that Siam will never become com­
pletely Westernized but will retain in her development her own individ­
uality. Her institutions , govenrnmental and otherwise , should not be 
blindly copied from Western nations , but should be the result and out ­
growth of  her own genius and experiencen. 
IBE SUPREME COUNCIL 
The creation of the Supreme Council at the beginning of  Your 
Majnesty's reign was to my mind a masterstroke. By creating a Supreme
Council endowed with high power and by placing upon this the five 
ablest and strongest men of  the Kingdom , every one of them of  unques­
tionable integrity and patriotism , Your Maj esty struck at the very root 
of the intrigue and underground scheming which had been going on before 
Your Majnesty came to the thronen. The result was the gain of  immediate 
confidence on the part of  the people of Siam and a great strengthening 
of the position of  the Monarch . In  my own opinion the functioning of  
the Supreme Council has amply j ustified its creation , and personally I 
do not feel that as long as it keeps free of intrigue it should be  
allowed to die a natural death . It seems to me that there are very
distinct functions which the Supreme Council can fulfil under the Pre­
mier scheme of  government which I have been suggestingn. 
Although the Premier should carry on the entire work of  the gov­
€ rnment , large questions of national policy cannot fail to keep con­
s tantly arising,  and these will have to be referred for decision to 
Your Majnesty. Many of  these must be  questions which from their very 
nature should not be decided single-handed and without help by anyone . 
Your Maj esty will doubtless wish to secure the advice of a few of  the 
wisest men of the realm . Such questions might well be referred by Your 
Maj esty to the Supreme Council for their advice and suggestion, always
reserving the power of  final decision to  Yourself. In  other words , my
conception of  the functions of  the Supreme Council under such a scheme 
of  government would be that it should form a purely advisory body to 
which the K ing might turn for advice on question [s] of large policy . 
It should have nothing whatsoever to do with the executive work of gov­
ernmentn. Presumably the Premier should be a member o f  the Supreme
Council , so that the person charged with the actual conduct of  the 
govenrnment could have the b enefit of  the advice and views of  the mem­
bers of  the Supreme Council .  On the other hand, no member of  the Cabi­
net other than the Premier should sit in the Supreme Council.  It 
should be kept sharply distinct from the Cabinet and should be confined 
purely to the giving of  advice direct to the King on questions of  pol­
icy. 
I realize that criticisms have been made concerning the function­
ing of  the Supreme Council, many o f  them unj ust, yet some o f  them not 
perhaps without foundation. To my mind the advantages of the Supreme
Council outweigh the obj ections to it. It serves as an e ffective pre­
ventative of  backstairs influence which must always be  an everpresent 
danger in [ an] absolute Monarchy. I t  provides for an effective avenue 
by which outside opinion may reach the ears of  the King, and thus 
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enabl e him the better to undrerstand and appreciate the truth underly in g 
any given situation. It gives to the King the benefit  of the wi s dom 
and experience of the ablest men of the Kingdom. 
On the other hand, it has its dangers if its powers are not 
strictl y confined to the giving of advice and if its advice i s  not 
strictl y confined to question [ s] of policy. There wil l al ways be the 
danger that the very eagerness of its members to correct abuses will 
l ead it to interfere with the work of the various Minristries and therer­
by to detract from the concentration of responsibil ity which should 
center in each of the Minristersr. I f  the Supreme C ouncil once begins to 
encroach upon the executive f ields of government by interfe-ring with 
the conduct of work in the separate Ministries, by advising as to ap­
pointments to be made under the rank of Minrister of State, or in any 
other way taking part in the executive functions of government, it will 
thereby at once lessen the efficiency and increase the diffriculties of 
every Minister. This must be an everpresent danger unless the powers 
of the Supreme C ouncil are strictly confined and limited solely to the 
giving of advice and to the giving of advice on question s  only of pol­
icy. Quesrtions of appointments should presumably be l eft to the free 
discretion of the Ministers. 
Again, as long as the members of the Supreme Council sit in the 
Cabinet, there is the danger of their forming a clique within the C abi­
net. The C abinet members will be ignorant of whether or n ot any issue 
under discussion in the C abinet has already been discurssed in the 
Supreme C ouncil, and the members of the C abinet will consequentl y be 
likely to feel that they are often acting in the dark. May there not 
be a dan ger that many  of tl1e C abinet members will s imply watch which 
way the· members of the Supreme Council vote, and will cast their vote 
accordingly, instead of exercising an independent j udgment and feeling 
a real sens e of responrsibility? I t  seems open to conrsiderable question
whether the Supreme Council, if it is to perform its most u seful func­
tions, should not be kept entirely separate from the C abinet and the 
members thereof except the Premier refrain from sitting in the Cabinet 
meetings. 
In answer to the 5th question put by Y our Majresty my answer is 
that in my j udgment the Supreme Council s hould be continued as a perma­
nent insrtitution of the country, but that its power should be carefully 
defined by law and s hould be limited to the giving of advice and to 
giving such advice only on question s of underly ing policy. I believe 
it should be separated from the C abinet and s hould act entirely inde­
pendently of that body. I t  should keep rigorously free of interfering
in executive matters. 
I n  the 6th question ,  Your Majesty asks whether we shou ld have a 
Prime Minis ter and whether iuch a system should be inaugurated n ow. I 
have already given the reasons why I believe that Siam should have a 
Prime Minister. I also believe that the s ys tem s hould be inaugurated 
now. If such a fundamental change is to be made, it would seem far 
easier to make it at the beginning of a reign when new policies are 
being formed and n ew paths are being blazed than later on when the con­
duct of government has become settled in f ixed channels and when re­
stricting obligations have grown out of troublesome s ituations or trou­
blesome pers onalitie� . If a change such as this is to be put into 
force, it would seem best to do s o  at the beginning of a reign so that 
the King can devote fresh energy and many y ears to the gradu al moulding 
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o f  tl1e s ys tem into the most efficient form of government whi cl1 can be 
evolve<l to meet the distinctive conditions and need of the country. 
I t  may be argued that there is at present no need for such a 
change , since under Y our Majesty's wise guidance with the assistance 
of the Supreme Council the goverrnment in Siam at the presernt t ime is 
entirely satrisfactrory. I cannot feel the force of such an argument. 
While it is quit e true that the present government of Siam i s  funct ion­
ing well, when one t akes a far l ook into t he future one must r eckon 
with a popular demand for some parliamentary or more populrar form of 
governmentr. This necessitates the making at some time of fundament al 
changes, and if progress demands t hese changes, surely the time to  make 
them is when a competrent and wise Monarch is on the throne, assisted by
able and patrriotic leaderrs. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
The question has been asked whether or not Siam should have a 
Legislative Council. I hope that some day it will be possibl e to form 
a popular and reprresentative l egislative body charged with the framing 
of the laws; this seems to me highly desirable and ultimately inevita­
ble. As already suggested, however, I do not feel that the rank and 
file of the people in Siam are at present sufficient l y  educated and 
interested in public affairs to  make the forrmation of such a body pos­
sible at t his time. 
F urthermore, I see very little advantage in the formation of a 
legislative body or council composed of r epresent atives f rom each of 
the Government ministries. I t  seems questionab le whether any useful 
purpose would be served by such a body other tharn that which is already 
being performed by the Cabinet and by the Departrment of Legislative 
Redaction, and such a council might add infrinitely to the delay in 
securing the passage of new l aws. Until the t ime when a law making
body can be elected by the rank and file of people and be thus directly 
reprresentative of the population as a wholre, in my opinion the forrma­
tion of a legislative council would pr obably serve no useful purpose. 
On the other hand, I can see a decided advantage in finding some 
method for making possible the interpolat ion [ intrerpell ation] of gov­
ernment Ministerrs. I f  the policy of any Ministry is misunderrstood by
the people generally, as long as it is an honest policy t he Minister 
ought to welcome the opportunity of explaining and defending the policy 
so as to disarm and silence criticism. I f  on the other hand, the pol­
icy is due to intrigue or adopted for selfish reasons the method [ of ]  
interpolation is often the best way to  br ing the mat ter to the atten­
tion of those at the head of the government. I f  it is possible there­
fore to secure a reprresentative body which will represent popular opin­
ion, I woul d like to see such a body given t he power to  put questions 
to the Ministers of Goverrnment. Such an outlet for popular opinion 
woul d form a kind of safety valve and do much to prevent such popular 
opinion from becoming by r eason of its suppression dangerous. I f  the 
system of Municipal Councils in the varrious cities proves practicable, 
it might later become possible to create a body containing one or more 
reprresentatives from each important city with the power thus publicly 
t o  interpolate the Ministers. This is a matter, however, which should 
probably be left as to details until a later time when the success of 
the Municipal Councils has become assured. I n  the meantime it might 
prove advantageous to allow the member s  of the Supreme Council to 
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interpo late the Ministers at a meet ing pres ided over by the King . 
Under the Premier system o f  Government i f  the members o f  the Sup reme 
Council could thus call  the Ministers to account , i t  would s e rve as an 
effective che ck  against the corrupt use o f  power by Mini s tersi· appointed
by an unscrupulous Prem i e r .  I t  would a l s o  s erve to reduce t o  a minimum 
misunde rstandings between the Cab inet and the Supreme Counc i l , for the 
quicke s t  way to prevent m isunderstandings i s  frank and fu l l  discus s ion. 
In reply therefore to the 7th ques t ion p roposed by Your Maj e s ty , 
I am not in favour of  creating a Legislative Counc i l , but I should sug­
gest the g iving of s e r ious consi deration to the l ater  formation of s ome 
body repres ent i ng popular opinion which should have the power to inter­
polate Cab inet Minis ters , and unt i l  such t ime the giving of this power 
to the Supreme Counc i l .  
I I I. FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 
I n  the 8th que s t ion Your Maj e s ty asks whe ther I have any opinion 
as to S i am ' s  financial pol icy.  S ince I am not a finan c i al expert , I 
think I should leave such [ a ]  que s t ion for the advice of a man l ike  S i r  
Edward Coo k ,  who i s  far better  equipped than I to adv i s e  on the finan­
cial  policy o f  S iam. Neverthel e s s , there are one or two matters con­
cern ing wh i ch I feel rather s trong l y ,  but upon whi ch b ecaus e they are 
quite unrelated to the other sub j ects  o f  this  Memorandum,  I shall  speak 
very b r i efly . 
S i am ,  in my opinion , should not b e  s o  l argely dependent upon a 
s ingle crop . I n  the case  of unfavourab le  weather condi tions and a con­
sequent shortage or failure o f  the rice crop , it means that Siam suf­
fers unduly , and is  some t imes p l aced in a temporarily precarious finan­
cial pos it i on . I t  does  not s e em wise  to p l ace on [ a l l ]  one ' s  eggs i n  
a s ingle b asketi. I the re fore sometimes wonder whither S i am ought not 
to t ake s teps to engage in the cul t ivat ion of s ome s econdary crop , such 
as tobac co.  I have been informed that there is  no reason , s o  far . as 
c l imat i c  condit ions are concerned , why tobacco s hould not be produced 
in S i am and that i t  could be produced in the off s e as ons b etween the 
rice crops . Why should S i am not profi t ,  as Java has done, from l arge 
tobacco crop s ?  Not only wou ld this divers i fy S i am ' s  crops , but i t  
would o f  course cons iderab ly increase the nat ional production and the 
cons equent revenues of the governmenti. S imil arly , there s eems no rea­
s ons [reason]  why Siam should not grow hemp and other s im i l ar products . 
Might not more a s s i s tance also  b e  g iven to efforts to obtain the 
s owing o f  a more s t andard and better rice seed ,  and thus to s tandardize 
the rice p roduced in S i am and to improve the qual ity of the crop?
Aga i n ,  might not the fisheries be protected and the product ion of fish 
thus increas ed? I bel i eve that certain k inds o f  fi sheries are now 
b e ing inj ured through l ack  o f  protection. With proper fish protection 
and an effic ient Fi shery Department not only could this inj ury b e  
s topped but the amount o f  fish ava ilable  for . food actually increase d .  
The ide a  which I am trying to suggest  i s  that the production o f  
Siam should b e  s t imul ated and increased i n  orde r  t o  increase the pro s ­
perity of the country. All  this would seem l argely dependent upon the 
e fforts of the Department o f  Agriculture , but that Department ,  o f  
course , i s  helpless  to. undert ake such activities  wi thout adequate
funds .  I nasmuch as  the future prosperity o f  S i am depend s  l argely upon
the s t imul ation and increase o f  her agricu l tural res ources ,  does i t  not 
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seem that pe rhaps  a greater p ropor tion of the revenues of t he Kingdo1n 
shou ld be allrotte d to the Ministry of Agr j culture than at p resent al ­
l owed? Might not a similrar remark be made with regard t o  t he Ministry
of Education, whose work again vital l y  concerns the future deve l opme nt 
of S i am? The thought in the back of my mind w i th re gard to the que s­
ti on of financial pol icy is the fund amental probl e m  of whether i t  might 
not be w i se to re consider afresh the proporti on of revenues a l l otted to 
each Ministr y in the l ight of the future hope of Siam. 
During the ye ar B. E .  2467 ( 1 9 24 /25 ] ou t of a total national expen­
diture of Tes. 9 6 , 4 52 , 497. 00 the e xpenditure of the Mini stry of Lands 
and Agriculture was onl y Tes. 4 , 1 7 7 , 709.00 and of the Ministry of Edu­
cat i on onl y Tes. 2, 64 0 , 34 4 .r00. Shou l d  not the al l otme nt of reve nues 
as betwee n  the different Ministr ie s be fre shl y considered and deter­
mined more in accordance with what wil l  make for the gre atest prospe r ­
ity and strongest Siam of the future? 
The 9th question which You r  Maj e sty proposed i s  whether anything 
can be done to make the Chine se become Siamerse as in the old d ays. 
This is a matte r of such far reaching imporrtance that I do not fee l  
that I ought to venture an opinion as to it without considerabl y more 
study than that which I have been abl e to de vote to it in the two d ays 
since Your Maj e sty's querstions were put to me. I should l ike before 
comi ng to any definite concl usions to discuss further with Your  Maj esty 
ce rtain underl ying prob l e ms of pol icy upon which this que stion must 
ul ti matel y depend. 
In order to put into concrete shape some of the ide as which I have 
e xp re ssed to Your  Maj esty, and in compl iance with Y our  Maj esty's de ­
sire , I have put into the form of a prel iminary draft of a shor t con­
stitution the framework of the gove r nment discussed above . I am sure 
that Your Maj e sty wil l unde rstand that this is not intended in an y 
sense as a finished document but me rel y  as a hastil y p repared starting
point upon which to base l ater discussions. 
Signed/ PHYA KALYAN MAITRI 
(Francirs B. Sayre) 
OUTLIN E OF PREL IMINARY DRAFT 
ARTICLE I 
The Sup re me Power throughout the Kingdom shal l be vested in His 
Maj e sty the King. 
ARTICLE I I  
The King shal l appoint a Premie r who shal l be re sponsibl e to the 
King for the e ntire e xe cutive work  of the Gover nme nt. He may be dis­
missed by the King at any timer. 
ARTICL E I I I  
The Premier shal l appoint and may rermove on his own re sponsibility 
the Min iste rs  of State at the heads of the various Gover nment Minis-
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tr i e s .  I le sha l l  b e  re sponsibl e to the King for the entire  work of each 
M i n i s try. l fc  shall  also be  charged w i th the duty of c arry ing out the 
gc nc rt1 l policies  of the Government as directed by the K ing and of co­
ordinating for thi s purpose the work of the separate Mini stri es. 
ARTIrCLE IV 
Each Government Minirster shal l b e  responsibl e  di rectly to the Pre­
mier for the work of hi s own Mini stry. He shal l assi st in carrying out 
the g eneral pol icies di rected by the Premier. 
ARTI CLE V 
The Cab inet shal l b e  call ed together and presided over by the Pre­
mier , and shal l b e  composed of al l the Ministers of State. I t  niay di s­
cuss matters of common i ntere st, but the responsi b i l i ty for al l dec i -
sions shall rest with the Premier. 
ARTICLE VI 
The Premier wil l  refer to the King for dec i si on all questirons of 
l arge g eneral pol i cy.  I n  al l matters he shal l b e  subject t o  the di r ect 
control of the King. 
ARTICLE V I I  
The King shal l appoin t  a Supreme Council of- fi ve members. The 
Premier shal l b e  a member ex offi ci o, but no  other Cabinet officer 
shal l b e  a memb er. The Supreme Council  shal l exercise no  executi ve 
power whatsoever . I ts func ti on shal l consi st solely i n  g i ving to the 
King when call ed upon to do so advi ce  on questi ons of general poli cy 
or on questi ons other than t he detai l ed execu tive work of the Govern­
ment. I t  shal l have no  power to advise as to appointments nor as to 
details of administrati on . I t  shal l however have the power to i nterpo­
l ate the Premier or any Cab inet officer. 
ARTI CLE VI I I  
The King shal l appoint and may remove at any time the membrers of 
the Privy Counci l .  
' ' 
ARTIrCLE IX 
Within three day s of ascending the throne the hei r apparent shal l 
b e  provi si onal ly chosen by the King wi th the advi ce and c on sent of the 
Privy Counci l .  The choic e shal l be  l i mi ted to sons of a King and a 
Queen or to those of Royal B l ood, but shal l not be  otherwise l i mi ted 
ei ther by rank or sen i ority. The c hoi ce of the heir apparent shall not 
b e  i rrervocab l e, but shal l b e  freshl y made by the K i ng with the advice 
and consent of the Privy Counci l at the end of each five-yiear perio d 
thereafter .  (Note: Or perhaps a period l onger than five years may b e  
desi red. ) Should  the King di e b efore any c hoice has b een made, the 
hei r apparent shal l b e  chosen i mmediately after the King's death by the 
Privy Council. I n  al l cases three quarters of the memb ers of the Privy 
Council  then within the Kingdom shal l be  n ecessary to el ect. 
ARTI CLE X 
The judi ci al power, subject to the supreme power of the King,
shal l b e  vested in the Supreme or Dika  Court  and in such infer i or 
Courts as the King may from t i me to time create. 
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ARTICLE XI  
The supreme legislative power shall rest in the King. 
ARTICLE XII 
Changes in this fundamental l aw may be made only by the King with 
the advice and consent of  three quarters of the members of the Privy 
Council. 
C. PRI NCE DAMRONG'S MEMORANDUM 
[In a draft covering letter (in Thai) from Prince Damrong to King 
Praj adhipok , dated August 1 ,  1926, Prince Darnrong says that he is 
submitting his views in English so that they can be read by Sayre 
without going to the troub le of having a translation done .  .He adds 
that he realizes that his English grammar is imperfecte, but that 
nonetheeless he hopes that Sayre can follow his argumentse. 
The text printed here is  taken from a copy of Prince Damrong ' s  
third draft of the Memorandume. Copies of the first two drafts are.e
also in the file . ]  
MEMORANrDUM 
1. I have carefully read His Majes ty ' s  memorandum, as well as 
that of Phya Kalyan. I have nothing except endorsrement to expres s re­
garding H . M.r's memorandum, but to P . K. 's [Phya Kalyan's ] memorandum, 
whi le admiring the expos i ti on of his vi ews and agreeing to i t  i n  s ome 
parts , I regret to find mys elf differ from him i n  others . But time allowed 
to formulate my ansrwer is short, and the handicap in  my cas e by having 
to express my vi ews in  English ins tead of Siames e, compels me to write 
only bri efly. However the proposals made by P.K. in  his memorandum are 
of two kindsr, namely, propos al on matters to be promulgated i mmediately 
and proposa l  on matters to be given further cons iderati onsr. I will 
only comment on the former. 
2 .  The mos t i mportant proposal, as i t  s eems to me, is to change 
the s ys tem of admi ni s tration of the Ki ngdom by the appoi ntment of a 
Prime Minis ter wi th the power of s electi on and d i s missal of minisrters 
of s tate, and wi th the s ole power to formulate policy and direct the 
admini s trati ons of the Kingdom, s ubject of course to the consent of the 
King and the shadow of a control by the Supreme Counci l of State. I am 
bound to admi t my limitatirons both in  the s tudi es and the knowledge of 
the adminisrtratirons of European countriesr. My i mpres s i on i s  that a 
Prime Minis ter i s  i ndis pens i ble i n  parliamentary government, but i n  a 
country where abs olute monarchy prevails  s uch as , for example, Rus s i a ,  
Turkey, and Pers i a ,  the s ys tem did not s eem to do much good without a 
s trong monarch ,  nor i ndeed able to safe [save] a weak monarch from his 
ruin. But I repeat again  that I do not cons ider mysrelf competent to 
judge matters of European nature, s o  I will confine my comment entir ely 
to wha t  I thi nk would affect Siam and the Siamese. 
3. First of all I will cons ider the general i mpres s i rons tha t  i t  
would likely make i n  the country, becaus e a Pri me Minisrter such as pro­
posed by P. K. , or , i ndeed , a Prime Minis ter i n  the European s ens e, is 
an unknown function i n  Siam, and to create one i s  an i nnovati on that 
would naturally give r i s e  to all s orts of conjectures . Plaus i ble ex­
planation may of cours e be wri tten in  the preamble of the decree, but 
would i t  be pos s i ble to c onvi nc e the people? The fact tha t  the Ki ng 
has appoi nted another pers on, whom they do not r es pect as much as the 
King hims elf , to gover n the country i n  his s tead , will mos t naturally 
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make them ask , why? Is it  because the King does not care to do the 
work as a King should do , or that the Supreme Council,  seeing that the 
King is too weak to rulen, persuaded him to appoint a Prime Minister? 
In e ither case the authority and the prestige of the King would suffer 
in the eyes of the peoplen. The innovation may be applaused [applauded]
by some Westernized Siamese , but how many are they comparing with the 
whole people of Siam? In  shortn, I am of opinion that the innovation 
would create a general unfavourable impress ion in the country. One 
must not forget that general impress ion means much in this country, as 
it has already proved by the result of H.M. ' s  first act in creat ing the 
Supreme Council of Staten. 
4. I will now cons ider  the likely effect that the innovation 
would take upon the ruling class ,  taking the effect already seen by the 
creation of the S . C. S. [Supreme Council of State ]  as a standard of 
j udgementn. I t  would in all probability create 3 kinds of sentiment , . 
i . e .  , 
(A) Those who applause [applaud] and [are ] willing to support the 
innovation, either by convict ion , or by allowing loyalty to the King to 
override their  conviction, and those who applause because they expect 
personal benefit from itn. 
(B) Those who are indifferent and sceptical , either because they
have no interest  of their own to concern , or being opportunists s imply 
awaiting to profit themselves out of whatever result it may bring . 
(C) Those who oppose it e ither by their own conviction, or by per­
sonal j ealousy ,  or havi�g profit or interest to lose  by the innovation. 
In  fact no matter what s ystem of government is adopted it can 
never give universal satisfaction , and there [are ] bound to be divi­
sions of sentiment something s imilar to what I have said.  Then_ only
thing to be hoped for is that the proportion of favourable sentiment 
be the majority , which I do not think would be the case in the appoint­
ment of a Prime Minister as proposed. 
5 .  H.M. rightly stated in his memorandum that he has received [a]
deplorable inherintance when he ascended the Thronen, because the author­
ity of the sovereign had fallen much in respect and confidence , the 
treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy , and the government was cor­
rupted and the services more or less in confus ion . I t  was the master's 
stroke of H . M. in the creation of the S. C. S. immediately after his ac­
cess ion that instantly restored the general confidence in the Thronen. 
Now let us look at the compos ition and the working of the S . C. S .  The 
Council is a committee of five persons of repute and experience pres ide 
[presided over ]  always by the King in person, and every resolution 
passed in the Council is executed by the King alone , no member of the 
Council is ever mentioned in any act , nor has any of them interfered 
with the work of ministerial departments , and yet accusations are not 
wanting , that the Council has usurped H.M .  ' s  authority and power ,  and 
also trying [has tried] to interfere with the ministerial responsibil­
ity. I am glad indeed that H.M. himself refuted these  accusations in 
his memorandum . But the fact that mischievous accusations are capable
of being made agains t a Council of five persons (perhaps I may be al­
lowed to call of high repute) is enough to make one realise what diffi­
culties a Prime Minister alone would have to face against all sorts of 
intrigue , while on the other hand he is being held responsible for the 
good administration of the country. Here one discerns the necess ity 
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which may arise that a Prime Ministe r would be obliged to resort tor. 
stratage ms, good or  bad, i n  orde r to kee p  hi s pos ition  o r  otherwi s e  
thro w u p  his apporintment altogether . 
6 .  Now I come to the perrso n and the res ponsibility of the Prime 
Ministe r. No doubt H . M. wil l select the be st qualified pe rso n in the 
Kingdo m as his first Prime Ministe r, and le t us pre su me that the se lec­
tion mee ts with universal appro val. The firs t impre ssio n cre ated by
the appointment o f  the Prime Ministe r would be that he i s  expected to 
impro ve the administration in such a way that wi ll give e ntire satis­
faction to the public. Should he fail to re ali se gene ral e xpe ctations 
howe ve r unre aso nable , he would always stand to have censure s  heaped 
upon his head which would make it extre mely difficult fo r a Prime Min­
iste r to maintain the public confidence for any le ngth o f  timer. Mo re ­
o ve r  the Prime Minister , ho wever  wise and able he may be , has to carry 
o n  his work with the approval of the King as we ll as loyal suppo rt and 
co mpetent assistance o f  the ministe rs o f  state . How is he to be assured 
o f  it? It is indeed proposed that the Prime Ministe r should have the 
power o f  re mo val and selection o f  ministe rs. But such po we rs have al­
ways been considered to belong to the King alo ne , and considered to be 
the mainstay against personal intrigue o f  o the rs. I t  will be a gre at. 
diffe rence be tween  the King e xe rcising tho se powers in the S. C. S . , and 
permitting the Prime Ministe r to exercise the m with his approval. I f  
·the King's o wn backstair[ s] is conside re d  o bnoxio us, what would it ber
to have ano the r one o f  the Prime Ministe r? Let  us suppose that nothing
I have said would happen.  No w if the Pre mie r co nsiders one or  more 
ministers o f  state inco mpe tent, who would he select to re place them? 
Naturally he would select those who m he has confidence i n  [ as regards] 
ability as well as loyalty torwards him. He re we may discern the e le ­
ment o f  party government introduced into Siam but without parliame ntary 
co ntrol; such e le me nt co uld e asily _ tends [ te nd]  to be a go ve rnment by
factiorn.  
7 .  The rerlatiorn be tween  the So verrerign and the Prime Minister  i s  
also most important and most delicate matte r. I t  would be utopian to 
expect that the King and the Prime Ministe r wo uld alrways see e ye to 
eye ,  o r  indeed that every Prime Ministe r would have the same degree o f  
favo ur and confidernce o f  the Kingr. I f  the King wants to dismiss a 
Prime Ministe r, he wo uld have to find [ a] convi nci ng re ason for so 
doing, but in the absernce o f  [ a] parliament who is to furnish the con­
vincing reaso n that protects H . M . 's de cisio n from being conside red u n­
just and arbitrary? The dismissed Prime Ministe r natu rally wou ld not 
proclaim his o wn faults, and he , being a grerat man, may have more o r  
less ad mirers who agree with him, and herre we see the e le me nt o f  o ffi­
cial o pposition be ing introduced into Siam, and again without parlia­
mentary co ntrol .  But the worse [ worst] woul d  happe n whe n the King 
wants to dismiss a Prime Ministe r and he has the general suppo rt o f  the 
peo ple , e ve n  in Bangkok aLoner. 
8. There is anorther thing which in Siam is still differ ent from 
Europe an countrie s whe re the syste m o f  gove rnment by Prime Ministe r 
e xiste d .  I n  a country like England or  France where government change sr. 
acco rding to the will o f  parliame nt, or  e ve n  Russia in the old days
when ministe rs were o ften changed according to the will o f  the Mo narch, 
in those countrie s they have organised de partme nts o f  Civil Service in 
which the permanent o fficials run the work; the minister only directs 
the policy, so a change o f  a ministe r does no t affect the works [ work] 
o f  the department. Now in Siam,. at present at any rate, and I am o f  
the o pinion that for so me time to come yet, the ministe r  is the backbone 
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of the ministry he presides [ over]n. The organization as well as the 
work of a department are still visibly affected by the competency of 
the ministe r .  That is why even without constant changes of the minis­
ter it is difficult to find a real [ly] competent man as head of a min­
isterial departmentn. I f  a ministerial post becomes unpermanent before 
a thorough organisation is made in the ministries in the same way as in 
European countries, I am afraid local discipline will also break down, 
because instead of looking to one chief all the time, speculation as to 
a coming chief  would constantly arisen. I t  may be argued that the Prime 
Minister is expected to cure all those imperfections, but from the na­
ture of things existing in this country as aforesaid, can one ma� do 
it? It may be argued again that the answer could be known only if we 
give the idea a trialn. But why run the risk of a trial for the sake of 
an idea when there is no necessity . 
9 .  I do not wish it to be understood that I think parliamentary 
government and the system of government by having a Prime Minister are 
forever unfit for Siam. I only maintain that both are unfit and unde­
sirable in the condition and circumstances which now exist in Siam, and 
the result would be disastrous even if the system of  government by a 
Prime Minister alone is adopted now . What Siam urgently wants at the 
present moment is to remedy the evils [ that] existed before H . M. came 
to the Throne, and to organise an efficient administration of the King­
dom before anything else. I n  this respect H.M .  himself has done a 
great act, which can never be overpraised, by th� creation of the 
S . C . S . ,  and himself working with it loyally and arduously with the 
satisfactory results, that confidence in the Government has beenn.nre­
established, and the national budget balanced, and put a stop of offi­
cial embezzlement and irregularities by removing undesirables from 
offices and putting in competent men to do the work of reorganisation 
of the administrationsn. One should not forget that all the good works 
accomplished by H.M .  were done within the last ten months, and there 
are many more works to be done, and "Rome was not built in a day . "  
Even if the innovation is introduced I doubt whether it can accomplish 
more rapidly, not to say, or better .  I am an old man and may be con­
sidered naturally conservative, but with sincere conviction I beg leave 
to ask that what fault or drawback the present system has shown, so as 
to endanger the safety or retard the progress of Siam, if it is allowed 
to continue? I s  there any apparent and convincing necessity which re­
quires radical modification? If the benefit of  the present system is 
found to exist no longer or has been compromised ,  I do not think any
member of  the s . c . s . · would hesitate to remedy it even with its own dis­
solution, but if the S . C . S. is still considered useful, I beg to warn 
that the appointment of a Prime Minister as proposed, and no matter  
what the proposal may provide for, the S .  C .  S. is bo_und to be extin­
guished in so far as its usefulness is concerned even within the life­
time of the old men who now serve in it. 
10n. H . M .  has done me a great and gratifying honour by mentioning 
my name in his memorandum among the first and firm supporters of his 
idea in the creation of the S . C . S .  I did so because I was absolutely
convinced that such [ a ]  council alone would be practicable for the suc­
cessful administration of Siam under the present circumstances. I f  I 
remember rightly I have also expressed my opinion to H . M. even then, 
that I do not think a system of  government by Prime ·Minister would do 
in Siam . I t  was therefore a sort [source? ]  of pride and satisfaction 
to me to see the results of H . M .  ' s  creation of the S . C . S. ,  because itn· 
made me feel that I was not wrong in giving him my support, and I wish 
H . M. to know that it was a real pleasure to me when sitting in the 
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Council to see and feel that everyone of its members from the Kin g  
downwards discard (ed]  all personal ambitions and work [ed]  together 
solely for the benefit of Siam. 
11r. As regards the impracticability of having a parliamenrtary 
government in Siam till the people are sufficiently educarted to under­
stand their responsibility in the election, I entirely agree with P. K .  ' 
and think that he is absolutely right. I would only add that eithe r 
when the institution of the S.C.S. is found wanting in usefulnress, or 
when the time approaches that H.M. is conrsidering the creation of the 
parliamentary government, then the question of governrment b y  Prime 
Minister should be taken up for consideration. 
12. As regards making municipal institution[ s] the starting point 
for r epresentative government I need not comment in this memorandum, 
because it was also a subject which I agreed with and supporte d H .M.r's 
idea before he came to the Throne just the same as I have supported his 
idea of the creation of the S. C. S. 
1st August 1 926 
� � 
I I .  DEMOCRACY IN SIAM 
Introduction 
From early in the reign, King Prajadhipok had discussed possible 
constitutional changes aimed at making the monarchy less absolute and 
introducing a measure of representative government (see I). His first 
important act as king was the creation of the Supreme Council of State, 
which while limited to high members of the royal family was nonetheloess 
a significant step away from one-man rule and towards collective lead­
ership by a royal oligarchyo. In 1927 came a second major constitution­
al change--and the last actually effected before the coup of June 193o2 
- -the establishment of the Committee of the Privy Council .o1 
The Privy Council itself had existed since the days of King Chula­
longkorn but had long since ceased to perform any significant function, 
membership in the Privy Council having become a symbol of royal favor 
that carried with it a certain prestige but no real role in the govern­
ment. At the beginning of the Seventh Reign there were well  over 200  
Privy Councillors, all with princely or high official titleso. King 
Prajadhipok wished to experiment with an advisory council which would 
be larger and more representative than the Supreme Council of State or 
the Cabinet Council, but the Privy Council as constituted was consid­
ered too large and unwieldly to serve this purposeo. Thus early in 1927 
the king appointed a committee of nineo, headed by Prince Boriphat, to 
consider the creation of a new and smaloler bodyo. 
The memorandum "Democracy in Siam" was written in response to the 
deliberations of this committeeo. While the only copy of this document 
that has yet come to light is unsigned and undated,o2 there is convinc­
ing evidence that the author was Prajadhipok himself. (See Note at the 
end of this introductiono. )  
The Committee of the Privy Council, as it finally came into being 
on November 30,  1927 ,  was an appointed body of forty members with 
quasi- legislative functionso. Its powers were very limited, but none­
theless had been the subject of considerable controversy. After the 
1 .  The account of the Committee of the Privy Collllcil given here is based on the ex­
tensive documentation in the National Archives , Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 
6 (fl'3 fllJU fli ) /2-25. 
These materials are also the basis of an important article (in Thai) by Chai­
anan Samuthwanich devoted largely to the fomation of the Privy Council Committee 
(pp. 1-40 in Sat Kan Muang, Bangkok , 1971). However, Dr. Chai-anan does not men­
tion the memorandum "Democracy in Siam" (which as noted below is not in the Royal 
Secretariat records)i, and even some of the documents in the Royal Secretariat 
files would appear not to have been used. For additional comments on Dr. Chai­
anan ' s  article see the review of Sati, Kan  Muang by the present editor in the 
Journal of the Siam Societyi, 62 : 2  (July 1974)i. 
...
2 .  The copy is in the National Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 42/67 ( L.aU11Jf1 / 
1 � 
I -
.� r nH1 T 1'3�1 : r ,�u��fl'tl'3 ��Ufl� Cabinet/Discussion of the draft Privy Council Act)i. 
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committee headed by Prince Boripha t had already finished i ts delibera­
tiorns on  the draft la� establishing the new body, Prince Sithipor n,r3 
who was a member o f  the committee, submritted a letter dissenting from 
the majority o pinion. Pr ince Sithipo rn drew a distinctio n between a 
'consultative' a nd an 'adviso ry' body, the difference being that a 
'cornsulrtative' body could meet o nly when summoned by the king, wherreas 
an 'advisory' body coruld in certain circumstances meet o n  its own ini­
tiative. Prince Sithiporn argued that the absolute monarchy was suited 
to the cornditions o f  Siam and popular with the publ ic, andrwould be .necessary for a long time to come, and yet that if the proposed new 
body were to be a t  all a step in the direction o f  demorcracy, and to 
have any po tential for restraining a possible abuse of power by a bad 
king, it should be an 'advisory' rather than a 'consultative' body.
Thus he proposed a n  amendment to the dra ft act which would allow the 
Privy Council Committee to meet o n  questions important to the national 
wel fare without being first summo ned by the king. 
Prince Boriphat seemed unimpressed with Prince Sithipor n's argu­
ments, but King Prajadhipok persornally ordered the committee recornvened 
to consider Prince Si thiporn' s pro posa l, which he deemed "very impor-
tant." I n  "Democracy in Siam" the king endorsed a modified form of the 
proposed amendment, in which 15 members o f  the Privy Co uncil Committee 
could request that a special meeting be held, the monarch having the 
power to approve or deny the request. 
The committee met again June 20, 1 927, and voted 6 to 3 in favor 
o f  making the new body 'advisory' rather than 'cornsultative.' The 
majority included Pr ince Boripha t a nd Prince Sithiporn, while the dis­
senting group was led by Prince Dhani, who at an earl ier meeting o f  the 
committee had expressed doubts as  to whether the demorcratic system de­
veloped in the Anglo -Sa.xon countries cornstituted a "World Axiom" uni­
versally applicable, and whether patriarchal r ule were no t better 
suited to Eastern peoples. The amendment as fina lly agreed upon was 
similar to tha t proposed by the king, but with the number o f  signartures 
necessary to request a meeting reduced from 15 to 5, the change being
made no t so much to encourage freer discussion of natio nal issues as  
for fear that a large number of  signatures on  a request wo uld be taken 
as a sign that a major issue was at stake. 
The change from a 'consultative'  to an 'advisory'  body had no 
practical effect, but the debate on  the questio n led to an illuminating 
expression o f  o pinio ns on  Siam's po l itical future. 
Another issue which arorused considerable discussion was the basis 
upon which members o f  the new body would be selected. The king himself 
wrote a lengthy memorandum o n  the question, in which he suggested the 
possibility o f  naming unorfficial members, citing as  an e xample 'Na i 
Lcrt,r' a n  entreprreneur who had built a business empir e based on  Bang­
ko k's largest bus company. (Tho ugh known as 'Nai,r' or  'Mister, '  'Nai 
Lert' in fact held the awarded title o f  nobility 'Phya.' ) It was de­
cided however that the time had no t yet come for representatives o f  
commerce, and the forty finally chosen consisted o f  members o f  the 
3. M. C. Sithipom Kridakara was variously a government official, businessman, poli­
tician, and editor, and--above all--a farmer and for nearly fifty years the most 
important figure in the development of Thai agriculture. For a brief account of 
his career see the review article by the present editor in the Journal of t he 
Siam Soaiety, 61 : 1  (January 1973), 302-309. 
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royal family and officials of 'Phyao' or ' Chao Phyao' ranko. A writer in 
the newspaper Siam Observer doubted "Whether it would have been possi­
ble for anyone to get together a more represenotative number of men in 
the Kingdom that matter,o" while the British Minister reported that "The 
first forty are a strange medley of the less influential princes, ex­
Ministers of State and minor officials, past and present . " o4 The 
Bangko k Dai Zy  Mai i particularly regretted that no officials of the 
Ministry of Agriculture were included, but some thought that agricul­
tural interests would be adequately represented by the presence of 
Prince Sithiporn, although his official career had been in the Ministry 
of Financeo. s  
In his message to the first meeting of the Privy Council Commit­
tee, the king traced the origins of the Privy Council to the Fifth 
Reign, and observed that as the number of members had increased during 
the Sixth Reign their meetings had become more cumbersome and less fre­
quent, and "the results of their discussions were not of great impor­
tanceo. "  In creating a new and smaller body, the king said, "Our pre­
dominating desire is to experiment in and cultivate the art of debating 
as practised in large assemblies so that whenever the time shall be 
ripe for a change in the method of government it will then be an easy 
matter to  effect such a change . "  
The new body was generally well received, more stress being put on 
its potential for development than on any expectation of immediate sig­
nificance. One Bangkok paper saw the creation of the Privy Council 
Committee as "an exceedingly important incident in the history of Siam, 
and one that will be regarded with deep interest by historians, for 
from it it is certain there will spring much of the future progress of 
the countryo. "  The real significance of the innovation, it was said, 
"lies in the fact that it is a foundation for the creation of a body 
invested with wider powers that at some later time will interpret more 
closely the voice of the people .o1 16  
The Committee of the Privy Council, however, did not evolve into a 
more powerful or more representative instiotutiono. Instead it led a 
useful but unspectacular existence of four and a half years devoted 
mainly to making relatively minor revisions in the drafts of laws, such 
as a new family act or certain small tax measures, which the government 
considered suitable for submission to public discussiono. Despite the· 
prediction of the American Minister that "any differences of opinions 
will be so expressed as not to prevent the final coalescense of minds 
4 .  Siam Observer, September 9,  1927; Great Gritain, Foreign Office Records, F 8176/ 
7777/40 (September 13,  1927) , Waterlow to Chamberlain. The British Minister con­
tinued, " ·  . •  in any case, it is hard to see what real part such a body can play
in the work of government. But its existence may for a time stop the mouths of 
those who clamour for representative institutions. It can hardly cause the Gov­
ernment any inconvenience or constitute a check on an autocratic monarch, as it 
can discuss nothing without His Majesty ' s  sanction, and therefore can always be 
ignored ." 
5 .  Bangkok DaiZy Maii ,  November 29,  1929; National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal 
Secretariat, 6/3. 
6 .  Siam Observer, December 2, 1927. (This newspaper article and those referred to 
in notes 4 and 5 are in the files of the Royal Secretariat. )  
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into a unanimous vote , " i7 t here were in fact genuine divisions of opin­
i on and quest i ons deci ded by votes , but the issues at s take were not of 
maj o r  importance.  I mmediately after the 1 9 3 2  coup the  Committee of  the 
P r i vy Counc i l  was abol ished , along with  the  Supreme Counci l of S t a t e .  
Al though i t s  role was not great , the Committee  of  the P r i vy Coun­
cil  was among the v arious ins t i tu t i ons of  the period of  absolute mon­
archy the one which mos t  closely resembled the later National Assembly , 
and it  i s  perhaps s igni ficant that many of  t he top leaders of  the go v ­
ernment and the As s emb ly o f  the e arly con s t i tutional period were forme r 
members o f  t he Privy Counc i l  Comm i tteei. 
The greater p art of  "Democracy in S i am" i s  devoted to the quest ion 
of whether o r  not a democratic system of government was or e ver  would  
be suited t o  t he conditions of  Siam ,  and the conclus ions reached are 
general l y  negati v e .  The b e l i e f  that Siam was not and for a long t ime 
woul d  not be ready for democracy was held by almo s t  all  important gov ­
ernment figures of  the period ,  as  i l lustrated by  t he writ ings of  the 
king , Sayre , and P rince Damrong in I ,  and by Prince Dhan i ' s  and Prince 
S i t h iporn ' s  opinions cited  abo v e .  Similarly , a report submitted in 
1 9 2 7  (also the date of  "Democracy in S i am") by  a commi ttee of  Thai 
officials and foreign advisers  s tudying a draft l aw for the suppres s ion 
of  ' Communis t i' and ' Bo l s he v ik '  doctrines said in part :i8 
However the Committee were of the opinion that new legislation
should not be confined merely to the suppression of those doctrines 
and theories which are inherently connected with violence and revo­
lution. There is another danger in Siam, to wit : unwise and prema­
ture agitation for changes in the form of government. In the process _
of time there may be a general desire for some form of popular par­
ticipation in government or some restraint upon the power of the 
Sovereign . The great bulk of the people of Siam however are as yet
not trained in political or economic thought. There is not now nor 
will there be for a considerable time to come any possibility of 
fundamental change in the Government of Siam. There is a danger 
accordingly that agitation of a political nature would lead to unrest 
and possibly premature attempts to secure some changes in the con­
stitution of the country. The question presents real difficulties. 
The quieting of any such agitat ion for radical  const itut i onal change 1s 
one of the arguments King Prajiadhipok puts forward in  favor o f  the 
7. United States,  Department of State, Despatches from Siam, 892.02/9 (May 22, 
1928)i, Mackenzie to the Secretary of State .  The American Minister had sent some 
newspaper clippings on the new Privy Council Committee , and the Department of 
State had asked for the Minister ' s  opinion on the change referred to in the 
clippings, "which appears to be one of some importance."  
8. "Report of the Committee on the Prevention of Communism, Bolshevism and Other 
Dangerous Propaganda , "  p. 3 ,  in the National Archives , Papers of Prince Damrong, 
42 ( L tiU'llJ� ) / 87 ( L f'fl'11J1ltl l 'rl1fl )  . The committee consisted of Raymond B. Stevens,
Prince Bowaradej , R. Guyon, and Phya Thepwithm. On Stevens ,  see- VI I ;  Prince 
Bowaradej, an older brother of Prince Sithipom, was an army officer who was sub­
sequently Minister of War, then the central figure in a maj or cabinet crisis in 
1931 , and finally, in 1933, the leader of the ' Bowaradej rebellion ' ;  Rene Guyon 
was a French legal adviser in the Ministry of Justice; and Phya Thepwithuil was a 
high Ministry of Justice official who subsequently served as Minister in the con­
stitutional period. The report is in English and was probably drafted by Stevens. 
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establishment of the Privy Councril Committee, and he adds that if the 
experiment fails perhaps the public can be persuaded to abandon any 
further demands for a democratic system. While there is no reason to 
doubt the sincerity of this argument based on expediencry, it should be 
noted that the king was writing for conservative high officrials and 
attempting to get their support in embarking on what appeared as though
it might be a fairly drastic innovation in government. It would not be 
surprising if the king chose to stress the argument most likely to pro­
ducre a sympathetic response. In addition to this rather negatirve rea­
son, the king makes two more positive points in favor of establishing
the proposed body- -that it may serve as a useful training ground for 
the day when it becomes necessary to introduce a greater measure of 
representative government, and that it may serve as a restraining i n­
fluence against a possible abuse of power by an absolute monarch. 
One unusual point in the memorandum is the predicrtion that the 
Chinese, with their money, would inevitably control any parliamentary 
system in Siam. This has apparently not happened, perhaps becrause of 
the relative weakness of the National Assembly and political parties in 
most periods since 1932. 
NOTE: The argument for royal authorship is based upon both internal 
and external evidence. Internally, a number of considerations point to 
the king as ·rthe author: The memorandum is in English, whic h was common 
in Prajadhipok's writings, especially those on political questions-­
even hi s political writings in Thai were full of English phrases- -and 
the style is similar to that of other of his writings (see his "Prob­
lems of Siam" in I). The referencres to English history and politicral 
prac tice are also typical of Prajadhipok, and the discussion of the 
dangers of an unlimited absolute monarchy is reminiscent of that in 
"Problems of Siam." The various references to the changes and experi­
ments the author would like to introduce in Siam also suggest royal
authority, and it is practically impossible to imagine anyone but the 
king himself writing and circulating among high officials the assertion 
that the only way to deal with a bad king is to "chop off hirs head!r" 
Finally, the phrase in the note at the end about the Privy Council in 
Siam resembling that of England "only in name" occurs again in King 
Prajadhipokr' s  message to the inaugural session of the Privy Councril 
Committee. 
The internal evidence alone makes it highly probable that this 
document is by Prajadhipok, but in addition three pieces of external 
evidence may be c ited. In the same file of the Damrong Papers in which 
"Democracy in Siam" is found there is a letter (in Thai) from Princ e 
Damras Damrong, one of the royal secretaries, to Princre Damrong, dated 
July 6, 1927 ,9 saying that the king has given orders to send various 
enclosures concerning the proposed Committee of the Privy Council, in-
cluding a "royal memorandum" (Yir : rl','illJU�n). The file, however, which 
totals 92 pages of docruments, contains nothing by the king other than 
some margin notes on a draft of the Privy Council Committee act- -unless 
the king wrote "Democr acy in Siam.r" Secondly, in another section of 
the archives, the Seventh Reign Royal Secretariat records, there is a 
letter from Princ e Boriphat to the king, dated July 8 ,  1927 , sending a 
report of the work of the committee Boriphat headed. In a handwritten 
9 .  The king ' s  instructions for this letter and the original draft are 1n the 
National Archives, Seventh Reign , Royal Secretariat , 6/4e. 
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note (in Thai) attached to the letter, dated June 10, Prajadhipok dis­
cusses the committee  ' s  work and Prince Sithiporn's proposals concerning 
the Privy Council Committeeo. The king then .ogoes on to say that he has 
a pe,rsonal opinion on which he would 1ike the committee's views, and 
that he is sending a memorandum which, for the sake of speed, clarity, 
and convenience of co-position, he has written in Englisho.o1 0  The Royal 
Secretariat records do not contain such a document, _but it is almost 
certainly the "Democracy in Siam" found in the Damrong Papers. Finally, 
the minutes of the June 20, 1927, meeting discussed above attribute to 
the king the proposal (said to be in English) that th-e number of mem­
bers necessary to request a special meeting be 15, which co•iresponds to 
the figure suggested in "Democracy in Siam" and thus provides additional 
evidence that the king was the author .o1 1 . 
If the argument for royal authorship is admitted, the -.odate can 
also ·be established. Prince Sithiporn's proposal-s·, which are discussed 
in "Democracy in Siam,o'  were submitted June _7, and hence the memorandum 
must have been composed between this date and June 10 when Prajadhipok's 
note was writteno. 
10. National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal se·cretariat, 6/3. 
11. The minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal
Secretariat, 6/4. 
DEMOCRACY IN SIAM 
The quest ion whe ther a democrat ic  form of government i s  suitable, 
or ever will be suitable, for Siam or not , has been dirscussed among the 
i nt elli gent sia of Siam for a long t ime, and is  even now being di scussed 
by the semi-educated people, some of whom having aired t heir opi nions 
i n  the Siamese press. The general consensus of opinion i s  t hat Siam i s  
not at present ready t o  have a democratic form of government , but may
have to  adopt it at some distrant date. Some people assert t hat parlia­
mentrary government will never be suitrable for the Si amese people, giv­
ing as reason t hat it is  only the Anglo-Saxons who have been able t o  
make a success of that form of government . 
There is no doubt t hat a democrat i c  form of government requir es a 
high degree of development of t he people t o  be a real success. It is 
even possible t hat t here must also be cert ai n racial qualities (which
the Anglo-Saxons possess t o  a high degree) if democrat ic  institutions 
are t o  be really beneficial t o  t he people as a whole and to  be really  
and tru ly democratic, not only i n  form, but also i n  fact . Too ma�y 
democracies are so only i n  form. 
Now I am also inclined t o  t hink t hat a real democracy is very un­
li kely to  succeed i n  Siam. It may even be harmful t o  the real interests. 
of t he people. One could readily i magi ne what a parliament ary form of 
government would be like in Siam,r1 and t here is no need t o  go i nt o  de­
t ails. I shall just mentrion one fact, that is the parliament would be 
ent irely dominat ed by the Chinese Party. One cou ld exclude all Chinese 
from every polit ical right; yet t hey will dominat e the situat i on all 
t he same, since t hey hold the hard cash.  
Any party t hat does not depend on Chirnese funds cannot succeed, so 
that poli t ics in Siam will be dominat ed and dict ated by the Chinese 
merchants. T his is indeed a very probable eventu ality .  One c ou ld 
easily f i nd many argument s t o  support t he idea that Siam ought n o t  t o  
have a parliament ary form of government . This being the case, one may
ask "Then why t hink about deinocracy at all?r" The answer is  that one 
must remember that t he majority of people do not t hink rationa l ly , but 
t hink only sent imentally. This is partricularly true of the crowd. 
There may come a t ime when t he Siamese people will clamour for a par­
liament . (Are t here not signs of t hat even now in Bangkok? ) It would 
be of no avail to  explain; even with the best of reason, that a parlia­
ment ary government is not suit ed t o  the racial qualit ies of the Sia­
mese! They will surely yell louder that t hey are being oppressed by a 
t yrannical ruling class, and t here may be some trou ble. (At the pres­
ent moment I do not believe that t here is any Si amese who would sacri­
fice hi s life  for a political fait h. ) 
1. Vaj iravtidh actually wrote a short satire "Rathasapha nai Anakhot" (fjan,'l \ftl'U 1�'1; 
The Parliament of the Future) on an imagined Thai assembly, in which members shout 
and interrupt, give interminable, irrelevant speeches, etc. It has been reprinted 
in Sulak Sivaraksa, editor, Nangs� Sanuk (inT..Ja'fla'1n) ,  Bangkok, 1965, pp. 95-104. 
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Perhaps some countries have adopted democracy merely as a neces­
sity, knowing ful l  wel l  that i t  does not suit  the character of the 
people. That is why there are countries who p lay at having parl iamentsn. 
I t  seems to me that it is quite on the cards that we shal l have to p l ay 
that sort of  game in Siam sometim e .  It  is with these  cons iderations in 
view that I am now cons idering certain reformsn. 
I t  seems to me that , if it is admitted that some day we may be 
forced to have some form of  democracy in S iam , we must prepare ourselves 
for it gradual l y .  We must l earn and we must educate oursel ves . We must 
learn and experiment so as to have an idea as to how a parliamentary 
government would  work in Siamn. We must try to educate the people to be 
politicall y  conscious , to realize these [ their ? ]  real interests so that 
they will not be misled by agitators or mere dreamers of  Utopia . I f  we 
are to have a parliamentn, we must teach the people how to vote and l1ow 
to e lect representatives who will  real ly have their  interests at heartn. 
The reorganization of  the Privy Council is  an attempt to carry out 
the first step o f  these  ideas . I t  will  be said that the Committee of 
the Privy Counci l  as reorganized wil l  not really represent publ ic opin­
ion in general , and that as a body i t  wil l  not really be representative
of the interests of  the people. This is , of  cours e ,  quite truen. I t  is 
firstly intended to be an experiment and an education in methods of  
parliamentary debate . I bel ieve that the experience to be gained will 
be usefuln. The body may possibly reflect something of  the general pub­
lic opinion , and I do not think that it will be entirely usel essn. I t  
is to be expected , however,  that the creation of  this body will not 
satisfy everybody , and that it wil l  be variously criticized. ( I  do not 
believe that it is possibl e  to do anything or organize anything without 
being destructivel y  criticised by a certain section of  the people in 
Siamn. )  
The next step in our education towards democracy would be the 
organization o f  municipalitiesn. This wil l  be  a means o f  teaching the 
people how to vot e ,  and the experiment would also prove useful and in­
structiven. I t  will certainly be  better for the people first to control 
local affairs before they attempt to control state affairs through a 
parliamentn. I sincerely believe that if  reforms are gradually intro­
duced in this way , a democratic form of government could possibly be 
introduced without too much harmn. But the process  must  be very gradual
and careful ly administered in doses . If the experiments fail at every 
step, then it may be  possible to persuade the people that democracy is 
not for Siamn. The danger lies in impatience. 
Another question which has also occupied the minds of  all  thinking 
men in Siam is the danger of  unrestrained absolute power of  the King.
Absolute monarchy , l ike democracy,  may become harmful at any time , be­
cause both principles rely on the. perfect ion of human nature � a very
frail thing to depend on.  A sound democracy depends on the soundness 
of  the peopl e ,  and a benevol ent absolute monarchy depends on the quali­
ties of  the King. I t  is unfortunately a fact that every dynasty , how­
ever bril liant , wil l  sooner or l ater decay , and the danger of  having 
some day a bad king is  almost a certainty .  I bel ieve that every method 
has been tried so as always to obtain a good king on the throne , and 
every method has developed some flaw .  The method of  e lected kings 
seems to be  sound in principle; yet it produced some of the worst 
tyrants ,  i. e .  some of the Caesars of Romen. 
The alternative method used is to chance on having a bad king and 
make some institut ion that could control him . 
so 
This method also fails  occas ionally ,  as in the case of King 
Charles I of England , but on the whole it has worked fairly wel l. 
I mos t earnestly des ire to organize  some institut ion which will  
serve to resntrain any arbitrary or unwise actions of the King in Siam. 
(I presume that nobody will  want to res train his good actions ?) I feel 
that if I succeed in evolving something really usefuln, I would have 
done a great service to my country and the Dynasty. 
The question is , what institution shall we organize  now , admitting 
that the parlniamentary system is impos s ib l e  for the moment? 
Perhaps the new Committee of the Privy Council  could be made to 
serve that purpose in a small way? This is the reason why I think Mom 
Chao Sithiporn ' s  opinion is of some interes t.n2 I should like , howeve r ,  
to suggest  a s light modification. A clause could b e  added t o  or after 
Article 1 3  saying that - - " I f  fifteen members of the n r r�n�r����ufir 3 make 
a written request to the President of the Committee , asking the Presi­
dent to submit to His Majesty the King that certain matters are of im­
portance for the general welfare of the country and the peoplen, and 
that His Majesty should be  graciously  pleased to allow the matters to 
be discussed by the Committee , the Pres ident shall submit a petition to 
His Maj esty,  asking for a Royal sanction to hold a meeting to discuss 
the matters.n" It is understood that the King may grant the permiss ion 
to hold the meeting or not as he thinks fit. ( It  is the right of veto 
recognized by all democracies. The King can also dissolve parliament.) 
I think that in this form, it is quite admis s ible and is  much better 
than to grant a general right to a non-elected body to hold a meeting 
at any time. I believe that i t  will  be  abl e  to fulfil its purpose  of 
being a deterrent to those in power from acting arbitrarily or against 
the interests of the State. Anybody in power would hesitate to refuse 
such reques�s , unless  he has very good reasons. Of course , a perfectly
unscrupulous man may pos s ib l e  refuse the request. But then with such a 
man , no institution could prevent him from doing bad actionsn, not even 
a parlniament (cf . Charles I ) ,  and the only thing to do then is to chop 
off his head! 
Thus the formation of this Committee may possibly  serve two useful 
purposes (however imperfectly) : - -
!. As a means of experimenting and l earning in methods of parlia­
mentary debate. 
2. As a resntraining influence against misuse of power. 
Note : I t  should be noted that the Engl ish translation of ����U�1 
as Privy Councillors is somewhat misleading, as our Privy Coun­
cil , particularly as reorganized ,  will  resemble  the English 
Privy Council only in name. There is no intention of imitating 
the British Privy Council. We must try and evolve our own Pol it­
ical Ins titutions and not merely copy others. That is why I be­
l i eve in making experiments. 
2. See explanation in the introduction to this section. 
3. Committee of the Privy Cotmcil. 
I I I .  THE PACE OF RE FORM 
Introduct i on 
I n  1927, on the occasion of Chulalongkorn Day--the Oct ober 23r. 
annirversary of the death of King Chulalongkorn--Praj adhi pok arranged 
for the publicat i on of Chulalongkorn's now famous speech on a dmirnistra­
tive reform, with a foreword writ t en by Praj adhipok hi mself. The 
speech is  a lengthy accou nt of traditional Thai admi ni st rat i on and the 
plans of King Chulalongkorn t o  reorgani z e  the government bureaucracy 
i nto  functional ministries. I t  was given i n  18 8 8 ,  but remai ned u npub­
li shed unt i l  1927 and apparently vi rtually unknown. Praj adhipok i ndi ­
cates that he had first seen i t  only three years previou sly, and even 
Pri nce Damrong, who was a lmost c ertai nly present when the speech was 
orirginally given, and who was the leadi ng Thai  hi st oria n, with a spe7 
cial i nt erest in the Fifth Reign, appears t o  have forgott en about it .  
When the speech was sent to  hi m before publication, he replied that i t  
was an i mportant document for the hi story of the F i fth Reign ''contain­
i ng much i nformation that I di dn't know before, a nd j ust learned through 
reading thi s speech.r"r1 
That King Prajadhi pok, who seldom wrot e for publicat ion, would 
personally write  a foreword for a speech of Chulalongkorn-i s  not sur­
prisi ng. Praj a dhi pok, and to  an even great er degree the i nfluent ial 
advirsers around hi m, believed that for all hi s abili t i es Vaj i ravudh had 
not been a success as a ki ng, and the writi ngs from the begi nni ng of 
the S eventh Reign are full of referenc es t o  the admi ni strative and 
fi nancial problems of the previous rei gn ( see I ) .  Whi le at t i mes ex­
pressi ng doubt s  as to  whether i t  were really possible, Praj a dhi pok 
sought to  restore the presti ge of the government and the monarchy, re­
versing the decline which had become appa rent under hi s elder brother 
by returning to  the spi ri t ,  and i n  some cases even the personnel, of 
hi s father's reign. Only days after Praj adhi pok c ame t o  the throne, 
the Bri t i sh Mi nister i n  Bangkok wa s reporti ng that the new reign "may 
best be descrirbed as 'a return t o  Chulalongkorn,r'" and early i n  1926 
he wrot e, "The not e st ruck by King Praj adhipok i s  economy, simplicity  
and accressi bi lit y. His  i nt ent i on is  to  return as far as  possible t o  
the golden age of hi s father, King Chulalongkorn. Although he appears 
to  have been fond of hi s lat e  Brother, everythi ng he says and does is  
in  fact the exact opposite of what King  Rama said a nd did.r"2 
In hi s foreword, Prajadhipok prai ses at length the 'revolut i on' i n  
the syst em of admi ni st rat i on carried out by Chulalongkorn, and empha­
si z es pa rt icularly that Chulalongkorn was suc cessful because he cor­
rectly j udged the pac e  of reform, going neither t oo slowly nor too 
1 .  Letter (in Thai) of Prince Damrong, dated October 11,  1927, in the National Ar­
chives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariati, 99/28i. This file contains the original
draft of the foreword in Prajadhipok ' s  hand . 
2. Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 78/78/40 (December 3, 1925) ,i.iGreg to 
Chamberlain; F 847/78/40 (January 29, 1926)i, Greg to Chamberlain. 
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quickly. Prajadhipok calls on the successors of Chulalongkorn to "fol­
l ow in his footsteps,r" and adds that on the crucial point of the proper
timing of changes they will need not only intelligence but also l uc k. 
The referencres to Japan are a reflecrtion of a widespread belief 
among the leadership of Siam that there were significant parallelrs in 
the recent histories of the two countries. With the excreption of the 
somewhat ambiguous c ase of China, ·rJapan and Siam were the only two inde­
pendent countries in Asia during the period, and special similarities 
were seen between the 'Record Reign' of Chulalongkorn and the Meiji Era 
in Japan; not only were they virtually identical chronologic ally .(1 86 8 -
1 910 in Siam; 1868-1 912 in Japan), both were periods of rapid and suc­
cessful change instigated from above, and both were subsequently looked 
bac k upon as something of a 'golden age' when traditional societies had 
been transformed into modern states and the immediate political threat 
from the West turned back. However, Prajadhipok is not altogether 
accrurate in saying that in Siam, unlike in the case of J apan, this 
transformation was carried out "peacefully without unrest.r" The changes 
of the Fifth Reign did "affect adversel y the interests of some groups,r" 
and the results could be dramatic. I n  one instance in 18 74-1 8 7 5  a 
split in the ruling Bangkok elite ended with the 'Second King' seeking
asylum in the British Consulate, while in 1902 rural discontent, caused 
in part by the reorganization of Siam's internal administration and the 
consequent extension of Bangkok's effective control- -outward from the 
c enter towards the fringes of the empire, and downward from provincrial 
c enters to the distric t and villrage l evel--erupted in short- lived but 
violent rebellions in the North, the Northeast, and the South. 
The text of Praj adhipok' s foreword is taken from � 1 :  1111fl1 fa'l u 
4 If If I I 
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(King Chulalongkorn's Speech on Government Reform), Bangkok, 1927r. 
This work has since been republished, while slightly variant versions 
of the foreword alone have recently been reprinted in Prince Dhani, 
Chumnum Niph o n i, pp. 6- 8 ,  and in Sulak Sivaraksa, editor, Nan gs� Sanuk ,  
pp. 105-108. There is an English translation in the Bangkok Times , 
October 24, 1927r. 
FOREWORD OFr.KING PRAJADHrIPOK 
Upon my last return from Europe, i n  1924, King Vajiravudh fel t 
that I had rerached the age when I should study the traditi ons of governr­
ment a nd admi ni stration i n  order that I be prepared to carry out the 
dutires of royalty. Therefore he ordered Chao Phyar_rMahithon to bring
important documents sett i ng forth principles of government for me to 
read and study, i n  accordance with the old royal tradirtion. 
·Among the documents whirch Chao Phya Mahi thon brought for me to 
read was King Chulalongkorn's speech on reform of the government admi n­
istration, whi ch I have had published i n  thi s  volume.r· 
Upon readi ng thi s speech, I felt that i t  was an extremely i mpor­
·tant document. It left me more convinced than ever of the wisdom and 
vi rtues of King Chulalongkorn, and further i ncreased my already great
love and respect for him. 
This speech was drafted with the utmost care, and shows clearly
that King Chulralongkorn had great understanding and broad knowl edge i n  
tradi ti onal Thai government, and had also studi ed European adminirstra­
tive practices and knew the princi ples thoroughly. The speech, there­
fore, is  a document which provides an excellent i nsi ght i nto the gov­
ernment of Si am. 
In  addi tion, thi s speech demonstrates clearly that as the basis- i n  
consideri ng all hi s actions Ki ng Chulalongkorn thought-only of the hap­
pi ness of hi s people and the well-being of the country. 
The change from the old system of adminirstrati on through the estab­
li shment of the twelve mi ni strires must be considered 
. 
a major change, . 
I 
whi ch can be called i n  ordinary speech 'Phli k Phaen Din' (��nuuu�u ) ,  or 
i f  we use English the word must be 'Re vo lution', not 'Evolution'. 
Very few countries indeed have been able to succeed i n  carrying 
out a major change like thi s peacefully without unrest--in fact one can 
almost say none. Japan also underwent a 'Phli k Phaen Din' change i n  
admi nistrati on, but not peacefully as i n  the case of Si am; there had to 
be di sturbances i n  the country, such as the Satsuma Rebelliron. 
That Siam was able to undergo a 'Revoluti on' i n  the system of ad­
mini stration wi thout the shedding of even a si ngle drop of blood must 
be consirdered mir aculous and extremely fortunate £or the country. A 
change like thi s  i s  likely to affect ad.versely the i nterests of some 
groups, and thus it  i s  extremely di ffi cult to carry out peacefully. 
That thirs change was successfully and peacefully carrired out i n  
Si am was because our 'Re vo lutio n '  was i nitiated by the king, and a king
who both ranked above all hi s contemporaries i n  abi lity and also had a 
noble character whirch i nspired loyalty i n  persons of every rank who 
came i nto contact with him. · 
King Chulalongkorn both saw the future clearly and knew the past
well. He consirdered his programs very carefully, selecting with great 
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wisdom from both Thai and foreign methods of administration. He car­
ried out the changes in the administrative system in a series of gradual 
steps completely appropriate to the situation  and appro priate in timing 
- - not too slow, and not too fas t. 
We who are members of the royal family and loyal officials, remem­
bering consotantly the beneficenceo_ of King Chulalongkorn, should deter­
mine in so far as possible to follow in his footsoteps, and should try 
to see the future but should also look back to the traditions and prin­
ciples of the pas t .  These two things are not too difficult--the hard 
part is to choose the proper timing, neither too late nor too soon. 
This is extremely difficult, and requires not only intelligence but 
good luck as well. But if we work honestly and to the best of our 
ability we _can say that we have tried to do our duty to the limit of 
our strengt h .  
I hope that this volume will be insotructive to those who receive 
it and will meet with general approbation. 
PRAJADHIPOK 
Amphornsathan Throne Hall, 
Dusit Palace 
12 October 192 7  
' I 
I V .  NAT IONAL I SM AND CHANGE 
Introduct ion 
I f  King Prajiadhipok and his  advisers were advocates o f  moderate 
and cautious change , adop t ing modern techno l ogy and expe r iment ing with 
certain new ins t i t u t i ons but  insofar as poss i b l e  preserving traditional 
Thai val ues ( see I - I l l ) i, there were in Tha i s o c iety other groups favo r­
ing much more radical  change . These groups maintained that many e l e ­
ments o f  the o l d  cul ture o f  S iam were hind rances t o  the country ' s  mod ­
e rn i z at ion and devel opment , and therefo re mu s t  b e  discarde d .  One s u ch 
g roup was Marxi s t  in insp irat ion (see V) ; ano the r ,  somewhat l arge r and 
much more in fl uent i a l ,  was composed of  s tudents educated in the Wes t .  
Al thot1gl1 rel atively few i n  numb e r �  the Western- educated s tudents 
exerted an i 11fl ucnce that was disp roport i onat e l y  l arge � Mos t  were from 
we alt l1y and powe.r ful  fami l ies , e i ther roy a l l y  r e lated or part o f  the 
offic ial nob i l i ty . Upon the i r  retu rn to Siam they cou l d  expect  to at­
tain re l at i ve l y  high o f f i c i a l  pos i t ions at  an early  age . Thei r  techn i ­
cal  and professional s k i l l s  were a source of  powe r ,  and the prest ige 
attain ing to things Wes t ern g ave add i t i onal  we ight  to the i r  ideasi. The 
impo rtant role of  s tudents educated in Europe , and part icul ar l y  in 
France , in the 1 9 3 2  coup has often been commented on , a l though i t  shoul d  
a l s o  be noted that most  o f  the important l e aders o f  the o l d  regime had 
a l s o  been educated in Europe. 
The art i c l e  "Na tional ism and Change" was publ ished in Samaggi Sara, 
the j ou rnal  o f  the as soc iat ion o f  Tha i s tudents in Engl and , in December  
of  1 9 2 8 .  Of  a l l  the students educated abroad , those sent to Engl and 
formed the most influent i a l  group o f  the pre -1 9 3 2  period . Brit ish  in­
terests were far l arger than those of o ther Western powe rs in S i am , and 
Brit ish prestige was correspondingly h igher than that o f  the o ther Wes t ­
ern powers . There were close  t ies  between the 'fh ai royal family and 
England , and the sons of  the most import ant prince l y  and official  fami ­
l ies were usual l y  sent to Engl and to studyi. Samaggi Sara c i rcu lated in 
Bangko k ,  and art icles  from i t  were frequently  reprinted in the Bangkok 
pres s . King Praj adh ipok , an o l d  Etonian , took a person a l  interest in 
the associat ion o f  Tha i  s tudents in Engl and and its  pub l ic at ions : 
. . Desp ite the art i c l e ' s  outspoken c r i t i c ism o f  many aspects of  Thai 
trad i t ion , including the Buddh i s t  re l igion , the Thai students in Engl and 
were in fact regarded as mode rates compared to some o f  tho se on the Con­
t inent , most particul arly the group in repu b l i can Francei. (Prince Dam­
rong , something o f  an angl ophi l e  as we l l  as a royal i s t ,  011ce noted with 
s a t is fact ion that no s tudents educated in Engl and had p l ayed a maj or  
part in the 1 9 3 2  coup . )  Wh i l e  the art i c l e  does not exp l i c i t l y  discuss  
pol itics , a subj ect that Th�i s tudents abroad were we l l  adv ised to 
avo i d , i1 the s o c i a l , cul tu r a l ,i· and economic changes proposed c learly 
have imp l ications for the po l it i c a l  order as Wt! l l . 
1 .  Pridi, for example, was nearly recalled from France in 1926, in part because of 
his political activities .  Pridie' s  father petitioned the king asking that he be 
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The text is taken from Samaggi SaPa, in the Damrong Library, Bang­
kokn, and from the Bangkok Times.n2 
allowed to stay, and Prajadhipok approved the request. The Thai Minister in 
Paris, Prince Charoonsakdi (an elder brother of Prince Sithiporn)a, had warned 
that Pridi and his group had radical political ideas; in a letter (in Thai) writ­
ten early in 1927 King Prajadhipok ,  speaking through the royal secretary, made 
the following interesting comment : 
This Nai Pridi is intelligent but inclined to be a little brash, as is common 
among the young. Once he enters the government in a responsible position he 
will probably work well, and I don't much believe that he will become a 
"serious danger to the government" as Prince Charoonsakdi has reported. If
the government doesn't use him in a manner commensurate with his knowledge, 
then things might develop in an undesirable way. 
(Translation by the present editor, in the Jou.:enal of the Siam Soaiety, 61 : 2, 
July 1973, 188-189; the letter is in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal
Secretariat , 10 . 1/7 . )  
2. Samaggi SaPa, vol. 6,  no. 3, December 1928, pp . 1-4; excerpts reprinted in the 
Bangkok Timesn, February 4, 1929. The author was said to be "the editor," who at 
this time was Mom Chao Rajada (Sonakul?) .  
NATIrONALI SM AND CHANGE 
[The article begins by raising the question of what the policy of 
Siam should be with regard to Western civilization, noting that some 
have advised that the Thai adopt the material side of Western culture 
while retaining their own Eastern spiritual heritage. The author, 
however, believes that material values must inevitably affect spiri­
tual values, and hence that the attempt to adopt Western materialism 
while preserving Eastern spiritualism must ultimately fail. ]a· 
. . .  This idea of the divisibility of the human mind into idea-tight 
compartments is a fallacy.  I f  we accept the material side of Western 
civilrization, our spiritual outlook will be transformed . .  • • 
When we speak of the material side of Western civilization we are, 
of course, thinking mainl y of the products of Western science. But we 
cannot pick out onl y the products and l eave out the philosophy of s.ci­
ence. We cannot, for instance, adopt vaccination and l eave out the 
theory of evolrution. I n  the West i tsel f science has been exerting and 
is exerting a great influence on tl1e theol ogy a nd art. The material ism 
of Darwinism shook Christianity at its base. Einstein may cure this 
materialism, but he will not be abl e to restore to the Church its an­
cient authority. 
The position of Buddhisrm in Si am at the present day is in certain 
respects different from that of Chrisrtianity in E urope in the pre­
science days of the seventeenth cenrtury. Buddhism commits itselrf to 
no metaphysical speculation, and whatever science may claim to discover 
to be the truth regarding the origin and the scheme of the visibl e uni­
verse, Buddhism cannot be proved wrong and thereby l ose its prestige. 
On the other hand, it lays down a set  of rul es of conduct by the obser­
vance of which a faithful folrlower wil l attain to true happiness . . r. .  
So far so good. People l1ave been c ontent to accept unquestioningly the 
dogmas of authority . Individual reasoning was not encour aged in oldr.
Indian and Chinese civiliz ations. And it would not h�ve mattered much 
if it had been . . . .  In  Siam we have Br ahminism and Animism, both-of 
which appeal entirelry to the mystic within us. The tendency of educa­
tion on Western lines is towards rationralism, and tha t is why few of 
the educated Siamese nowadays take Br ahmanism and Spirit Worship se ri­
ously. They find that the less exciting rites of Buddhism alone �re 
enough to satisfy the mystic within il1em . . . .  I f  Buddhism is to have 
the same hold in the future as in tl1e past, however, we bel ieve that 
the merthod of teaching it qeeds an extensive reform, which, of course, 
means reforming the Church itsel f.r1 To mention just one examplre, does 
1. A second Samaggi Sara article from the same period similarly called for a reform 
of Thai Buddhism, noting that "with the apathy shown to religion the masses have 
tu·rncd to recruit their morals from the foreign films, with disastrous effects" 
. (quoted in the Bangkok Times , March 4 ,  1929) . 
In 1930 there appeared yet another Samaggi Sara article, entitled "Religion
and the lluanok" ( 'Huanok,a' literally 'foreign heads,a' was the term commonly 
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anyone suppose that i n  twenty or fifty years' ti me, with the i nc rease 
i n  populatiron and the cost of livirng, the majrority of the member s of 
the monkhood can c ontinue to live on the labour of the rest of the com­
munity, as they do now? Perhaps i t  i s  deplorable that a man should not 
then be allowed to live a life of cloi stered contemplatiron when and as 
long as he likes at the expense of others, but then de  Lessep [ s] ,  in 
cutting the Suez Canal let loose upon us a great many thirngs from the 
energeti c West which, judging from old standards are deplorable . . . .  
Our li terature of the old classical type has sc arcely any future. 
At i ts best i n  the past output has been li mited and stereotyped. Our 
poetry, like our musi c, has a superfic i al charm of i ts own, but i t  i s  
a si gnificant fact that those of us who are able to compare our poetry
and our music with those of the West always admit our i nferirority. A 
Geni us may arise who will d evise a means of touchi ng our golden chords 
i n  a way essenti ally Siamese, but while wai ting for hi m l et us not be 
too proud to appreci ate, to borrow and even to copy from Western cul­
tural art. 
Our old d rama--the khon and the Zakorn --is  gone never to return, 
and 1 n  i ts place we have the c inema. The cinema i s  of i mmense educa­
tional value, and for better or for worse will be one of the most 
potent factors i n  transforming our customs and tradi ti ons . . r. .  Cus­
toms then c an change, and someti mes change quickly, and the sooner we 
accept thirs fact the better. Everyone has heard of the Great Plien­
Thamnien2 Ceremony in the early part of H.M. King Chulalongkorn's pro­
gressive rei gn. We cannot pi cture anythi ng more i mpressive and drastic.  
Yet even the most conservative at that time never murmured di sapproval 
--at any rate we never heard that any did.  Mr. Le  May, i n  hi s book An 
Asian  Arcady , deplores our lack of traditi on.3 We d iffer from hirm. We 
see very little good i n  tradition. We are not i n  a posi ti on to be able 
to afford i t. We thi nk our adaptabi li ty i s  an asset and only wi sh we 
had more of i t. 
We do, however, have tradi ti ons. One of these i s  the Chirnese one 
of blind reverence for parents. Education on Western lines will weaken 
this. The general adaptation of European sport will weaken thi s rever­
ence f urther . . r. .  Our Si amese world to-day i s  not the same as that 
of, say, twenty years ago. The struggle for exirstence i s  f iercer and 
li fe a more serirous busirness, and all thi s will be much worse i n  another 
twenty years' time. We c an no longer let a boy loose i n  a temple as a 
Z uk-sirt-wat  or i n  a palac e as a mahad- lek 4 by way of giving hirm a good 
applied to Thai educated in the West), acknowledging, with apparent regret, "that 
we of the yotmger generation are very far from being devout Buddhists," "indeed 
the post-war generatio� of Siamese are indifferent to religion . . . .  Young Siam 
is indifferent to religiona. Yes, Young Siam in general, not only Huanok" (quoted 
in the Bangkok Times , November 17, 1930). 
2. ' Plien-Thamnien' is literally 'tradition-changing. ' The reference is to Chula­
longkorn's second coronation (1873), at which he commanded the abolition of the 
traditional practice of prostration in the royal presence. 
3. Reginal Le May (1885-1972) was a British Adviser in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Comnnmications and the author of a nlUllber of works on Siam. He replied to the 
criticism of his views in this article in a letter in the Bangkok Times , March 
26, 1929. 
4. 'Luk-sit-wat' were temple boys, and 'mahad-lek' were pages. Before the advent 
5 9  
.
education and a fair start in iife • . o. .  We are of  the 6pinion· _othat · 
the members of  our educated class on the whole ·fail to pay sufficieµt 
attention to t�e changes in our social and economic conditions whi�h 
are rapidly taking place. We. think that it is time our· educated baihe­
lors take a leaf out of the Western bachelorso' book and· recogni.se the 
grave responsibility of marriage. 
. 
Another social and economic question for wh-ich a more rapidoadop­
tion of  Western ideas is called for is that 0£ the position of women � 
We suggest that we pass over that Western custom of chivalr_y to ladies 
as not worth adopting, being in ·reality quite useless to the women 
themselves and a little hypocritical on the part of  the men, and at 
· once to accept in full the prin�iple of absolute equality of the sexeso. 
Women should be educated to beo-not only the intellectual but alsoo.othe 
economic equals of men. So long as they are fitted -for the· one cal.ling 
of marriage only, so long will they be a drag on the progress of any 
modern nationo. This ideal of  :equal opportunity for the sexes is far 
from being realised in the West itself, but since the War the Westerno. 
women have made tremendous strides toward their emancipationo.o · The gap 
between their attainment and that of the women in Siam is widening, not 
narrowing. The mental energy of the Siamese woman �s quite as great as 
that of the man, so that t6 make an arbitrary distinction between theo· 
two would merely be holding �n to a wasteful and antiquated custom • 
The voice of reaction is often disguised ·as .the voice of patrioo
. . 
­
tismo. The die-hard and the j i�go are apt to imagine themselves better 
patriots than the radical and the pacifisto. But in reality the love of  
one ' s  country is an inborn instinct . . o. .  
Nationalism is patriotism gone wrongo. It is good too·olove the 
place of our birth and to have a kindly feeling for t_he people of our 
race, but that is quite different from mistrusting- foreigners and for­
eign ideas.o . I n  the past our ancestors had not been too proud to own 
the I ndians and the Chinese their teacherso. Why should we now be 
ashamed to own ourselves the pupils of Europe a-nd America? The danger 
is not that we may change too quickly, but that we may change too slow-
ly. . . . 
England ·owes her present position not to the fact that she has 
been slower to change than other countries, but that she has been quick­
ero. She is not to6 proud to follow the lead of  America in putting a 
premium on efficiency and to transfer her allegiance to theo_ ' business 
men . '  · 
Nationalis- came from the West,o·oand it is an irony that our reac­
tionary should adapt it as his most effective toolo. Is this wisdomo. or 
blindness? Is this the discus or the lotus flower?o5 
of a Western-style s ystem of education in Siam, th·ese were the two main paths by 
which a young man might receive an education and prepare for a profession. 
. . 
S. The allusion is to the Thai saying L�U0'1 101 LWfltlOU1, literally, to mistake the 
discus for the lotus flower. The discus, a weapon, symbolized evil, while the 
lotus flower, a common feature in Buddhist art and ceremonies , represented good,
whence the figurative meaning to confuse good and evil , or right and wrong. 
1. 
V. A MARXI ST ANALYSI S OF THAI SOCI ETY 
I ntroduction 
Students in the West were one gro up questioning f undamental values 
of Thai tradition and offering a vision of an alternative society in 
the late 1920's (see IV ) ; another was the f ollowers of Marx and Lenin. 
The starndard studies of Marxist-communist influence in Siam, and later 
Thailand, have dealt mainly with the post-World War I I  period, with 
some occasional discussion of the 1930's a nd pa rticularly P ridi's eco­
nomic plan (see IX) .1 Nonetheless, Marxism and communism had been 
known in Siam long before 1932,r2 and in the 1920's communist propaganda 
and activities became a major concern of the government. 
Pre-1932 Marxist-communist activity in Siam was limited almost ex­
clrusively to non-Thai ethnic groups. The most important of these was 
the Chinese, followed by the Vietnamese, with a scattering of other 
nationalities. The few reported cases of ethnic Thai involvement al­
most all concerned students or exiles living in Europe� and even in 
these cases the evidence was usually doubtful, while the definition of 
'communism' used by the Thai government and its infrormants was so broad 
as to cover practically the.whole spectrum of l eftist politics. There 
were occasional reports that Tha i or Western agents, such as the mys­
terious Slater, reputedly a British subject, were being sent from 
Europe to organize communist cells in Siam, but none of these reports 
The best known studies in English are Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The 
Left Wing in Soutiheast Asia (New York, 1950), pp. 51-75, and David A. Wilson, 
"Thailand and Marxism, " in Frank N. Trager, editor, Marxism in Sout heast Asia 
(Stanford, 1959), pp. 58-101. 
There is a brief mention of communism in Siam in the 1920's in Thompson and 
Adloff, p. 53, which mistakenly attributes to Prince Traidos (see VII)  the title 
of ' Phya,a' and which refers inaccurately to "the Ang Yee society ( ' ang yee,a' from
Chinese, being the generic term in Thai for any Chinese secret society) . 
Thompson and Adloff mention (p. 52) as factors contributing to the failure of
communism to win any significant number of Thai converts, "the widespread peasant 
proprietorship of the land, the absence of intense economic misery, popular devo­
tion to the Chakri dynasty, the strong hold of Buddhism on the population, and 
the lack of an independence struggle such as has occurred in the neighboring 
colonial cotmtries,a" as well as communism's identification with the Chinese 
minority. 
2. There is a mention of 'commtmism,' perhaps the first in Thai history, in an 1881 
letter from Prince Devawongs to the American Consul-General, John A. Halderman, 
expressing King Chulalongkorn's regret at the shooting of President Garfield, 
and the king 's  hope that the "Superagency who ruled this Universe" would help 
Garfield "escape from this tmfortunate jaw he is now under.a" "And His Majesty 
think that the time would come when Providence will open a measure to secure all 
rulers in this world from the hands of those based classes Sociallist, Nihilist 
Communists etc . "  (United States, Department of State, Despatches from Bangkok, 
July 15, 1881, spelling as in original. ) 
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was ever crinfirmed.o3 Instead, the available evidence indicate� thgt 
communist activities in Siam were largely confined to non-Thai Asianso_ 
whose primary political concern was not Siam but their native countries 
--China or the various colonial lands of Southeast Asiao. 
Among the Chinese involved were both adherents .oof the communist 
movement in China and various Kuomintang factions, which in �heo.oeyes of 
the Thai government were also ' bolshevik . '  Southeast Asian communists 
in Siam included a number of leaders of anti-colonial nationalist move­
ments--in the late 1920o' s  Ho Chi Minh spent a year in northeastern 
Siam, and in 192 5 the Indonesian Tan Malaka - was reportedly in Chieng­
mai4 --for whom Siam provided a base of operations beyond the reach of 
colonial police. 
In 1927 an American diplomat reported a conversat.ion in which the 
Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs outlined what he believed to be com­
munist objectives in Siam :o5 
·Prince Traidos gave it as his opinion that the · present situation · 
·i· in so far as Moscow was concerned was about as follows� Siam was an 
Asiatic country with an Asiatic Government and Asiatic people. There 
was not the slightest indication that communism could or would make 
any headway wfth the Siamese and even if it did, Siam was a small and 
unimportant country in world affairs so that any real effort .on the 
3. For reports on communist activities in Europe and Siam see the National Archi v_es,  
Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/61i,66, and 174; Great Britain, Foreign Office Rec- · 
ords , nos . 2987, 3881 ,  4058, 4126, 4926, 4928, 5572 , and 5828 in the series 
F ----/2987/40 (March to May, 1927) ; and United States,  Department of State, 
Despatches from Siam, 892 . 00B/1 and 892 .4016/6 (May, July 1927) . The Thai gov- . 
ernment had reservations about the authenticity of some of the information re­
ceived, while the British noted that the Thai government paid its informants so 
little that it could hardly expect authentic intelligencei. 
There were occasional cases of alleged communist influence in the Bangkok 
pressi. In 1927, for example, the Thai-language Siam Review was closed down be­
cause of an article on popular government which implied that only violence could 
bring change, and then cited the fate of Czar Nicholas I I  of Russia, saying that 
if he were still alive he would regret having acted too slowly, and warning that 
other ruling monarchs should take care and heed the voice of the people. (Na­
tional Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 19 . 2/10;  United States, De­
partment of State, Despatches from Siam, 892 . OOB/ 1 ,  July 22 ,  19.27,  Mackenzie to 
the Secretary of State . )  
There is no immediately apparent explanation for the concentration of Seventh 
Reign materials on communism in the year 1927, but it may be noted that 1927 was 
also a year of momentous events for the communist movements in China and in Indo-.
nesia. 
4 .  On Ho Chi Minh see Hoai Thanh et ali. ,  Souvenirs sur Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi, 1962)i, 
pp . 102-117 (pp . 119-135 in the English translation Days with Ho Chi Minh (2nd
edition, Hanoi,  1962 ] ) .  The reports concerning Tan Malaka are . (pp . 1 1 ,  28) in a 
secret report (in English, 83 pp . )  on Indonesian Communist Party activities,  
July 1 ,  1925 to January 1 ,  1927 ,  in which the government of the Netherlands 
Indies sent to the Thai government (National Archives ,  Papers of Prince Damrong, 
47/61)i. 
S .  United States, Department of  State, Despatches from Siam, 892 . 4016/6 (May. �4,
1927) , Greene to the Secretary of State . 
62  
part of Moscow would scarcely j ustify itself.a6 The object and aim of
the Communists therefore was to use Siam as a sort of neutral base 
from which to carry on activities in south eastern Asia. Three West­
ern powers possessed important colonies in the vicinity of Siam, 
Burma and India to the west, French Indo-China to the east and the 
Dutch East Indiesa7 to the south, and in his opinion it was at these 
that the activities of Moscow were really aimed. Prince Traidos said 
that in the reports received from the Siamese Legation in Paris, it 
had been clearly indicated that the Soviet had felt it necessary to 
increase its activities in south eastern Asia , and to have a center 
from which to base its work. What more logical than that Siam should 
constitute that center, where the Bolsheviks doubtless hoped to have 
more freedom of action than could be hoped for in one of the colonies 
of the great powers whose organization for protecting itself against 
communist activity must necessarily be greater than that of Siam. 
The activit ies of t he various ant i-colonial movement s posed a 
serious dilemma for t he Thai governmentr. On t he one hand, t he Thai 
were proud of being t he only people in Southeast Asia t o  have maint ained 
their natrional independence, and it followed logically that t hey under­
stood and sympatrhized with t he desires of other Asian peoples t o  throw 
off Western rule. On t he other hand, Siam was vit ally interested in 
maintraining good relatrions with t he major Western powers, and particu­
larly France and Great Britain, t he t wo great colonial powers of the 
region. F urtrhermore, it appeared t hat t hese independence movements 
were t o  a considerable extrent communist inspired and led (in part be­
cause of t he effectriveness of colonial police in suppressing moderate 
natironalists), and the success of such movement s would inevit ably in­
crease t he t hreat which communism posed to  the conservat ive political
and social order of Siam. 
The ambivalent att it ude of the government of Siam toward Southeast 
Asian natrionalism was clearly shown in a draft lett er t o  French authori­
t ies which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Devawongs, submitt ed 
t o  King P rajadhipok in December of 1930 .r8 The French had request ed the 
extradit ion of some Vietrnamese whom the Thai authorit ies had arrested 
at P hichit, charging t hat t hey were 'communist s.r' Such requests were 
frequent in t he period and created awkward situatrions, for t he Thai 
government had no illusions about t he probable fat e  of persons turned 
over to  t he colonial police. In t he draft reply, Prince Devawongs 
wrot e t hat alt hough t he French said "that these Annamites are communist s 
it is clear from t he evidence t hat t heir chief purpose is to  estrablish 
6. However, a report (in English) entitled "Communist Intrigues in Siam" received by 
the Thai government in 1927 concluded, "The Soviet Government, knowing it is 
doomed to fail in China, would be pleased if it could achieve the overthrow of an 
absolute monarchy in the Far East, even as small as Siam.a" This report also 
claimed that Vajiravudh had surrounded himself with favorites, and that King Pra­
jadhipok "has made a clean sweep of these favourites, who have now formed an anti­
royalist party bitterly opposed to the government" (National Archives , Papers of 
Prince Damrong, 47/61)a. 
7. The text reads "Dutch West Indies ,"  an apparent error that has been corrected here. 
8. The draft letter, with the king's comments and corrections, is in the National 
Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1/24. 
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inde pendence of their country,r9 and such taint or trace of communism as 
appears in the documents or the ir conduct are incidental to th eir ma in 
pu rposre.'' He  said that Siam was anxious to cooperate with its neigh­
bors in suppressing communism, but that in the case in question there 
was not enough evidence to justify deporting the suspects to I ndochina. 
He then continued with a paragraph surmmar izing the Thai attitude toward 
i.ndepenrdence movements: 
Obviously, the recent movement in certain Eastern countries to 
regain their independence presents a difficult problem for His Majes­
ty ' s  Government .  I t  is but natural that such a movement should find 
a certain amount of sympathy amongst the people of this country. On 
the other hand it is the sincere desire of His Maj esty ' s  Government 
to preserve its relateions of friendship and comity which happily 
exist between itself and all European Powerse. The course which His 
Maj esty ' s  Government should pursue is clearly marked. It  cannot be 
expected that it would give aid and help to the European powers in 
putting down insurrectionse1 0  or movements aimed at independence. On 
the other hand it does not intend to give aid or encouragement to 
such movementse. 
This was an accurate statement of the Thai position but it would hardly 
have pleased the French, and King Prajadhipok, a more prudent diplomat 
than his Foreign Minister, crossed the paragraph out of the draft re­
ply.1 1  
The document translated here gives a standard Marxist anal ysis of 
the Thai social,  econromic, and polritical systerm. Although originally 
written in Chinese, like practically all Marxist writing of the period
in Siam,r1 2  it is atypical in that it deals almost exclursively with the 
9 .  The king crossed out the phrase "to establish independence of their country" and 
substituted the more bland "mainly of a political nature . "  
1 0 .  The text has "resurrections" rather than the obviously intended "insurrections . "  
1 1 .  There is also a lengthy letter (in Thai , dated December 1 1 ,  1930) in the National 
Archives , Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/203, in which the king expresses his fear 
that an independent Vietnam would be dominated by China, posing a Chinese threat 
to Siam, and that therefore despite Thai sympathy for the Vietnamese people no 
aid should be extended to help them overthrow French rule. 
See also the file of Thai newspaper articles on Vietnamese anticolonialism, 
and particularly the nationalist leaders Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh , in 
the National Archives , Seventh Reign , Ministry of the Interior, 26 .5/11e. Like 
the official viewe, that of the press was ambivalent : while admiration was ex­
pressed for the desire of the Vietnamese to obtain freedom and 'not be slavese' 
the nationalist leaders were at the same time criticized for having rebelled 
against legitimate and benevolent authority, as represented by 'our friendse' the 
French. 
Phan Boi Chau had visited Siam several times during the period 1908- 1911 in 
connection with anti-French activities .  
1 2 .  While the conununist literature uncovered by the government was virtual ly all in 
Chinese, it was occasionally accompanied by transelations into Thai , and some­
times English (prestunably for the benefit of the English-language press)e. I t  
has been noted that so far as is known the classic works of Marxist literature 
were never translated into Thai (Wilson, in Marxism in Southeast Asia, p .  98) . 
In the months immediately following the 1932 coup, a short-lived period of 
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internaP conditions of the country, rather than the more usual topics 
of world revolution and events in China, India , or the Soviet Union .o1 3  
King Prajadhipok himself considered it an·oexceptional document , as 
shown in the cornments--themselves rather exceptional--which he made 
upon i t : o1 4  
This is very well written, and not the work of someone foolish. Also,
it was not wntten in China, but· in Siam. The author is a knowledge­
able person well worth listening to,  and I would like for all the mem­
bers of the cabinet to read it in order to see what cornrntmist propa­
ganda in Siam in like. If the contents of this document were dissemi­
nated among the agricultural classes in Siam, many might find it quite 
aonvinaing. It is very different from all other such documents I 
have seen. 
As might be expected, in the Marxist analys is the Western imperio­
alists figure as the main villains of the piece . This provides an in­
teresting parallel to a case of a very different form of political dis­
sent which occurred in the last days of the Sixth Reign and the firs t 
days of the Seventh Reign - -a phu wiset rebelliono. A phu wiset is a 
person claiming to have supernatural powerso, and for centuries movements 
led by phu wiset,  usually with millennial overtoneso, have been a feature 
of the rural Southeast  Asian scene. The phu wiset 'rebelliono' near 
Saraburi ,  north of Bangkok,  late in 192 5 was a minor affair, in which 
the phu wiset and his handful of followers were soon killed or dispersed 
by the Thai authorities.o1 5  The leader of the rebellion , known in the 
unusual political freedom and activity, there was a rash of appearances of com­
mwiist leaflets in Bangkok, including some , in the words of the conservative 
Bangkok Times, "in English, of all languages" (October 3,  1932)i. 
13. There is a document (in Thai , translated from Chinese) between the two extremes , 
in the National Archives ,  Seventh Reign, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 1/24-,
dated May 1 ,  1930, and addressed to the 'Workers of Siam' by the ' Committee of 
the Commwiist Party of Siam.i' After complaining of working conditions in Siam 
and calling on workers to wiite to better their lot, the document attacks the 
monarchy as ' an instrument of the imperialists '  and even makes the charge that 
the king is planning to join with the great powers to overthrow the government 
of Soviet Russia. It calls for the overthrow of the monarchy and the imperial­
ists and the establishment of a 'democratic' Siam. It concludes with a May Day 
appeal to carry out a program of 14 diverse points , among them resisting police 
who arrest peddlers, overthrowing the royal family and the big landowners, 
opposing a second world war which is expected to break out among the great 
powers, and aiding the Soviet Union and the revolutionary movements in China 
and India. 
14. The text is taken from a copy of a letter from a royal secretary to the Ministry 
of the Interior. As was always done in royal correspondence , King Prajadhipok ' s  
original comments ,  characteristically in a simple and lucid Thai, have been re­
written into ratahasap, the special dialect used when talking to or of high mem­
bers of the royal family, and recast in the third person. The present editor 
has taken the liberty of changing the passage back into the first person and 
dropping some of the royal embellishments (National Archives, Papers of Prince 
Damrong, 47/187)i. 
15. The documents relating to this episode are in the National Archives, Seventh 
Reign, Ministry of the Interior, 14/1. 
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government accounts as 'Ai  Kan , ' 1 6  had a criminal record and a history 
of  stnrange behavior,  was a sometime monk , and also had pretensions to 
royal bloodn1 7--all recurrent e lements in the phu w i s e t  trad.i tionn. What 
was new was the aim of  the rebell ion , which according to Ai Kan was to 
send a message to the king complaining that the Thai people were being
oppressed by foreigners , particularly the Brit ish and the French , whon1 
he held responsible for economic hardships , higher taxes , and the al­
leged abandonment of the Buddhist religion in favorn. -Of  Christiani ty �  
Ai Kan then gave the king seven days in  whi ch to throw off foreign dom­
ination,  fai l ing which he would com� deal with the situation himsel f .  
Within a few days Ai Kan was dead and the uprising ended ,  but i t  
is striking that intellectual traditions as far removed from one an� 
other as Marxism and the p h u  hli s e t i, both looking mainly at centril 
Siam ,  the region in  which the nineteenth century treaties with the West 
had led to the development of  a widespread commercial r ice agriculture , 
should come to such similar conclusions about the nature and causes .nbf  
conditions in  the countryside .n1 8  
The document is in the National Archives , Seventh Reign , Ministry 
o f  Foreign Affairs , 1/24 , and the Nat ional Archives , Papers of  Prince 
Damrong, 4 7/187. 
16 .  'Ai , '  in this context , 1s  a derogatory title used with the names of slaves , 
criminals,  and rebelse. 
1 7 .  According to one account , Ai Kan claimed to be the son of the ' royal personagee' 
drowned in a boating mishap at Ang Thong ,  which he himself survived. Ai Kan 
was said to be 43 years old in 1925 , and hence presumably was born in the early 
1 880 ' s .  In 1880 a queen of Chulaleongkorn, eneeinte at the time, was- drowned 
along with her small daughter in a boating accident on the river between Bangkok 
and the palace at Bang Pa-in. Bang Pa-in is some SO kilometers below Ang Thong 
on the Chao Phya River. 
In another account , Ai Kan- styled himself a son of a royal person of the 
Front Palace, the residence of the 'Second Kingse' in the Bangkok period. 
Government records claimed that Ai Kan had been born near Lopburi of com­
moner parentse. 
18e. Although written some four years after the phu wiset upr1s1ng, the Marxist 
analysis also relates to a period of relative prosperity, before the effects 
of the depression were strongly felt .  
DRAFT STATEMENT ANALYZ I NG THE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY OF SIAM, 
AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ASSOCIATION, APPROVED BY THE 
SPECIAL ENLARGED COMMITTEE, MARCH 20 
(Translation from Chinese) 
Siam is an agricultural country, but since the imperialists came to 
sell goods the economy, which was formerly self-sufficient, has been up­
set to the point of long since being ruined. The basic agricultu ral 
product is rice, which accounts for 9 0 %  of the total annual exports,
going mostly to British colonries. The major import is cotton textiles, 
of which 80% or more come from Great Britainr. Cloth used to be woven 
in Siam, but now there is scarcely any in the market. Thai handicrafts 
are not exported at all, and raw materials are in short supply, insuffi­
cient for the in ternal needs of the country. Siam is therefore nothing 
but a great market for the imperialists. 
Formerly, since Great Britain and F rance had equal inf luence in 
Siam, Siam was called an independent country. Now it is clea r that 
Siam is really a dependency of Great Britain, as in 1855 the British 
were the first to force Siam to make a treaty of commerce.r1 The impor­
tant point of that treaty was that Great Britain got certain special
rights, namely the right to trade freely and the stipulation that im­
port duties were not to exceed 3% . When World War I broke out in Eu­
rope, the government of Siam had to send a contingent of soldiers to 
help the British.r2 The British Conrsul . . r. [note in Thai says that 
here the Chinese text is too faint to read] . . .  changed in many ways,
international courts or advisers . . r. .  Today the adminristrative power
in Siam remains in the hands of the British as before, while in the 
economy Great Britain overshadows all other countries. Of the annual 
trade of Siam, 80% and up of the exports are British, while for imports
the figure is 9 7 %  or more. Of the passenger vessels that enter the 
Gul f  of Siam in one year, one third or more of the tonnage is British, 
and British shipping is more than twice that of any other country.
Siam's mining in the northern Malay peninsula is completely conrtrolled 
by seven big British companries. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank has the 
power to dominate the financial affairs of Siam. The money which the 
government of Siam has borrowed to construct railways is all British 
and, moreover, the railway line from Bangkok to British Malaya is 
clearly wholly the property of the British. Considering all these 
things, administrative and financial power in Siam is in the hands of 
the British, and it is clear that Siam is a colony of the British im­
perialists. 
As time went by, differences developed between the British and the 
French in Siam. In 1887r3 France used military force to seize Thai 
1. Commercial treaties had been made with Great Britain in 1826 and the United 
States in 1833, but the 1855 treaty with Great Britain was the first in which
Siam was forced to cede rights impinging on Thai sovereignty. 
2. Siam entered the war on July 22, 1917. 
3. The date intended is probably 1893. 
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t erritory in order t o  make Siam a French Asian colony like Vietn am, but 
the French were oppos ed by the Britis h who wanted t o  cont rol Siam them­
selves. Great Brit ain and France t herefore agreed to  have e qual right s 
in Siam. But that sit uat ion has now changed--on the on e hand Siam has 
become a dependency of Great Brit ain as was shown, and on t he ot her 
hand the Unit ed States and Japan have recently c ome in and are competr­
ing wit h the British for influence. The Japanese in Siam, in addit ion 
t o  compet ing to  the utmost in c ommerce, in 1928 set up a special asso­
ciatrion t o  conc entrate t heir resources for expanding their influence in 
Siam, and t he Americans, going even furt her, from the t im� of t he Firs t 
World War becrame t he first t o  consider giving up t heir consular court 
right s in Siam, in order t o  remove British influence. I n  1925 the 
American adviser to  t he Ministry of Foreign Affairs4 wrot e openly atr­
t ac king the British, and recently t he Americans have estrablished a spe­
cial commercial associat ion in order t he bet t er t o  c ompete with t he 
British commercially and t o  exploit Siam. Therefore, in t he present 
state of divisions among t he imperialists t o  seize Siam, Great Britain 
versus the United States must be con sidered _the princ ipal split, fol­
lowed by Great Brit ain versus Japan and France, as in t he ot her coun­
tries of t he 'South Seas.r'5 
At present t he government administration in Siam is a system in 
which the royal family are mastrers of t he land with governing power. 
At the same t ime, as a result of t he imperialists sending in money 
t here has developed a class of compradores of businesses and banks who 
c urry favor wit h t hose holding royal power. Thus at present t he royal 
govern ment and t he compradore class, owners of t he land, are instru­
ments for delivering Siam t o  t he imperialists. Near t he end of t he 
nineteenth centur y  t hree areas in the region of Cambodia were trans­
ferred t o  France and four areas in t he Trenggan u  region were given t o  
Great Britrain.r6 Supposedly this was in return for t he surrender of 
consular court right s; but in fact it was like givin g away somethin g  
for not hing. The revision of t he unequal treat ies, as before, actually 
resulted in _treatries which still severely rest rict ed Thai sovereignty; 
for example, the foreign loans only resulted in t he imperialists fur­
t her seizing control of financial affairs. As  for j oining t he Allied 
forces in 1917, it only demon st rates subservience t o  t he British im­
perialistrs. The spoils seized from the German enemy in Siam, with the 
except ion of t he Legation, · all went to  t he Brit ish and Siam got not hing. 
In sum, Siam at present is act ually a colony of t he British, and t here­
fore t he British benefit from helping the government t o  rule as their 
agents of oppression. 
The imperialist s want t he absolute mon archy in Siam t o  be perpetu­
ated in order t o  preserve t heir instrument of opprression. They want 
t he royal government.t o  endure. The economic foundat ion of this gov­
ernment is apparen t - -t he royal family who have t he ruling power are 
large landowners. This is the import ant economic foundatrion of t he 
government,  and a means by which t he imperialists inc rease t heir influ­
ence and dominat ion in Siam. 
4. The adviser was Francis B. Sayre (see I). 
5. 'South Seas,a' a standard phrase in Chinese, was used to designate (approximately)
the maritime Southeast Asian region. 
6. The cessions of territory actually took place early in the twentieth century. 
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The result of this imperialist economic oppression will surely be 
the speedy ruin of the farmers. The government increasingly extorts 
high taxes, and the capitalists demand high rates of interest on loans. 
Oppression is pervrasive. The farmers, who are the majority, thus be­
come more impovrerished each day, and suffer increasingly. The numbers 
of thieves and bandits increase in proportion. Yet'rthere are many
well-to-do Thai farmers. The ordinary ones have SO or 10 0 rai each,7 
and those who rent land pay only �bout one tenth of their income in 
rent. Therefore some people think that the land question in Siam is 
not an important problem, and that as for poor farmers it is a question
of c apital rather than land. This kind of thinking is the thinking of 
those who still have an imperfect understanding of the situation. Even 
though it is not yet possiblre to describe in detail the basis for the 
farmers' struggle, nonetheless looking at the characrteristic s of op­
pression and the monopolization of land one c an at present distinguish
the following important points: ( 1 )  The royal family, who control the 
government, have the advantage, and thus use their privileges to expro­
priate more land each day. (2) H igh interest rates are demanded and 
the farmers are oppressed in evrery way, until the farmers no longer
make enough to pay their debts, and have to give up their land. (3) The 
imperialists want to profit from a rise in land pricres, and are going
around buying up farmers' land. (4) At present only one third of the 
l and of Siam has been cleared for c ultivration. If more is cleared in 
the future, the farmers will not benefit. The land of the farmers at 
present remaining will be taken away so that less and less is left, and 
land rents will become increasingly oppressive. (5 ) Farmers who are 
hired laborers are especrially oppressed. When the farming season is 
over their employers take all of their earnings and dismiss them with 
nothing. This is one common practice. Even worse is to hire them per­
manently and slowly bind them and get the advantage until they become 
slaves. Farmers who have no land must suffer oppression like this. It 
is clear that the struggle to revise the existing system of concen­
trated land holdings must break out someday, and the land problem will 
surely be the basis of the change of the system of government of Siam 
to that of democr acy. 
A consequence of the imperialists' corning to compete for profits
1 s  that for the Thai people money is increasingly tight. S ince the end 
of the First World War, it is apparent that money has become scarce 
just as in the various colonial lands of the 'S outh. S eas.r' Agriculture 
and manufacturing have to a large extent come to a standstill. Among
workers about 2 out of 3 are now unemployed. Many Chinese shops and 
factories have closed, as for example last year as many as 60 % of the 
rice mills c eased production. Because of this shortage of money, the 
royal government, in order to preserve its ruling power, has tried to 
improve the c ondition of the people, as for instance by lowering export 
duties, which is actually not of much importance in aiding industrial 
capital in the country, and by trying to improve the economic situation 
of the farmers, in hopes of postponing their political awakening. But 
this alleged improvement in the economic c ondition of the farmers, 
other than protecting the interests of the landlords, only amounts to 
the construction of some irrigation works in areas close to Bangkok. 
In addition, there are also what are called 'agricultural cooperatives,' 
but the result of these c ooperativres is only to c ollect high interest 
rates and oppress the farmers, not to make the farmers prosper.· The 
reason the farmers cannot be helped to escape from poverty is largely 
7 .  An area of one rai 1s equal to about 0 . 4  acrese. 
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because the imperialists maintain t heir advantage and are not wi l l ing 
to concede an yt hing at all, as  clearly shown in t he case of g i ving 11p 
the consular court s and revising the treat ies. As f or rai s i ng the  duty 
on import s from 3% t o  5% , it applies only to  ce rtain import s wh i c h .are 
small in quant it y  and are not necessit ies- -it st ill cannot b e  s a i d  t l1at 
Siam can set the dut y rates herself. E ven t hough when t h e  Unit e d  St ates 
and Great Britain were at odds over the t reaties, the Uni t e d  Stat e s  de ­
clared that it was wil l ing  t o  give up it s consul ar court right s in Siram, 
t his was only American policy, which uses the strat egy of wi thdrawal  to  
att ack Siam, whi ch is an even more vicious policy than before. To  think 
that t his is a concession by t he Amerircans would be a very serious mis­
understranding. 
Various Classes in Siam 
1 )  Siam has people of many races mixed toget her, as  in t he various 
colonial lands of the ' South Seas,' and all are similarly oppressed by 
t he imperialists. The people of Siam are of the Thai, Lao, Mon, and 
Malay races, as well as  many still uncivilized groups living in the 
jungle. Of t hose who have come from other count ries, the Chinese , In ­
dians, and Vietnamese are great er in n umber t han other nat ionali tie s .  
According t o  t he latest figures the t otal populat ion of Siam is ove r 1 1  
million. Of t hese t he Thai are t he largest group, fol l owed by t he Chi­
nese. In t erms of occupat ions, farmers a re t he largest group. 
2) Siam has more t han 300,000 monks. T his group, de pendent upon
t he rice of others for sustenance, is one inst rument for t he preserva­
t ion of t he power of royalty. They are land owners and lend mon e y  at 
high rat es of int erest. Although t hey a re of high standing, for t he 
most part t hey have studied t he principles of capitalism, like t he 
E uropeans. 
3) The royal family are a special class and few iri number. On the 
one hand t hey are great landowners, and on the othe r hand t hey rule as 
agents of t he imperialists. 
4) T he landowning class: all who have land, but do not work the 
land t hemselves are included in t he ' landowning class.' 
5) The compradores: agent s  of the imperialist s who import goods
and exchange t hem for agricultural product s t o  export are t he t rading 
compradores. In a ddition ,  there are banking compradores who lerid money 
to  t he farmers at high rat es of int erest . This class works close ly 
with t hose of rank and autrhority. 
6) Those wit h capital who sell goods in the vill ages: t his group
is closely associa t ed wit h t he landowners. They are clever in selling 
merchandise and loaning money to the farmers, asking  high prices and 
high rates of int erest, t hen waiting t o  g�t t he crop or confiscate the 
land. 
·
7) T hai capitalists:  history shows t hat persons of t his class can 
also join in t he struggle t o  change t he syst em of government.  But in 
Sia m t his group is very weak, and for t he most pa rt t hey combine with 
the ruling class t o  oppress t he poor classes. Even worse, some aid t he 
imperialist s  in vying t o  seize Siam as a colony of t his or t hat coun­
try (this is clearly seen in t heir showing approval of t he Americans-­
who are disciples of imperialism--belrieving that t hey have good int en-
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tirons toward Siam). Thus we see that this group cannot be with usr. 
Only the mas s es can be the force to oppos e i mperiali s m. 
8) The wealthy farmers : this group are i n  part farmers , i n  part 
landownersr. I n  Siram they are not few i n  number. They farm themsrelves , 
and als o i nves t money s eeki ng profit. When they have a lot of money
they go i nto trade and cons i der themsrelves s uperior, hiring either 
s easonal laborers or permanent laborers· who eventually become s lavesr. 
Thesre are ther_rwealthy farmersr. 
9) The f armers : ( a) The mi ddle level farmers : whether they farm 
thei r own land or f arm rented land, they make enough to s upport thei r 
famili es with perhaps a little left over. · Sometirmes they might hire 
s ome temporary farm labor, but they have no land to rent to othersr. 
Thes e are called middle level farmers . (b) The poor f armers : thes e 
are divi ded i nto two groups . One group farms a little land and c an 
make enough to s upport themsrelves , without having to hire thems el ves 
out to othersr. The other group cannot produce enough to live, and have 
to work as laborersr. 
10) Rural workers : this group are laborers working i n  farming or 
lumbering i n  the fores tsr. They are the propertyless people of the vil­
lages . In  Siam this group is large, and i n  the f uture i t  wi ll i n  the 
nature of thirngs get even larger. 
11) Thos e i n  i ndus try: Siam, although a country with a relatively 
poor economy, nevertheless has s ome large enterpris es (s uch as rai l� 
ways , s awmills , and cement factories), and these enterpris es have more 
than 3 000 workersr, all Thai or Chirnesre. E ven though at presrent the 
total number of workers is not yet known with certainty, i t  is apparent
that s i nce the end of the war i n  E urope there has been rapi d develop­
ment. 
Siam, in addi tion to always having had bandi ts and robbers caus i ng 
trouble i n  varirous provirncesr, has also had leaders gatherirng followers 
to foment rebelli ons i n  various places , as for example about the middle 
of last year there were many reports of oppos i ti on to the king. It 
s hould be remembered that upon i nvesrtigation i t  was found that thes e 
doings were not ai med at changing the s ys tem, but were caus ed by gov­
ernment offi ci als who had been dismi s s ed from their pos i tions ,  who con­
s pi red with local authoriti es to s ei ze power, acting only i n  thei r own 
s elf-interes t. It  was als o f ound that there were pers ons buying large 
quantitires of guns and ammunirtion from abroad. It  is clear that all 
this was being s upported behind the s cenes by the i mperialis ts .  But i t  
s hows that the reasron that the government i s  always divided i s  becausre 
the condirtion of the famrers is s o  bad. In  yet another casre, not too 
long ago merchants i n  Bangkok united to oppos e the collecti on of the .r_
capitation tax, clos i ng t heir s tores and s topping work for many days .r8 
This s hows that the divi s i on between the capitalis t clas s and the offi­
cial class will pers i s t  for a long time. 
In  s ummary: 1) Siam surely cannot remai n outs i de the his tori cal 
laws affecting the condi tion of all countries i n  this age, and i t  is 
pos s i ble that the country will be parti ti oned by the i mperialists .  The 
8. The reference is presumably to the Chinese strike of 1910. See G. William 
Skinner, Chinese Soaiety in Thailand: An Analytiaal History (Ithaca, N. Y. , 
1957), pp. 162-164. 
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pe op l e  of Sia m being in a situation l ike  th isr, it is natural that they 
mus t  un<lergo even greater suffering, and mus t  be  opprers s edr-b y  the royal 
power ,  wh ich is protected b y  the imperiali sts. The only way to escape
th is suffering is to destroy the impe ri alis ts and those who serve as 
th eir i nstru ments, and it is necessary to oppose the establishment of 
a national assemb ly and a constitution, wh ich would only b e  a �eans of 
de ceiving the people. 
2) Th ose Thai without property will now persuade the farmers to 
J oin the strugg le. The general slogan should b e  ''Beginr.b y  opposing 
rents and moneylenders, un til the owners are overthrown.r" This slogan 
means to oppose only the rich , farmers, becau se most of the middle level 
farmers should rally to our side. As for the poor f armers and ruril 
laborers, they should all b e  united with us. 
3) Up until this time, Siam has never experienced a violent strug­
gle to change th e system. But at present it is apparent that the class 
conflict is b ecoming increasingly intense, and e ven membrers of the offi­
cial class cannot get along with one another. The propertyless class 
should point out to the people that this strife is the result of the 
i mperialists scrambling to expand their influence in Siam. I f  distur­
b ances b reak out, we will not help either side. Our desire is that 
b oth sides b e  defeated, then immediately to u nite the people to strug­
gle against the imperialists, against the power of royalty, _and ·ragainst
the landowners. I f  there develops a split b etween the wealthy people 
and the royal class, then the propertylerss class should oppose royalty,
but at the same time should not b ecome intimate with the wealthy class. 
The struggle must continue until the propertyless class are the lead­
ers, holding absolute power. 
4) The conclusions of this analysis of the g overnment and economy 
of Siam are in accord with the procedurres for parties in the South Seas 
which the central association sent to the South Seas parties Octobrer 23 
of last year, and b oth can be  used as a guide to operations. 
Until the third meeting of representatives in the South Seas is 
held, thi s  document should b e  considered as only a draft. 
February 20, 1930 
Committee in Siam 
(A note in Thai says th at there f ollows more discussion of the commu­
nists' methrods of operation, but that the text is faded and can b e  read 
only in parts and that therefore it has not b een translated. Sig ned b y  
the head Chinese translator of.the Bangkok police, dated May 6, 1930. ] 
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VI.  THE ECONOM IC CRI S I S  
Introduction 
The Seventh Reign had begun amid severe economic difficulties, but 
a vigorous program of economy and ' retrenchment' in 1925o- 1926 succeeded 
in turning what had been sizeable deficits in the national budget into 
substantial surpluses. This satisfactory state of national finances 
continued for several years, until in 1930- 1931 the effects of the 
world depression began to undermine Siam'os financial position. The 
price of rice, the country' s principal export, dropped sharply, and 
government revenues fell far below expectations. In September of 1931 
Great Britain left the gold standard. Siam ' s  currency, the baht, had 
been linked to sterling and hence to gold, and on the recommendation of 
the British Financial Adviser, E. L. Hall- Patch, Siam cut the link with 
sterling and remained on a gold standard. In  late 1931 and early 1932 
the economic situation steadily worsened, and a major debate developed 
within the government over the proper policies to be followed. 
The issues involved were many and complex, but the main questions 
were whether Siam should abandon gold and return to a link with ster­
ling, in effect devaluing the baht; how the large expected deficit for 
1931/32 was to be budgeted for ; how great the cuts necessary in govern­
ment expenditure were and where they should be made ; and what realistic 
estimates were for government revenue and expenditure for 1932/33.o1 
The two major protagonists were the Minister of Commerce and Com­
munications, Prince Purachatra,o2 and the Minister of Finance, Phya 
Komarakul Montri, both backed by the foreign advisers of their respec­
tive ministries. The Minister of Finance and Hall-Patch stood firm for 
the classical policies of conservative finance, including maintenance 
of the gold link, at least until the budget w·as safely balanced, dras­
tic cuts to bring the budget into balance, and the use of conservative 
estimates of expected revenue in preparing the budget for the coming 
year. The Minister of Commerce and Communications and his advisers 
were less concerned with the technical aspects of finance--questions 
such as reserves, currency cover, and debt funding- -than with the ef ­
fects of the economic crisis on trade. Maintaining the high value of 
the baht, they argued, was making Thai rice uncompetitive in sterling 
bloc markets, which made up a major portion of Siamo's traditional ex­
port trade. They pointed to widespread economic distress in the 
There is extensive documentation on the economic cr1s1s of 1931-1932 1n the 
National Archives,  Seventh Reign, Ministry of Finance filesi. 
2 .  Prince Purachatra was a son of King Chulalongkorn and the leading figure in tech­
nological modernization in the last years of the absolute monarchy . While best 
known for his work as head of the state railway system,  he also made important 
contributions to the development of aviation, telecommunications, and highways 
in Siam. He became Minister of Commerce and Communications early in the Seventh 
Reign and in 1931 was made a member of the Supreme Council of State. 
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countryside,o3 and expressed the fear that further cuts in the govern­
mento' s  administrative expenses might have not only economic but polit­·o
ical repercussionso. Thus they favored relinking the baht to sterling,
limiting further cuts in government expenditureo, even if this meant 
larger deficits (they were wil ling to raid various reserve runds set 
aside for specified purposes if necessary to cover temporary short­
ages), and they took a more optimistic view of projected government 
revenue for 1932/ 33. Other ministers and advisers offered yet other 
opinions, differing in greater or lesser degree from these two basic 
positionso. Even Sir Edward Cook, the former Financial Adviser credited 
with successfully salvaging Siam ' s  financial position in 1925-1926, was 
sending advice from his new post in Egypto. Cook had chosen H all-Patch 
as his successor, but he now became increasingly critical -of the Hall­
Patch policy, especially on the question of maintaining the link with 
gold.4 
In the middle of these conflicting opinions stood the king, who 
had repeatedly made the point that he had little understanding of eco­
nomic matters (see I ) ,  but who nevertheless had to make all the final 
decisions.o5 In February of. 1932, when the divisions in the government 
over economic policy were most acute, Prajadhipok gave the �peech r�­
printed here to an assembly of military officers. The king began by 
saying that he felt that he ·o1 1was born to cut things down, ;' a reference 
to the retrenchment program at the beginning of the reign, to the re­
cent cutbacks, and to the further cuts anticipated, and then discussed 
the economic situation and possible rem�dieso. He  argued that if the 
government had made mistakes the mistakes were in not having taken cer­
tain steps rather than in any of the steps which had been takeno. Final­
ly, referring candidly to the split among his advisers and to hi� own 
difficult position, the king concluded :o6 
The financial war is a very hard one indeed . Even experts contradict 
one another Wltil they become hoarse. Each offers a different sug­
gestion. I myself do not profess to know much about the matter and . 
3 .  The Ministry of Commerce and CommW1icationsi' reports on rural economic conditions 
in the spring of 1932 are Sl.Dlllilarized briefly by the present editor in the Jou.ma.Z 
of the Siam Societyr, 61 : 2  (July 1973) , 192-193. 
4. In a letter to Raymond B. Stevens dated March 5 ,  1932 , Cook described Hall-Patch 
as "the best man I could find--on the salary which the Siamese were prepared to 
give" (National Archivesi, Seventh Reign, Ministry of Financei, 15.i1/4)i. 
5.  The - king ' s  difficulties were not helped by the fact that in the early months of 
the crisis he was being told by  his advisers that the world economy had been in 
an abnormal state since World War I ,  and that the world depression was only "a 
sudden return to normal conditions" (National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry 
of Commerce and CommW1ications, 8 . 1/1)i. 
6 .  The English translation of the speech is taken from the Bangkok Times,  February
13,  1932i. It should be noted that while the English version is probably not de­
liberately misleading, in places it softens the wording. In. the passage quoted, 
the phrase "I myself do not profess to know much about the matter • • •  " is in ., ., ., , ..
Thai 111l1 L l1 L tl'311Jt L 1tl'3fl1 1  L �U L tlU or ' I  myself know nothing at all about finan-
cial matters . • • •  ' (The original Thai text is in the National Archives , 
Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 21/5 . )  
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all I can do is to listen to the opinions of others and choose the 
best. I have never experienced such a hardship; therefore if I have 
made a mistake I really deserve to be excused by the officials and 
people of Siam. 
The king had made two shorter but similar speeches, also to military 
groups , in the fall of 1931, but they had received little notice .o7 
However, th� government decided to give the February speech maximum 
publicity, and in this it was successfulo. Th� full text was published 
in both the Thai and English language press in Bangkok and the complete 
English text was reprinted in Samaggi SaPa (see IV) in London, and the 
speech rapidly became one of the best known documents of the reign. 
The government-sup,orted Bangkok Times praised the king's forthright­
ness, 8 but others wondered if it were wise for an absolute ruler to 
make such a frank statement of the country's problems and the govern­
ment's inability to deal with them .  The American Minister described 
the speech as "almost an apology and a confession of lack of confidence 
in the Goveornment's policy,o" while the British Charge reported to Lon­
don that the speech "was, of course, intended to enlist the sympathy of 
the officers of the army and navyo. It seems to me, however, to be a 
somewhat risky experiment for an absolute monarch, ruling over a people
of whom the great majority are still uneducated, to confess to mistakes 
and doubts. Also, I cannot help thinking that it would have been bet­
ter not to have given it so much publicity.o"9 
The frequent references to the speech made by governments in the 
constitutional period would seem to confirm that such doubts were jus­
tified .  In 1936, for example, a government-approved school history 
text quoted from the speech as an illustration of the economic failure 
of the old regime,o1 0  while in a 1939 broadcast Prime Minister Phibun 
cited the speech as justification for the People's Party seizure of 
power in 1932 :ol l  
As to the then sorry plight of the country even King Prajadhipok in 
his address delivered to the officials at the Minister of Defence in 
B . E .  2474 alluded to the fact that he was at a complete loss himself. 
7. The Thai texts are in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry of War, 
1/37, the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 21/4, and the 
National Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/233. See also Prince Chula 
Chakrabongse, Loz,ds of Life: A Histoz,y of the Kings of Thaiiland (2nd edition, 
London, 1967), p. 308, and Prince Dhani, Chumn:um Niphon ,  pp . 15-18 . 
8 .  Bangkok Times, February 16, 1932. 
9 .  United States, Department of State, Despatches from Siam, 892.00 P. R. /35 (March 
9, 1932), Kaufman to the Secretary of State; Great Britain, Foreign Office Rec­
ords, F 2881/200/40 (February 15, 1932), Johns to Sir John Simon. A hand in the 
Foreign Office in London added the notation, "The King's speech is a very clear 
exposition of the state of affairs, but such an apologetic tone from an Eastern 
autocrat is certainly, as Mr . Johns points out, a departure from tradition which 
cannot be devoid of risk." 
4'
' -
10. PJ:'aJ.,Jatsat Sayam ("f :1fi�1flfiffl U1" ; History of Siam), Bangkok, 1936, p. 356. 
1 1 .  Bangkok Times , November 29, 1939. Phibun continued with a paraphrase of part 
of the speech. 
• • 
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In addition to questioning the political wisdom of the s peech, others 
noted that the king had violated one of the cardinal tenets- of finan­
cial policy by raising the possibility of a devaluati on before i t  had 
actually been decided upon and announced. Everything the king sai d was 
in fact true, but the government immediately took steps to create a 
different impressionr.r1 2  
The debate within the governrment over financial policy continued 
through th� early months of 1932, with almost daily meetings, increas­
ingly acrimonious debates, and an exchange of bitter letters and memo­
randa between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Communrications. The controversy was finally resolved with the 1 adoption
of the Ministry of Commerce and Communrications' point of viewr.- Hall­
Patch, finding his advice ignored, submitted his resignation in March 
and shortly thereafter the Minister of Fin ance was removed, in part
because i t  was discovered that he had failed to inform the k ing of a 
letter from Sir Edward Cook crirtical of Ministry of•rFinance policy.
The new budget was based upon Ministry of Commerce and Communricatirons 
figures, and a committee, headed by Prinrce Purachatra, was set up to 
study the questiron of going off the gold standard. As expected, the 
committee's report endorsed s uch a move, and in May the baht was onrce 
again linked to sterling.1 3  A number of new taxes were also intro­
duced, including a controverrsial and politircally unwise salary tax that 
affected mainly clerks and middle grade officials. 1 4  Whether these n ew 
12. National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry of Finance, 14/4. 
13. Prince Sithiporn (see III), who had j ust become Director-General of the Depart­
ment of Agricultural Research, was a member of the committee. He argued in 
favor of devaluing the baht as a means of stimulating agricultural exports, and
proposed a new value even lower than that finally adopted. 
14. The salary tax, which seta. off .a storm of protest in the press, has been de­
scribed elsewhere by the present editor (Jour>nal of the Siam Society,  61 : 2, 
July 1973, p. 193) as follows: 
The tax affected mainly middleclass government officials and employees of 
Western-style firms; in particular it left practically untouched royalty and 
the higher nobility, a major part of whose income was derived from sources
other than salaries, and the Chinese merchant class, who generally received 
no salaries as such at all. The government itself conceded that the tax was 
unfair, but defended it on the pragmatic grounds that the government lacked 
the bureaucratic capacity to administer a more equitable but more complex
general income tax. 
One consequence of the new taxes was a prophetic article by a French writer, 
published in Saigon in May and discussed in the Bangkok press before the coup,
which said in parta: 
Budget difficulties have always led to political changes, and Siam will 
not escape from the rule. An absolute monarchy which has been forced by 
events seriously to increase taxation could not long continue in the patri­
archal form; it has itself signed a decree for its modernisation. Such is
the inevitable, if not imminent, consequence of the economic and financial
crisis. 
(Translation from the Bangkok Timesi, June 4 ,  1932; on June 7 the Bangko k Times 
published a translation of comments on the article which had appeared in a Thai­
language paper.)  
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policies would have succeeded is impossible to say--before they had had 
time to show measurable results the absolute monarchy was overthrown on 
June 24 .n1 5  
15. There were some indications of improvement in the economic situation in May and 
early Jtme of 1932, especially in the rice trade (see the National Archives, 
Seventh Reign, Ministry of Commerce and Comnnmications, 8. 1/4), while the speed 
with which the economic crisis was overcome by the constitutional government 
also suggests that the policies of the fonner government may have had beneficial 
effects. 
ROYAL ADDRESS TO THE MILITARY, FEBRUARY 5, 1932 
To-day I heard that the Minister had collecoted the officers to­
gether in order to explain to them the financial position resulting 
from the depressed condition of the countryo. I have therefore. taken 
the opportunity to attend, and am also taking this opportunity - to make 
some explanations myself to my officer friendso. Almost always whenever 
I met officers I used to express my desir� to support the nationo'� 
armed forces and to effect progress in both the army and navyo. But • 
whenever I did so, I had afterwards to cut . one expe_ondi ture and then 
another, which should naturally indicate the futility of my intentions. 
As a matter of fact I had no intentiono-to deceive, but circumstances . 
presented themselves to force my action so that the resolutions turned 
into untruths. It is the same thing on this occasion, to my real re­
gret, and I do not know how to effect .further reductions. I personally 
feel that I was born to cut things down. From the beginning I haveo. 
been cutting and now I am forced to cut the more and I do not know what 
the future still holdso. I take it that it is my t?ad luck always to do 
so ; even now I have tri.ed all I can. to refrain from cµtting, but it is 
beyond me. Truly speaking the retrenchment at present in view makeso·ome 
feel more heavy at hearto· than on previous occasions.. Formerly I £el t 
that we had more men than l-{Or k , and hence I did not fee 1 th;i t my . act ion ·
was a matter of very serious momento. Also, theno- there were .oopenirigs 
outside which did not make the finding of the means of livelihood ao . 
hard mattero. Now, it is different, �nd I feel heavy at heart because 
I realise that the present cuts necessitate the abolishing of positionso. 
The fighting forces are already small in number, .and still more cuts 
have to be· made in their ranks .o· The same thing applies in other Minis­.o
trieso. I realize that the retrenched men willo. find more difficu�oties 
than formerlyo. It is at the thought of their inability to find some­
thing to do that I feel anxiety and sadness, and deeplyo·opity all those 
who will have to leaveo. If there is any means whereby I can beoof aid·o
to lessen their burden I am oniy too willing to do so ; but the present 
situation is beyond me and I am forced to order the cutso. Thereo·oare 
many ways whereby I cano·oavoid cutting, but these are worse than the 
cutting, as I shall proceed to explaino. 
Method I: We need not cut anything, either in regard to money or 
·the suspension of officials ; and this is an easy matter .o We can in­
crease our currency issue and as the notes are only paper, we can also 
order an increment in the salaries of officialso. Just because the 
notes are only paper, when these are not supported by capital, they are 
only worth what they really are, i . e .  papero. - When this is soo·othere is 
no value attached to them and they will be refused by traderso. Such a 
method would only mean an indirect way of cutting salarieso. It forms 
a deceit pure and simple. For instance, an official receives a salary 
of Teso. 100. He is actually paid a hundred pieces of useless paper. 
This being so a direct cut is more preferableo. An indirect cut does 
not only affect officials, but the whole country because it will bring 
down the value of money. Such a thing happened before. in Germany when 
currency notes issued were not backed by securitieso. A thing might be 
worth a thousand in the morning, while the same thing was declared to 
be worth three thousand in the eveningo! Those who have had prior ex-
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perience of  this method do not wish to experience it  again.  Other 
countriesn, thereforen, refrain from taking that as an examplen. This 
being so we should not try to i ssue such currency notes because if  we 
do s o ,  it  will not answer the purposes of the Services , but would only 
serve to show that the Government is  cheating . 
Method I I :  We may try to increase revenue by increasing taxesn. 
To collect such taxes from the poor is at present impossniblen. Hence 
we can only think of  taxing the wealthyn. At present taxes on the rich 
by increased tariffs have already been imposed and further increase is 
s t ill being contemplated . Even s o ,  after due calculations we find that 
with such increases our revenue is  still insufficientn. This is  because 
the wealthy among us are s t ill few in number when compared with other 
countriesn. Even take my own case , there are many who think I am the 
richest  man . But when compared with a rich Englishman or an American 
or an Indian Raj a ,  you will find that I am on the lowest  grade in the ir 
mids t .  Although I am not so well off,  I still submit to being taxed to 
the utmost without a grumble. As to levying taxes on the rich people 
there is  still a limit which means that the amount to be collected is 
still below our expectationsn. Even should we collect all the monies of  
the rich people in Siam and essay to divide these out , still not many
would be enriched therebyn. The Ratsadoirni1 would not get many Baht 
each , and such amassed money would only be wasted . Therefore the ex­
cess taxing of  the rich may poss ibly bring bad results in its train.  
It may affect trade and bring it  down because when the rich have no 
money to buy goodsn, trade will slacken. The maintenance of trade de � 
pends also on the ass i stance given it  by the rich . In any case we 
s ti ll have in mind to "fleece" the rich as much as possnible as we can 
not "fleece" the poor . 
Method III :  We may obtain loans from foreign countriesn. This can 
be donen, but if we cannot obtain revenue to cope with our expenditure , 
i . e .  if  expenditure is  still in excess of revenue , the pos ition is bad 
in respect of  such loansn. In the case of  an individual , law suits 
would occur, properties would be s e ized and bankruptcy would follow . 
It i s  the same with a countryn. If  there is  insufficient revenue and 
loans are obtaine d ,  its properties , such as railways , etc . , would be 
seized . Ultimately the country goes  bankrupt and our freedom would 
gradually come to an end . Certain precedent cases have already taken 
placen. I do not wish to see such happenings in Siam, and hence I do 
not wish to obtain loansn. This being s o ,  the only advisable thing to 
do is  to cut down expensesn. Therefore i t  is  highly incumbent on us to 
do away with certain posi tions to lessen work and j ust  maintain enough 
to carry onn. 
If  we should speak of hardships , I wish to say that the Ratsadoirn 
and the merchants have experienced these more than the Kha Rajakarn . i2 
In the case o f  the forme r ,  the ratsadorn and the mercantile clas s ,  
there has already been heavy retrenchmentn. Both the merchants and the 
peasants have had their incomes reduced more than the Kha Rajakarn .  
Even the rich people have experienced cuts in their way; for example , 
paddy land owners have had to pay paddy land taxesn, while the rents 
they obtain have been reduce d .  It i s  thus that you cannot say that 
they are quite happyn. But still when compared with the poor peasants 
1. Ratsadorn: people or subjects, especially as contrasted with officialdom. 
2 .  Kha Rajakani: government officials. 
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they are better off, because they :ohave enough to live upono. As a mat­
ter of fact the weal thy have already had their incomes cut ; but of 
those in the Government service only the ones enjoying high positoions 
have had their salaries cut, not those in low positionso. Further I 
would say that the Kha Rajakarn have received increments because of the 
low prices ruling in the marketo. Food is lower by a hundred per cento, 
equoivalent to an increment of a hundred per cent in payo. The val�e of 
money rests on its purchasing power. If a tical will buyo- a hundred 
ticals worth, then an earning of one tical is equivalent to a hundred 
ticalso. It is vice versa if a hundred ticals is only worth a tical in 
value. Ordinarily we do not stop to think of the purchasing power of 
our money ; we only wait to count its amount. When we experience a cut 
we realise the l ightness of our pockets. But if we pause to think that 
the purchasing power of our money is more we shall consider that we 
have had no cut at allo. Based on the past those in Government service 
should consider themselves fortunate in only experiencingo.othe cut after 
the otherso. But the t ime has now arrived .for such cuts and it is to be 
hoped that they will face the situation bravelyo. All throughout the 
country are requested to assist in bearing the load at this present 
junctureo. 
Now, if we should -think of what we should do to remedy the posi­
tion to increase our revenue, there seems to be only one way and that 
is we should try to have more produce for sale, most of which may be _derived from agriculture .  _oTherefore, firstly, we have to promot� agri­
culture. Secondly, to reduce the expenses of production with a view to 
easy saleo. Thirdly, the haulage freight by train or boat should be . re­
duced. Merchants complain of the dearness of the tical and wish to 
have it lowered in valueo. But in all three methods pointed out as 
being_ possible means of remedy we still require money, and before. all 
else we have to adjust the receipts and expenditure of the Government 
to balance, in order not to be indebted before taking any stepso. We 
may obtain loans from foreign countries if we consider the same to be 
beneficial to uso. It is the same with the idea of lowering the value 
of the ticalo. If we consider doing so when we are indebted to many in 
big amounts coupled with the fact of our expenditure being in excess of 
revenue, that will spell disaster and eventually the tical will ; be low 
in value, and may become mere scraps of papero. We haveo, therefore, to 
be cautious . When the position is properly adjusted and balanced we 
may aid trade ; but the lowering of the tical may only benefit those 
having goods to sell and will in no way benefit the Kha RaJakarn who 
have to pay more for their purchaseso. Indirectly this may benefit 
everybody in general, but this is a dangerous matter when chances of 
loss and gairi have to be taken into corisideration. We have to exercise 
care and· caution and when we have supported trade we may be considered 
to have supported other aspects of the country as wello. This is the 
step under consider�tion, but before we may do anything it  is necessary 
for us first to adjust the Government �alance. 
The majority of the Government officials .omay want to know what is 
going to be done about the various suggestions proffered by the Press 
that they have read. As a matter of fact I cannot tell you in detail 
just yet in regard to whether. there is to be a salary cut or abolish­
ment of positionso. In t ime the plans now under discussion will be made 
known, but we are trying our best to make the same as little painful as 
possibleo. · 
Another thing, there may be some who think that the present finan­
cial difficulty �xperienced by the Government is brought about by cer-
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tain fatal steps taken by itn. I agree that some mistakes have been 
made , but not by any steps that have been taken but rather by not hav­
ing taken such steps. We might have thought of cutting expenses ear­
l ier. If more officials had been dismissed and more expenses cut we 
would not have to do so much cutting now. We did not do this in time 
because we did not wish to place anyone in hardship. Dared not do it , 
in factn, and attempted to find ways and means that would enable us to 
refrain from suspending men. I have resolved all along to refrain from 
suspending anybody whatsoever. You may call it a soft heart on mynpart-
if you like. Ultimately the situation became worse , and hence the 
present difficulty. I confess  that it was a wrong step . Furthermore , 
we placed too much faith on the duties on imports and exports to save 
us taking a drastic s tep. But all  such hopes are devoid of results for 
the good. The hope that business  would improve l atterly cannot also be 
entertained because we cannot s ay when it will improve. Our mistake 
was based on the fact of too much soft-heartedness and too much reli­
ance on hopes. In no way must  the trouble be assumed to be due to a 
wrong measure taken , but to such measures not being taken at all ; that 
is how we are placed in such bad financial straitsn. It is hard to de­
termine what the future holds for us. On a previous occasion I have 
told you officers that we were already engaged in warfare , a warfare 
that was hardest to fight because the enemies were invisible. If we 
could see them we could send spies to discover their intention. But at 
present we cannot send our spies and hence cannot form a conjnecture as 
to their movementn. To guess  wrongly would only be worse for usn. Take 
the sale of our silver , for which we have been termed very �illy.n3 
This also may be classed in the fact of our not knowing the intention 
of our enemies. Who was to know that silver would go up in value? 
Also , no one knew that England was to give up the gold standard for the 
pound sterling. Apart from the Cabinet Ministers no other person in 
England knew· anything of such a step being contemplated . Therefore , in 
this case it is beyond us to frame a correct guess because we are not 
Devada4 or fortune tellers. The financial war is a very hard one in­
deed . Even experts contradict one another until they become hoarse. 
Each offers a different suggestion. I myself  do not profess  to know 
much about the mattern5 and all  I can do is to listen to the opinions of 
others and choose the best. I have never experienced such a hardship; 
therefore if I have made a mistake I really deserve to be excused by
the official s  and people of Siam. I hope you will realize my real posi­
tion in the matter and I trust that everyone will try to be brave to 
carry us through the crisis till the last obstacle is safely surmounted.  
I still have more faith in my officers than in others to show their con­
fidence in me and if they wish to spread a rumour let it be one of bene­
fitn, such as that everyone is prepared to support the Government to 
their fullest capacity to brave the tide. I have already said before 
that if an officer felt ill at heart in warfare all of the population 
woul d  lose or die or become s l aves of others. If our fighting forces 
always have strong hearts and are prepared to fight every time , we would 
ultimately win our battle. When such victory is secured it will encour­
age the rest of the people and we shall then succeed in surmounting all  
obstacles as we have done in the past. 
3 .  In the summer of 1931 the government had sold a part of its silver holdingse. 
4 .  Devada: supernatural beings, hence endowed with powers of prophecy. 
5 •e. See footnote 6 of the introduction to this section. 
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Therefore I ask you officers to assist by putting up a good heart 
in support of the resolution of the rest of the Thai iace to face the 
present crisis. 
1. 
VI I .  THE LAST CHANCE FOR POLITICAL REFORM 
Introduction 
In 1931 , King Prajadhipok made a long trip to the United States 
and Canada , the main purpose of  which was to seek medical attention for 
his deteriorating eyesight. During the course of his stay in the United 
States the king made several statements to journalists about the possi­
bility of introducing a measure of representative government in Siam , 
and following his return to Bangkok in October the king took steps
which indicate that he had modified somewhat his earlier views (see I ,  
I I )  on the inadvisability of any maj or changes in the system of govern­
ment of Siam. 
Early in 1932 , the king ordered his Minister of Foreign Affairs , 
Prince Devawongs Varodaya,n1 to submit a plan for a constitution allow­
ing a degree of representative government , which the king hoped to pre­
sent to the nation on April 6 ,  1932 , the 150th anniversary of the es­
tablishment of the Chakri Dynasty.n2 The actual drafting of the plan 
was turned over by the Minister to Raymond B .  Stevens and Phya Sri 
Wisarn Waja , two h�gh officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Raymond B. Stevens had been since 1926 the Adviser in Foreign 
Affairs to the government of Siam . He was ,  like Sayre (see I ) ,  an 
American and a Democrat , and had been active in New Hampshire politics, 
though not altogether successfully because , he claimed, of his high
ideals.n3 He had consistently maintained that Siam was not yet ready 
for major political changes ;  as he wrote in 1930 , " I  am of the opinion
after four years' service here in Siam that an unlimited monarchy is 
certainly for a considerable period of time the best government for the 
country.n"4 
Prince Devawongs Varodaya was a son of Prince Devawongs Varopakarn, half-brother 
of Chulalongkorn and Minister of Foreign Affairs for nearly forty yearsi. On the 
death of the elder Prince Devawongs in 1923 his son succeeded to his office, which 
he held until the 1932 coup. In 1931 he was made a member of the Supreme Council 
of State. Prince 'Devawongs Varodayai' was awarded his name by the king in 1929 , 
prior to which he had been known as Prince Traidos. 
In 1929 Prince Devawongs Varodaya had accompanied the king on a visit to Java, 
and on the orders of the king had made a study of representative institutions set 
up by the Dutch colonial administration. 
2. According to his own accountsi, it was Prince Chula Chakrabongse who first suggest­
ed to the king, during a visit to Bangkok late in 1931 ,  the appropriateness of the 
April 6 date . Prince Chula Chakrabongse ,  Brought Up in England (London, 1943)i, 
p .  164 ; The '1wain Have Met (London, 1956) , p .  156. 
3. Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 1903/1903/40 (January 28, 1927)i, Water­
low to Chamberlain. 
4 .  The quotation is from a March 10,  1930, memorandum from Stevens to Prince Bowa­
radej, in which Stevens argues against Prince Bowaradej ' s  proposal for a stronger 
press law. (National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 19 .2/7.) 
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Phya Sri Wisarn Waja had been educated in England and was the 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairso. Following the 1 9 3·2 
eoup he became the first Foreign Minister of the new regimeo. He had 
not been one of the ' promot�rs' of the eoup , and his selection was. un­
doubtedly due in part to the desire ·of the eoup group to reassure the 
Western powers and thus reduce the chances of foreign intervention ; 
Phya Sri Wisarn Waja himself told the British Minister in July of 1 9 3 2  
that he had been invited to become Minister of Foreign Affairs ••�t the 
point of a bayonet.o"o5 
In early March of 1 9 3 2 , Stevens and Phya ·Sri Wisarn Waja submitted 
a draft "Outline of Changes in the Form of Government" together with 
comments upon ito.o6 The contents ofo- these documents have been summa­
rized elsewhere by the present editor as follows :o7 
. .
• • • In fact Stevens and Phya .Sri Wisarn Waj-a did draw up an outline 
plan for change in the political system which was submitted to the 
Supreme Coun
.
cil of State in great secrecy in March 1932i. The plan 
was strikingly similar to that actually implemented by the constitu­
tional regime. It called for the appointment of a prime minister and 
the removal of the King from the everyday affairs of state (since
Chulalongkorn' s  days the absolute monarchs had in effect served as 
their own prime ministers)i. The prime minister was to preside over 
a cabinet responsible to a legislative assembly, and it was recom­
mended that the assembly be composed ofi.iequal numbers of appointed 
and elected members, the eiected members to be chosen by a:n indirect 
process. The·imain differences between the proposal and the system 
actually  put into practice after June 1932 were that thei.iSupreme
Council of State would be retained,. al though with a modified member­
ship and functions, and that exte.nsive powers, at least of a ' vetoi' 
nature, would be reserved for the monarchy. In  separatei· c.omments on 
the proposal , both Stevens and Phya Sri Wisarni- Waja maintained that 
the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Siam was both in­
evitable and desirable; both however expressed doubts that the proper 
time had come, pointing to the level of education among the general 
public as well as the d�ger of major changes which mighti. disrupt a 
government already beset by economic crisis. The long, slow process 
by which a degree of constitutional government had been achieved in 
Burma and other countries was cited. Both therefore opted for a 
policy of gradualism, and suggested that local municipal governing
assemblies be introduced at once, but that the question of a national 
assembly be deferred. Stevens went further and also recommended the 
immediate appointment of a prime minister, a · change which hei.deemed 
important but not fundamentali. 
However, April 6 came and went without any significant political 
changes, and less than three months later the absolute monarchy was 
oveorthrown. One would l_ike to know how the dec·is ion not to implement 
any of the proposals of Stevens and Phya Sri Wisarn Waja was reached, 
but thus far little evidence has come to lighto. The proposals and 
5 .  Great Britain, Foreign Office Records , F 6563/4260/40 (July 28, 1932)i, Dormer to 
Sir John Simon. 
6 .  Stevens was probably the ·actual author of the "Outline," as evidenced by  the 
style, the content, and the secretarial notation "RBSi:SP" at the end. 
7 .  Jou:PnaZ of the Siam Soaiety, 61 : 2  (July 1973) , 191 .  
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comments were dated March 8 and 9, and on March 12  copies were sent to 
Prince Damrong with a covering letter from Chao Phya Mahithon,  the head 
of the Royal Secretariat, saying that the king had ordered the docu­
ments sent in order that they be considered and discussed in the Su­
preme Council of Stateo.o8 As the king hoped to announce the changes by 
April 6, the meeting of the Supreme Council presumably took place in 
the latter part of March. Unfortunately the minutes o f  such a meeting 
are not known to exist, and it is possible that the king solicited the 
opinions of the members of the Supreme Council individually rather than 
in a formal meetingo. 
However, there is an important piece o f  later evidence bearing on 
the decision not to implement any political changes in the spring of 
1932. Four days after the June 24 coup which overthrew the absolute 
monarchy the British Charg6 went to see Prince Devawongs Varodayao. The 
prince said that even if asked he would not remain as Minister .oof For­
eign Affairs as "he could not work with those now in power,o" ando9 
He then referred to the constitution and told me that some six months 
ago the King had instructed him to draw up a constitution to be pre­
sented to the people on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the 
Chakri dynasty, that is to say, on the 6th April last. However, the
Princes had opposed this project and the King had to give way, al­
though His Majesty had warned them at the time that the inevitable 
result would be a coup d ' etat and a military dictatorship. This had 
now happened and the Princes were reaping the results of their own 
actions. Prince Devawongs mentioned no names, but he was obviously
referring to the members of the Supreme Council, as these would have 
been the only Princes whom His Majesty would have consulted in such 
a matter. 
In March of 1932 the Supreme Council of State had six members: 
Prince Boriphat, Prince Damrong, and Prince Naris, the three surviving 
members of the original five (see I) , and the Prince of Lopburi, Prince 
Purachatra, and Prince Devawongs Varodaya, who had been appointed fol­
lowing the deaths of Prince Bhanurangsi and the Prince of Chantaburi. 
As noted above, it is uncertain wl1ether a formal meeting took place to 
discuss the proposed political changes, and if such a meeting did occur 
it is possible that Prince Damrong and the Prince of Lopburi, who were 
unwell,o1 0  and Prince Naris, who often missed meetings, did not attendo. 
But regardless of whether the decision was reached at a meeting, or 
through the soliciting of opinions individually, or a combination of 
the two, the statement of Prince Devawongs Varodaya indicates that a 
majority opposed the king's plano. On the basis of their positions 
8. The covering letter (in Thai) and copies of the outline proposal and the com­
ments of Stevens and Phya Sri Wisarn Waja (all in English) are in the National 
Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/242. 
9. Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 5918/4260/40 (June 29, 1932), Johns to 
Sir John Simon. 
10. In March of 1932 Prince Damrong was recovering from a serious illness, and he 
is known not to have attended meetings of the Supreme Cowicil on March 16 and 
18, and the Prince of Lopburi also missed the latter meeting (National Archives, 
Seventh Reign, Ministry of Finance, 14/5). The Prince of Lopburi had been in 
poor health for years, and following a boating accident and the strenuous cere­
monies in connection with the April 6 anniversary he died on April 8. 
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taken on earlier issues, it  seems likely that Prince Damrong and Prince 
Naris would have been part of the opposition maj ority, while the evi­
dence of Prince Devawongs Varodaya imploies that he and the king favored 
poliotical changes . The positions of the three remaining members of theo. 
Supreme Council, Prince Boriphat, Prince Purachatra, and th� Prince of 
Lopburi, are problematica1.o1 1  In any case, it is unlikely that �ajor 
changes in the system of government would have been undertaken without 
virtually unanimous agreement among the high princes of the toyal fam­
ily, and it should also be recalled that both Stevens and Phya Sri 
Wisarn Waja, the authors of the proposed plan, had been opposed to im­
plementing its more revolutionary provisions.o1 2  
In his comments on the proposed.oplan, Phya Sri Wisarn Waja notes 
that "there are rumours current that· there will be ano. attempt to over­
throw the government at some future occasion.o" Such rumors were wide­
spread in Bangkok in the weeks before the ceremonies in early April 
marking the 150th anniversary of the dynasty, not only because of the 
economic and, to a lesser degree, pol itical d iscontent, but specifi­
cally because of a prophecy, said to have been made by the founder of 
the Chakri dynasty, that the dynasty would last only 150 years-- a  
prophecy which proved to be remarkably accurate insofar as the abso­
lute power of the dynasty was concernedo. 
11 .  Post-aoup rumors held that both Prince Damrotlg and Prince Boriphat had opposed 
the king ' s  plans for political reform. -Concerning Prince ·iDamrong, who often 
described himself as· a conservative, it is likely that the rumors were correct, 
but in the case of Prince Boriphat the evidence is more ambiguous ·(see I) . 
Prince Boriphat ' s  alleged opposition was attributed in part to the fact that 
the king had no children and Boriphat was regarded as a likely successor to the 
.. 
throne. 'Nai Honhuai, '  c:haofa Pra,chathipok ( l 11'11111 ::t1t1Jn ; Prince Praj adhi­
pok)i, Bangkok, 1948, p .  97. 
12. Several of the published accounts mention that the king w�s considering granting
a constitution on the April 6 anniversary, but the details given are frequently 
inconsistent with the dotuments and evidence presented here, especially as re­
gards chronology. See for example Wichai Prasangsit, Phaendin,rSomdet Phfaa 
Pokklao, pp. 173-185, and Prince Chula Chakrabongse ,  BPOught Up in England, p .
164. 
A. AN OUTLINE OF CHANGES IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
There is submitted herewith, in accordance with the wish of His 
Majesty, an outline of a new constitution, together with a brief ex­
planation. 
In general the plan involves the beginning of a parliamentary form 
of government. In theory His Majesty still remains the Chief Executive 
and Law-giver. As Chief Executive, however, He acts through a Prime 
Minister who is responsible to His Majesty for the administration of 
the Government. The Prime Minister and Cabinet is [are] under the plan 
also subject to certain supervisory powers of the Legislative Council. 
His Majesty as Law-giver will act with the aid of the Legislative 
Council composed in a substantial part of elected representatives. 
It is not assumed that the plan presented herewith is either com­
plete or perfect. It is put forth as a basis for consideration and is 
limited to certain main principles. Obviously many details would have 
to be worked out later. 
The Government under this proposal would be as follows : - ­
(a) The Monarch 
(b) Supreme Council 
(c) Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(d) Legislative Council 
Supreme Council 
The Supreme Council will be retained with certain modifications. 
It should be a small body of not more than 6, and shall be appointed by 
His Majoesty. The term of office shall be as at present--during His 
Majesty �s pleasure- -and not for a fixed period.
I 
The Supreme Council should act purely as an advisory body to His 
Majesty on matters of general policy. 
. No member of the Supreme. Council shall at the same time serve as 
Prime Minister or member of the Cabinet. Furthermore the Council shall 
not sit with the Cabineto. 
If members of the Cabinet may also serve as members of the Supreme 
Council the influence and position of the Prime Minister might be seri­
ously weakened. 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Appointment 
The Prime Minister shall be selected by His Majesty and shall be 
responsible to His Majoesty for the administration of the Government. 
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There should be no limitation upon the King ' s  power of selectiono. 
He should be free to s el ect the most capableo· man for the position with­
out regard to any factors except his qualifications for the Officeo. 
If the Prime Minister is to be responsible for the .adminisotration 
of the Government he should have the right to choose hiso. Cabinet Minis­
terso. A complete delegation to the Prime Minis ter of- the power of ap­
pointment would be however too drastic a changeo. It is therefore sug­
gested that the choice of the Prime Minister should be subject to con­
firmation by His Maj esty . 
Term of Office 
The Prime Minister and Cabinet members shall be appointed for a 
fixed period and at the expiration thereof their resignations mus t be 
offered to His Majesty .  They should however be eligible to re-appoint­
mento. The term of office should be the same a� that for the Legisla­
tive Council, so that a new Council and a new Prime Minisoter and Cabi­
net should come into office at the same timeo. This plan would permit 
changes to be made as a matter of cours e  and without compelling His 
Majesty to exercise his sovereign power of removalo. His Majesty would 
also have the right at any time to request  theo.oresignation of the Prime 
Ministero. Whenever the Prime Minister resigns, either-voluntarily ·or 
on request , the members of his Cabinet shal l also  tender their resigna­
tionso. 
The Prime Minister shall preside over Cabinet - meetings and will 




The Legisolative Council should be large enough to be representa­
tive of the publico. On th.e other hand it should not, at the beginning, 
be too la!ge, since a numerous body is unwieldly and slow to acto. 
It is suggested that the Council should be not more than 75 or 
less than so ·. · 
The Legislative Council may be composed entirely of appointed mem­
bers or solely of elected members or .of a combination of the twoo. A 
purely appointed Councilo.owould not have sufficient independence and 
would not be considered by the public as representativeo. On the other 
hand a Council composed entirely of elected members might not have 
sufficient number of persons of experience and judgment in public af­
fairso. It is therefore suggested that at the s ta�t the Legislative 
Council should be equally divided between appointed members and elected 
memberso. 
Of the members appointed by His Majesty not more than half should 
be at the same time Government officialso. With this limitation His 
Majesty should be free to select such members as he deems fito. 
The Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet shall be members of 
the Legislative Council ex-officioo. 
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If the Legislative Council is to exercise some power of supervi­
s ion over the administration, together with the right to pass a vote of 
lack of confidence, it is essential that the Prime Minister and the 
members of the Cabinet should have at least the right to sit and speak 
in the Councilo. Whether they should also have the right to vote is a 
debatable questiono. If the underlying purpose is eventually to estab­
lish a Parloiamentary Government, then these executives should be full­
fledged members of the Councilo. 
Election and Qualifications of Voters 
The method of election shall be indirect, that is, the voters of 
each Amphur shall choose electors who will meet together and elect by 
ballot the representatives for the Monthon. Since the Amphur districts 
vary in population from 70 thousand to as low as 3, 4 and 5 thousand 
the number of electors must be based on populationo. 
Voters must be nationals and reside in the Amphur or Amphurs where 
the voti�g takes placeo. They must also pay a certain amount of taxo. 
The Monthons, of which there are ten, also vary in population from 
Nakorn Rajasrima with 2 � o800,000 to Phuket with only 24,000. The number 
of represoentatives from the Monthons should also vary according to the 
population in order that the Legis lative Council may approximate a 
truly represoentative bodyo. 
The election of the members of the Council shall be by majority 
voteo. In case any Monthon fails to elect its representative or repre­
sentatives His Majesty shall fill the vacancy by appointmento. 
Qualifications of Members of the Council 
They must be Siamese nationals and at least 30 years of age, able 
to read and write and must pay a certain amount of taxo. No elected 
member shall at the same time hold any other Government positiono. 
Term of Office and Meetings 
Members of the Legislative Council should be elected for a fixed 
period of either 4 or 5 years. This term should be the same as fixed 
for the period of office for the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
The Legisloative Council should meet at least once each yearo. It 
may be called in a special session at any time by His Majesty and may 
also be dissolved by His Majestyo. 
Functions of the Legislative Council 
1. Legislative 
All  laws proposed by the Prime Minister must be submitted to the 
Council for its approval. The Council may adopt amendments or altera­
tions. Furthermore the Council may initiate legislationo. 
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The Budget shall be submitted to the Council by - the Prime Minister . 
In case of disagreement between the Council and the Prime Minister over 
the Budget the matter shall be referred to His Majestyo. 
Treaties and agreements or arrangements with Foreign Powers do not 
have to be submitted to the Councilo. 
His Majes ty has the power of veto on any legislation approved by 
the Council. Furthe·rmore His Majesty may ino. any emergency or whe'never 
in His opinion the public interest or security requires it, enact leg­
islation without reference to the Legislative Councilo. In ��se of any 
veto His Majesty shall in a message to the Council set forth the rea­
sons for His action . 
2 .  Administrative 
The Council may interpellate the Ministers on any matter affecting 
the Governmento. The Ministers are bound to give explanatjons unles s 
incompatible with public interest .  
The Council may, by 2/3 majority, pass a vote of la�k of confi­
dence in the Prime Ministero. In such case the Prime Minister and Cabi­
net must tender their resignations to His Majestyo. His Majesty may 
accept or refuse· to accept as he deems proper in the public interest .  
3 .  Organization. 
The Council may select its own presiding officer and shall adopt
rules for its deliberation and work. 
Ordinarily all meetings of the Council shall be in publico. The 
Council may, however, by a: majority vote, go into executive session 
which shall be secreto. 
RBS : SP 
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B. MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CHANGES 
IN  THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
I have doubts whether it is �dvisable to adopt in its entirety the 
proposed plan for a new constitutiono. I express these views with some 
diffidence as I fully realize that my knowledge of the Siamese people 
is limitedo. On the other hand I have had a long experience with popu­
lar government .  I am not one of those who believe that unlimited mon­
archy should continue to exist indefinitely in Siamo. The time will 
undoubtedly come when some disotribution of power will have to  be madeo. 
I do not believe however that that time has yet arrivedo. 
There is one marked difference between the two important aspects 
of the proposed plan : - -The creation of a Prime Minister and the crea­
tion of a Legislative Council with both legislative and administrative 
functions. While the creation of a Prime Minister �ould be an impor­
tant change it cannot be deemed fundamentalo. At present His Majesty is 
His own Prime Minisoter and exercises His power as Chief Executive 
through responsible ministerso. The experiment of a Prime Minister can 
be tried without serious consoequences even if it should prove unsuccess­
fulo. 
The creation of a Legislative Council with a subsotantial number of 
elected members exercising both legislative and executive functions is 
of quite a different categoryo. It is extremely difficult to withdraw 
political power once granted to  the peopleo. As a rule such organiza­
tions when once created tend inevitably to acquire more powero. Accord­
ingly such experiments should not be made until it is clear that, in 
the words of Lor� Bacon, ''The necessity be urgent or the utility evi­
dent . '' I do not believe a Legislative Council would render the Govern­
ment of Siam more efficient or wiser than the present Governmento. Also 
I do not believe a desire for some form of popular government is wide-
spread among the peopleo. 
I t  is true that a period of depression such as now exists in Siam 
always creates some re-action against the Government in powero. However, 
His Majesty's Government is not responsible for the economic depres­
siono. Since in large measure the present unres t is due to economic 
reasons and not because of dissatisfaction with the form of Government 
it is not advisable to attempt to allay that unrest through changes in 
the constitution . 
In stating the opinion that the greater part of the Siamese people 
are not yet fit to  take part in the national Government I would not be 
understood as casting reflections on the natural capacity of the Sia­
mese race as compared with the Burmese or other Easotern races where 
elected Legislative Councils now existo. In  fact the capacity of the 
Siamese for government has been amply shown by the achievements of mem­
bers of the Royal Family and officials of the Governmento. The situa­
tion in Burma is fundamentally different from the situation in Siamo. 
Burma for many generations has been ruled by an alien power. Naturally 
there exists in Burma a wide-spread feeling against English ruleo. Siam 
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has been, on the other hand, always ruled by its own people and the 
Siamese people have been loyal to theiro.orulers ; 
Furthermore in Burma the people have had po·l itical training through
their participation in local Government for many years before the crea­
tion of the Legis lative Councilo. In  Siam so far there is no form of 
real local self governmento. The best method of training a people for 
self government is to give them first some control over and responsi­
bility for their local interests with which they are in direct contacto. 
I would suggest as a safe course that the changes to be made in 
the immedi ate future in ·siam should be restricted to the creation o-f a 
Prime M inister with a fixed ter� and the creation of municipal govern­
ments and that the quest ion of the estab l ishment of a Legislative Coun-
cil should be deferred.  
.
(Signed)oRaymond B. Stevens 
Office of Adviser in Foreign 
Affairs, 9th March, 1932. 
RBSo: SP 
C. MEMORANDUM 
1. In compliarnce with the Royal Command, a plan for the institu­
tion of government by Prime Minister and for the establishment of a 
Legislative Council has been drawn up. 
Owing to the limited time at our disposal, this plan has been 
worked out with a certain element of haste and there is no pretension
that it i s  perfect or final. 
2 .  I n  practice it will be found that the success of the plan 
would entirely depend upon the question of personnel. This is all the 
more so in the case of the Prime Minister a nd the Cabinet. The choice 
of the Prime Minister is of extreme importance. 
3. The establishment of a Legislative Council, however, implies 
a very fundamental change in the present constitution. It constitutes 
the first step towards parliamentary government, and when once it is 
set up, the tendency will naturally be to extend its activities a nd in­
crease its power. 
4. I s  the present an opportune time to effect a fundamental 
change in the constitution? 
There is at present a feeling of dissatisfaction prevailing amongst 
a certain class of people, brought about primarily by the world economic 
depression. I n  order to meet the financial situartion the government
has been reluctantly compelled to make drastic cut [ s] in government ex­
penditure and to impose new emergency taxes. These measures will to a 
certain extent increase the feeling of discontent with the government.
I n  these circumstances there are rumours current that there will be an 
attempt to overthrow the government at some future occasion. Although 
some of these rumours appear to be wild and unreliable, yet it would be 
wise for the government to be prepared for all eventualities. I n  
time[ s] like this, it is imperative that there should be a feeling of 
confidence and unity amongst all the members of the government. There 
should be no change which would weaken the power of the government. 
The answer to the question rarised at the beginning of this para­
graph is tha t much depends upon the effect of the change that is pro­
posed. Until the present financial crisis is over, no change in the 
constitution should be a dopted which would have the effect of weakening 
the power of the government. 
5. In order to insure the satisfactory working of a Legislative
Council, it is essential that the members of the Council should possess 
a certain amount of training in the work which is to be entrusted to 
them. I n  this respect the experience of our neighbours may be of in­
terest to us. Both in I ndia and Burma, no Legislative Council was set 
up until the inhabitants have had [ had had] some local training in self 
government. The best training for local self government would seem to 
be the establishment of municipalities in the more advanced parts of 
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the countryo. I n  the case of Burma municipalities �ere set up as early 
as 1884 , but the present Burma L�gislative Council was not set up till  
192 3 .  
I n  the case of Siam , a ·1aw for the setting up of municipalities 
has now been drafted. It is respectfully submitted that the draft law 
should be examined and , if found agreeable,  should be adopted and put 
into forceo. This will  enable the local communities to gain some ex- · 
perience in self government .  When sufficient experience has been 
gained in this way , a L�gislative �ouncil could be set up with aocer­
tain measure of confidence that it wil l function well  and wisel y .  
Saranromya Palace 
Bangkok 9th Marcho, 1932o. 
(Signed) Phya Srivisar 
[Phya Sri Wisarn Waja] 
2. 
VI I I .  LETTER ON THE EVE OF THE COUP 
Introduction 
Late in May of 1932, Prince Dhani , the Minister of Public Instruc­
tiono, sent King Prajadhipok a copy of a statement of Mussolini on edu­
cation policy in Italyo, which stressed the role of education as a bul­
wark of the political ideology of the stateo. On May 27 the king wrote 
the comments translated here , which were incorporated in letters of 
June 1 from the royal secretary to Prince Dhani and the members of the 
Supreme Council of State.o1 
In his comments, Prajadhipok alludes again to the difficulty of 
restoring the prestige of the absolute monarchy (see I) ,  and then men­
tions possible alternative political systemso. It should be noted that 
"dictator" and "fascisto, "  as used by Prajadhipoko, did not have the 
meanings they would come to have in later yearso. Hitler had not yet 
come to power in Germanyo, and the only ruling fascist party was that 
in Italyo, where the government was credited by many with having re­
stored political and social ordero, and instilled a sense of national 
purposeo.o2 
This was to be one of the last political documents of the absolute 
monarchyo. On June 8 the court left Bangkok for the seaside palace at 
1. The text in the king's hand is in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry 
of Public Instruction, 1/1; the letters to Prince Dhani and Prince Damrong are in
the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 38/17, and the 
Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/247 .  
Early in 1929 there was a lively debate in the Thai-language press of Bangkok as 
to what constituted a 'dictator' and whether such an institution would be benefi­
cial to Siam. One newspaper reported the rumor that Prince Boriphat would be
made 'dictator,' and added the hope that the rumor would prove to be true. (The
relevant newspaper clippings are collected in the National Archives, Seventh
Reign, Ministry of the Interior., 2 6 . 4/75 . )
At the same time the Bangkok Times (March 4, 1929) was quoting an article in 
Samaggi Sara pointing to Fascist Italy as a model for Siam, while shortly after
the 1932· aoup the s<ame paper, which was never critical of Thai governments on
major questions, translated with favorable comments excerpts from an Extreme-Asie 
article approving the new regime, which said in parta: 
· we have yet to learn w�o will be the Mussolini of the new Siamese Fascist 
State. If there is no lasting head, we fear that the People 's Party may 
prove to be singularly like the Chinese Kuomintang and become the occasion
of frequent internal difficulties. In the interests of the very sympathetic 
Siamese people themselves, may this fear prove groundless! 
Two days later the Bangkok Times published, again approvingly, an article and a
sympathetic analysis of the Thai coup from the August 4 Times of London, which 
concluded, "Outwardly the new regime is democratic, though there are features in 
the Constitution which suggest that in practice and at the outset it will be a 
one-party Government of a mildly Fascist complexion" (Bangkok Times, August 27
and 29, 1932). 
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Hua Hin--a factor of importance in the timing of the doup , as many of 
the plotters were reluctant to take ariy act·ion which might involve the 
king personally, while others feared that the use of  force iri �angkok 
while the king was in the capital would strengthen opposoition to the 
coup . The journey was by train, with a sto� in Nakorn P�athom to visit 
the famous temple and attend a boy s cout ceremony. The king made a 
short speech to the assembled scouts that was probably his last public 
statement as absolute ruler, in which he admonished them to l ove their 
country and their rel igion, but never to the point of denigrating the 
race, country, or rel igion of  otherso. He stressed that all of  the 
great rel igions ,taught noble moral values, and urged the scouts to re­
spect and· admire the virtues and accomplishments of  peoples of every 
race and creed. The speech passed virtually u-nnoticed, but it was a 
message of tolerance characteristic of PTajadhipok, and an appropriate 
end to his long and often difficult years as the -l ast absolute king in 
a rapidly changing world.o3 - . 
· 
Two weeks later the absolute monarchy in Siam came to an end.o-
3. The text of the speech (in .Thai) is in the National _ Archives, Seventh - Reign,
Royal Secretariat, 21/1.
It was a theme that was not characteristic of some of the writings of Vaj ira­
vudh or, to an even greater degree, some of the policies of governments of the 
early constitutional period. Not surprisingly,  the extreme nationalist phase of 
- the late 1930i1 s and early 1940 ' s i·isaw the development of something of a cult of 
Vajiravudh, reviving his. reputation which in the years immediately following his 
death had not been h_igh, while Praj adhipoki' s s.tanding wa� correspondingly low. 
TEXT 
(Note: The italics are in ·the originali, and the words in quotation 
marks are in English in the original . ]  
This is very "interesting." They are able to teach their children 
to support the fascist system of government, but can we teach the Thai 
people to support the "absolute monarchy"? I very much doubt it, for 
if we begin now it is alPeady too lateo. 
I feel  that it is no longer possible to restore the support and 
the respect for the monarchy that existed in the former days, because 
the fathers of present - day students have been criticizing the monarchy 
until it has become habitual. 
Our country uses a "Dictatorship" system of government, but our 
system is not like other "dictator" systems. On the contrary, it has 
many characteristics of a "democracy . "  Thus it is a sort of half-and­
half, and we haven't really decided which system we will follow. We 
fear that if we don't use the system of "democracy" the Westerners will 
call  us "unciviolized .o" The Italians needn't worry--if people criticize 
them they can ignore it. So because of indecision, our country is 
"between two stools." Actually, if we adopted the "Fascist" system 
and established a "fascist party" it might be desirable and the best 
"way out." But could we do it? If not, perhaps we should prepare for 
a change to a "Consotitutional Monarchy" at the earliest possible moment, 
and direct education along that path. 
Prajadhipok 
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IX. THE MONARCHY IN TRANSITION 
Introduction 
In the early hours of June 24, 1932 , a small group of military and 
civilian officials seized control of the government and brought to an 
end the absolute monarchy in Siam. Relations between the king and the 
new leaders began badly, went through a period of mutual accommodation 
and cooperation, and then again deteriorated as irreconcilable differ­
ences emerged. These differences ultimately led to the abdication of 
King Prajadhipok on March 2, 1935, and the publication of his explana­
tory statement translated here. • 
On the day of the aoupr, with success still uncertain, the People's 
Party (as the aoup group was known) distributed a leaflet attacking 
Prajadhipok and his government which the aoup leaders subsequently re­
pudiated as extreme, but which, they said, they had thought justified 
as a tactical meaiure to gain public support. It read' in part:o1 
·When the present King succeededi. his brother to the Throne, some 
people at first expected him to rule with justice for the good of his 
subjects. Their hopes did not materializei. The King was above the 
law as before. He appointed his relatives and incompetent favourites 
to important positions without listening to the voice of the people_. 
He allowed dishonest government officials  to abuse their power , such 
as by receiving bribes in government building projects and buying
supplies, seeking profits in the exchange of government money, and 
spending public money extravagantly.i· He .elevated
.
the royal class and 
gave them many privileges so as to allow themi·to oppress the common 
people. He rules without any guiding principle. Asi· a result,  the 
destiny of the nation was left at random, as evidenced by economic 
depression and t�e miseryi- and hardship of the people, which is gen­
erally known. The absolute monarch was unable to remedy these 
wrongs. • • • 
The King ' s  government rules dishonestly with deception. I t  has 
made the people believe it would promote their economic well-being·. 
But the people have waited .in vain. The rulers even insult thei. 
people, who feed royalty with their taxes,  that they cannot have a 
voice in government affairs because they are still stupid. Such a 
statement is nonsense. If  the people are stupid then royalty is 
stupid too , because both are of the same race . That the peoplei. are 
less educated than the royalty is due to the fact that the royalty 
deliberately withholds their educational opportunities. The royalty 
fears that when the people are educated they will be able to compre­
hend the evils of their rulers • • i. .  
1 .  The translation is taken from Thawatt Mokarapong, Histocy of the Thai Revolution :  
A Study in Politiaal Behavior (Bangkok, · 1972) , pp. 244-245. Dr. Thawatt ' s  book 
is the fullest accowit in English of the backgro.und .and immediate consequences 
of the aoup ; see however the comments of the present ed�tor in the Jo1,{PYUJ,l of 
·the Siam Soaiety, 61 : 2  (July 1973) , 185-195. 
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At the same time that this denunciation of  the king and his administra­
tion was being circulated the coup leaders were inviting Prajnadhipok to 
remain on the throne under a constitution , adding that should he refuse 
he would be replaced by another member of  the royal family or Siam 
would become a republic . Praj adhipok' s final act as absolute monarch 
was his decision to give up his powers and return to a capital held by 
hostile forces rather than risk civil war in Siam , and thusn, noting
that he himself had been cons idering granting a constitution , he agreed 
to remain as a consntitutional monarch , and the possibility of a violent 
confrontation was averted.n2 The court returned to Bangkok from the 
seaside palace at Hua Hin ; the members of  the royal family who had been 
detained ,  who included Prince Damrong and Prince Naris (Prince Pura­
chatra had escaped by train to warn the king) were released; and Prince 
Boriphatn, whom the coup leaders regarded as the strong man of the old 
regimen, agreed to live abroadn. The Supreme Council of  State and the 
Committee of  the Privy Council were abolished, and a temporary Consti­
tution promulgated. A permanent Constitution was then drafted whith 
appeared to resntore a measure of  power to the monarchy ,n3 and on Decem­
ber 1 0 ,  following a ceremony at which the c o up leaders expressed regret 
for the criticism of  the king and the dynasty made at the time of the 
coup , the new Constitution was proclaimed amid elaborate rituals and 
national celebrations. It  seemed that Siam had made a uniquely peace­
ful and succes s ful transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional 
rule. 
However ,  1933  was to be a year of  political difficulties in which 
the high hopes and good will o f  the first months o f  constitutional gov­
ernment were rapidly dissipated. Early in the year Pridi presented his 
celebrated economic plan ,n4 which brought out into the open deep divi­
sions already existing within the government and precipitated a consti­
tutional crisis. The more conservative faction within the government
gained the upper hand, and in April the Assembly was closed, certainn· 
provisions of. the Constitution were suspended, and Pridi was sent 
abroad ' to study . n' But two months later the military , with Phya Phahon 
rather reluctantly at the head, again overthrew the government , and the 
Assembly was reopened and Pridi recalled to join the government ,  al­
though it was made clear that there was no question of  reviving his 
controversial economic plan. Rumors of  further political unrest to 
2 .  The king ' s  reply to the coup leaders said in parti: 
Physically I am not strong. I have no children to succeed me. My life­
expectancy is not long, at least if I continue in this office. I have no 
desire for position or for personal aggrandisement. My ability to advance 
the progress of the race alone constrains me. 
(From the translation in Kenneth Perry Landon, Siam in TPansition, Chicago, 1939;
reprinted 1968, p .  10.)  
Dr. Thawatt ,  in Histoey of the Thai Revoilution, Chapter 4 ,  argues that in fact 
the royal powers were more illusory than real , and Prajadhipok ' s  abdication 
statement confirms that in practice this was the case. 
4. On Pridi ' s  plan see Landon, Siam in TPa:nsition, particularly the documents in 
Appendix III ,  pp. 260-318, and Pierre Fistie, Sous-Developpement et Utopie au 
Siam: Le 'Prograrrvne de Reforrnes Presente en 1933 par Pridi Phanomyong (Paris, 
1969) , which includes a French translation of Prajadhipok ' s  critique of the plan. 
Prajadhipok ' s  objections were originally published in Thai , and Fistie ' s  book has 
also recently been translated and published in Thai . 
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come were widespread , and in October Prince Bowaradej led provincial 
troops agains t the Bangkok government.n5 After fierce fighting on the 
outskirts of Bangkok the rebels were repulsed. The king ' s  only public 
s tatement during the rebellion �xpressed his regret that Thai were 
fighting Thai , and he consequently incurred the enmity of  both s ides , 
each of  .which felt that his public support would have insured its quick 
success.  Despite the rebellion the government went ahead with the 
s cheduled .November elections to choose one half o f  the members of the 
National Assembly , and the king himself was present at the election for 
the province of Songkla. 
Relations between the king and the government had been s trained 
since the 'second aoupi' of June 193 3 ,  and the October rebellion made 
matters more difficultn. Late in 1933 the king decided to go abroad for 
further treatment of his eyes , despite government requests that he re­
main in Siam and offers to bring specialists to Bangkok. In January of  
1934 the king left Siam never to return , going first  to Java for a re­
union with Prince Boriphat and other leading members of  the royal fam­
ily , and then to Europen. With the king out of the country the gulf
between the king and the government grew wider .  The king complained 
that various government �easures infring�d both on traditional royal
prerogatives ,  such as the right to grant pardons in the case of death 
sentences , and on new constitutional powers , such as the right to have 
a voice in the selection of appointed members of the National Assembly , 
and he also called for the release of political prisoners. He argued 
that so long as the government was not truly democratic  the role of  the 
monarchy should be more than a ceremonial one , and he proposed various 
constitutional and other changes which would have had the effect ofn· 
considerably increasing royal powers , ·warning that if his proposals 
were not accepted he would have no choice but to abdicate. The govern­
mentn, aware of the high regard in which the king wis held by the people
and of the value of the monarchy as a unifying symbol , did not want the 
king to abdicate , but on the other hand it was unwilling to agree to 
his proposalsn. In  len_gthy negotiations the govenrnment "attempted the 
impossiblen- - that isn, to try to prevent the King from abdincating and at 
the same time to turn down his proposals in the most  tactful and polite 
' 6way .' In November of 1934 a special govetnment mission was s ent to 
England to see the king , but no agree�ent was reached , and following
the government's final refusal ofn- his termsn, Prajadhipok signed the 
abdication instrument on March 2 ,  1935. 
The abdication s tatement s ummarized Prajadhipok ' s  case agains t 
the government ; the government replied by publishing a large volume of 
documents concerning the negotiations between the king and Bangkok.n7 
5 .  Although this is always described as a royalist rebellion, Prince Bowaradej ' s  
motives remain somewhat obscure. Prince Bowaradej was on bad tenns with several 
of the highest members of the royal family, and before the 1932 coup had been in 
contact with Phya Phahon and other dissidents and had been considered a possible
leader of a plot against the_ absolute monarchy. The government claimed that 
Prince Bowaradej wanted to puti_ihimself on the throne. One consequence of the 
rebellion was the imprisonment for eleven years of Bowaradej ' s  younger brother, 
Prince Sithipom (see II)i. 
6. Thawatt Mokarapong,iHistor>y of the Thai Revolution, p.  223. 
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(Government Report on the Abdication of King Prajadhipok) , Bangkok, 1935 , 456 pp . 
This volume includes (pp. 101-116) the text of a December 1934 memorandum (in 
1 0 0  
Prajadhipok was the first Thai king to abdicate since the mid-eighteenth 
century, when the next to last king of the Ayutthayan l ine gave up the 
throne; 8 paradoxically, this las t absolute monarch abdicated because he 
consnidered the government not to be sufficiently democratic. The his­
tory of Thai democracy in the succeeding forty years has been one of 
viciss i tudes, and in recent years Prajadhipok's abdication statement, 
with its strongly democratic flavor, has been frequently cited and 
quoted by proponents of democracy in Siam,9 and Prajadhipok himself has 
received belated recognition as a central figure in modern Thai politi­
cal historyn. 
The translation of  the s tatement given here is from the Thai text 
1n the government volume; the Thai text has been republished a number 
of times, as, for example, recently in Chalee Iamkrasninthu, edi torn, 
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. 1Buang Lang Phra Pokk 1,ao  Sa la Ra tahasomb a t  ( L 1Jfl'3\Jl'a-3Yt1 ::ufl L Ott'lfl'a:  11'1!fllJllfl ; 
Behind the Abdication of King Prajadhipok),  Bangkok, 1973, pp.n· 4 6 6 - 4 71,n1 0  
and (with one paragraph missing) in Sat Kan Muang, pp. 38-40n. There is 
an English translation in the New York Times , March 4, 1935; an English 
translation of excerpts in the Times of London of the s ame date, re­
printed in Thawatt Mokarapong, His tory of the Tha i  Revo lution , pp. 249-
251; and yet another English translation in Landon, Siam in Trans ition , 
pp . 257 - 2 5 9 . 
Thai) by Prajadhipok, frequently reprinted in recent years, which elaborates the 
arguments of the abdication statement. The king objected particularly to having 
no role in the selection of the appointed members of the Assembly, and to the
fact that under the 1932 constitution only a simple majority was required to 
override a royal veto of an Assembly act, and this in an Assembly which was half 
nominated by the government. The king said that his various demands were put
forward not because he wanted power--in fact he was "thoroughly tired of poli­
tics"--but because he could not continue to bear responsibility while having no 
real authority (p. 110) . 
The government's position in the dispute was summarized in English in M.
Sivaram, "Siam in Transition,"  Siam Today, July 1936, pp. 33-39. (Siam Today 
was a government publication ; Madhvan Sivaram was an Indian national who for 
many years worked for English-language newspapers in Bangkok, and who wrote sev­
eral books on the early constitutional period. ) Landon has concluded that "The 
impartial reader finds the king's demands moderate,"  and "Few kings have come
through political revolution as unscathed, and with such dignity as King Praja­
dhipok" (Siam in Transition, pp. 40-43)a. 
8. There are indications, however, that had he lived longer King Mongkut would have 
abdicated in favor of his son Chulalongkorn. (See also footnote 10. ) 
9. See for example Chai-anan Samuthwanich, editor, Sat Kan Muang (Bangkok, 1971) , 
p. 300. 
10. This work includes the text (pp. 15-16) of a confidential record of a meeting 
held only days after the aoup at which Prajadhipok, citing particularly his eye
problems, discussed with the leaders of the new government the possibility of 
abdication. The king noted that even before the aoup took place he had been 
considering such a step, and that both Mongkut and Chulalongkorn had also con­
templated abdication. 
,  
KING PRAJADHIPOKo' S  ABDICATION STATEMENT 
' 
Noel, Cranl�igh, England 
When Phya Phahon and his party took control of the government by 
force on June 24,o. 1932, they sent me a message inviting me to remaino. as 
a constitutional monarch. I accepted on the. ,understanding that Phya 
Phahon and his party wouldo_ establish a constitution like those in other 
countries using this system, so that the people would have the. right to 
express their views on the administration of the country and policies 
affecting the public welfare. I was already in favor of sue� a system 
and waso· considering how such a change in the administration of Siam 
could be made without upheaval. Since the eoup had taken place and the 
leaders said that they wanted only to establish a constitution which, 
in fact, was also my intention, I thought that for the sake of order 
and peace in the country it was proper for me to go along with their 
wishes. I tried to assist in maintaining good order so that this im­
portant change could be made as smoothly as possible, but my efforts 
were without avail, because the new leaders _failed to establish real 
political freedom, nor did they truly listen to the wishes of the peo­
ple. From the two Constitutions it can be seen that the power to carry 
out various policies rested solely with the Peopleo' s  Party and their 
supporters, not with the elected representatives of the people .o For. 
instance, the temporary Constitution made it clear that anyone not hav­
ing the support of the People's Party could not serve as a member of 
the National Assembly. The permanent Constitution was an improvement,
owing to representations I made, but still one half of the membership
of the Assembly was appointed. I agreed to having two categories of 
members in the hope that the second category members, whom I was to 
appoint, would be chosen freely from those with ability and experience 
in government administration, without regard to their party affilia­
tion, so that they might assist and guide the elected members. But 
when the time came to appoint second category members I had no voice 
at all in their selection, and the government chose practically all 
from among its supporters, regardless of experience. Also, some mem­
bers of the Peopleo' s  Party favored making radical changes in the eco­
nomic policy of the country. This caused a split within the Peopleo' s  
Party, leading, upon the recommendation of the government then in 
power, to the closing of the Assembly and the suspending of some sec­
tions of the Constitution, which resulted in political unresto. Subse­
quently Phya Phahon and his group again seized power by force, and ever 
since then the hope that changes could be effected smoothly has dimmed. 
Because the Peopleo' s  Party did not establish real political free­
dom, and the people had no opportunity to _express their opinions before 
important policy decisions were made, a rebellion broke out, with Thai 
killing Thaio. 
When I asked that the Constitutiori be revised to make it truly 
democratic so that it might satisfy the public, the government and its 
supporters, who now hold absolute power, would not agree. I asked that 
the people be given an opportunity to express theiro· views before changes 
were adopted in important policies affecting the public welfare, but 
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the government refused. Even in meetings of the Assembl y on important
questions, such as my various requests, the members did not have an 
opportunity to study the questions carefull y  and in detail because they 
were pressed to reach a decision immediatel y in a singlre session. Fur­
thermore, the government promulrgated a l aw for the suppression of per­
sons accused of polritical crimes which is contrary to universal l y  
accepted principlres of justice in that the accused have no opportunity 
to defend themselves in court and the proceedings are by secret trial 
before a committee--a procedure which I never used even when I had 
absolute powers. I asked that this procedure be abandoned, but the 
government refused. 
I feel that the government and its party empl oy methods of a dmin­
istration incompatiblre with individual freedoms and the principlres of 
justice. I am unablre to agree to any person or any party carrying on 
such a government in my name. 
I am will ing to surrender the powers I formerl y exercised to the 
peopl e a s  a whol e, but I am not wil l ing to turn them over to any indi­
vidual or any group to use in an autocratic manner without heeding the 
voice of the peoplre. 
Now I see that my desire that the peoplre have a real voice in the 
affairs of the country has not been ful fil l ed, and as I feel that there 
is no l onger any way for me to assist and protect the peopl e I there­
fore desire to abdicate and l eave my position as king as from this time. 
I wish to renounce al l my kingl y privilreges, but to retain al l the 
rights which were mine before my accession to the throne. 
I do not wish to exercise my l egal right to name a successor. 
Furthermore, I have no desire that anyone create a disturbance in 
the country on my behal f; if anyone uses my name in this connection, it 
shoul d be understood that it is done without my approval or support. 
I deepl y regret that I am no l onger abl e to serve my people and my 
country in accordance with the hopes and intentions which I inherited 
from my forefathers. I can but pray that Siam will prosper and that 
the peopl e wil l have happiness. 
PRAJADHIPOK 
March 2, 1935 
